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REGARDING PSYCHOLOGISTS TESTILY: LEGAL
REGULATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
ASSESSMENT IN THE
PUBLIC SCHOOLS*
DONALD N. BERSOFF**
From its beginnings in World War I, the use of psychological tests
has become so widespread that it is likely that every person in the
United States has been affected in some way by the results of such
tests.' Testing has become the means by which major decisions about
people's lives are made in industry, hospitals, mental health clinics,
the military, and, most pertinent here, the public schools. Tests
themselves, by and large, are facially neutral. They do not inherently
discriminate against those who take them and, undoubtedly, scores
derived from tests have been used to admit, advance, and employ. For
most people, however, test results have served as exclusionary
mechanisms - to segregate, institutionalize, track, and deny access to
desired goals. It is the unjustified negative consequences of psychologi-
cal testing that have evoked legal concern, and it is the law's response
that this Article explores.
Although testing affects virtually all Americans, 2 its most
pervasive use is in the public schools. It has been estimated that more
than 250 million standardized tests of academic ability, perceptual and
motor skills, emotional and social characteristics, and vocational
* @1980 Donald N. Bersoff. All rights reserved. A revised version of this Arti-
cle will appear as a chapter in 3 Perspectives in Law and Psychology: Testing and
Evaluation (B. Sales ed. 1980).
** Associate Professor, University of Maryland School of Law; Professor of
Psychology, The Johns Hopkins University. B.A. 1958, M.A. 1960, Ph. D. 1965, New
York University; J.D. 1976, Yale University.
1. Contrary to popular belief, however, it was not Binet, his enthusiastic
American adopters (e.g., Terman, Goddard), or the World War I test developers (e.g.,
Otis) who initiated the testing movement, but the Chinese of 3000 years ago. "[Tihey
invented the psychological test, applying it to government, the very framework of
their society, in such manner that the test-makers, in effect, determined over many
centuries much of the format of Chinese society." Dubois, A Test-Dominated Society:
China, 1115 B.C. - 1905 A.D., in TESTING PROBLEMS IN PERSPECTIVE 29 (A. Anastasi
ed. 1966). For brief histories of the testing movement in this country, see Crissey,
Mental Retardation: Past, Present, and Future, 30 AM. PSYCH. 800, 803-05 (1975);
Cronbach, Five Decades of Public Controversy Over Mental Testing, 30 AM. PsYcH. 1
(1975); Laosa, Nonbiased Assessment of Children's Abilities: Historical Antecedents
and Current Issues, in PSYCHOLOGICAL AND EDUCATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF MINORITY
CHILDREN 1-6 (T. Oakland ed. 1977). For a black psychologist's perspective, see R.
GUTHRIE, EVEN THE RAT WAS WHITE: A HISTORICAL VIEW OF PSYCHOLOGY (1976).
2. See D. GOSLIN, THE SEARCH FOR ABILITY, passim (1963).
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interests and talent are used annually in education. 3 Tests are used in
conjunction with almost every major educational practice: screening,
placement, program planning, program evaluation, and assessment of
individual progress. 4 But because tests have been used to exclude and
segregate, they are alleged to have undermined "the American public
school ideal promoted by educational reformers in the last century,
whereby the school would serve as an object lesson in equality and
brotherhood by drawing students from every social, economic and
cultural background into the close association of the classroom. "15As a
result, testing, the means by which it was hoped schools would most
effectively and efficiently attain this ideal, has suffered heavy
criticism. In the words of one commentator, the results of testing may
"place an indelible stamp of intellectual status ... on a child. . ., and
possibly do irreparable harm to his self-esteem and his educational
motivation."6
[Testing] may lead to a narrow conception of ability.
It may emphasize individual competition and success rather
than social cooperation, and thus conflict with the culturation of
democratic ideals of human equality. It may foster conformity
rather than creativity. It may involve cultural bias. It may neglect
important intangibles. It may, particularly in the case of
personality testing, involve unwarranted and offensive invasions
of privacy .... It may reward specious test-taking skills, or
penalize the lack of it [sic].7
3. 0. BRIM, D. GLASS, J. NEULINGER, I. FIRESTONE, & S. LERNER, AMERICAN
BELIEFS AND ATTITUDES ABOUT INTELLIGENCE 1 (1969); M. HOLMAN & R. DOCTER,
EDUCATIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING 3-4 (1972).
4. Screening involves identification, usually through group tests, of those that
may need special attention. Placement involves evaluation for entrance into special
education programs or ability tracks, usually through the administration of
individual assessment devices. When used for program planning, tests help determine
specific curricula and intervention methods. Tests used for program evaluation assess
the efficacy of instructional programs. When used to measure individual progress,
they serve to monitor academic achievement in those educational programs. J.
SALVIA & J. YSSELDYKE, ASSESSMENT IN SPECIAL AND REMEDIAL EDUCATION 14-16
(1978).
5. Sorgen, Testing and Tracking in Public Schools, 24 HASTINGS L. J. 1129, 1137
(1973) (citing H. MANN, THE REPUBLIC AND THE SCHOOL; THE EDUCATION OF FREE
MEN 8, 32-33 (7th ed. 1957)).
6. Ebel, The Social Consequences of Educational Testing, in TESTING PROBLEMS
IN PERSPECTIVE 18, 20 (A. Anastasi ed. 1966).
7. Id. Ebel also offers recommendations for averting these adverse consequences
and lists briefly the consequences of failing to test. For supporting and contrary
views, see A. ANASTASI, PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING 45-64 (4th ed. 1976); H. BLACK,
THEY SHALL NOT PASS (1963); L CRONBACH, ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING
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Although criticism of testing from social, political, and psychologi-
cal commentators spans six decades, only in the last fifteen years have
legal scholars begun to examine its use.8 Two trends may explain this
rather current interest. First, there has been an increased judicial
scrutiny of educational practices, and, second, with desegregation of
the schools ordered, psychological and educational tests have been
criticized as devices used to hamper integration. Test results have been
298-307, 509-15 (3rd ed. 1970); M. GROSS, THE BRAIN WATCHERS (1962); B. HOFFMAN,
THE TYRANNY OF TESTING (1962); L. KAMIN, THE SCIENCE AND POLITICS OF IQ (1974);
G. ROBB, L. BERNADONI & R. JOHNSON, ASSESSMENT OF INDIVIDUAL MENTAL ABILITY
20-24 (1972); J. SATrLER, ASSESSMENT OF CHILDREN'S INTELLIGENCE (1974); W.
WHYTE, THE ORGANIZATION MAN (1956); M. YOUNG, THE RISE OF THE MERITOCRACY
(1958); Anastasi, Psychology, Psychologists, and Psychological Testing, 22 AM.
PSYCH. 297 (1967); Bernal, A Response to "Educational Uses of Tests With
Disadvantaged Subjects," 30 AM. PSYCH. 93 (1975); Bersoff, Silk Purses into Sow's
Ears: The Decline of Psychological Testing and a Suggestion for its Redemption, 28
Am. PSYCH. 892 (1973); Cleary, Humphreys, Kendrick & Wesman, Educational Uses of
Tests With Disadvantaged Students, 30 AM. PSYCH. 15 (1975); Cronbach, Five
Decades of Public Controversy Over Mental Testing, 30 AM. PSYCH. 1 (1975); Deutsch,
Fishman, Kogan, North & Whiteman, Guidelines for Testing Minority Group
Children, 20 J. Soc. ISSUES 129 (Supp. 1964); Jackson, On the Report of the Ad hoc
Committee on Educational Uses of Tests with Disadvantaged Students: Another
Psychological View from the Association of Black Psychologists, 30 AM. PSYCH. 88
(1975); Jorgensen, IQ Tests and Their Educational Supporters, 29 J. Soc. ISSUES 33
(1973); Kamin, Social and Legal Consequences of I.Q. Tests as Classification
Instruments: Some Warnings from Our Past, 13 J. SCH. PSYCH. 317 (1975); Laosa,
Nonbiased Assessment of Children's Abilities, in PSYCHOLOGICAL AND EDUCATIONAL
ASSESSMENT OF MINORITY CHILDREN 10-11 (T. Oakland ed. 1977); Lippman, The
Abuse of the Tests, 32 NEW REPUBLIC 297 (1922); McClelland, Testing for Competence
Rather Than for "Intelligence," 28 AM. PSYCH. 1 (1973); McNemar, Lost: Our
Intelligence? Why?, 19 AM. PSYCH. 871 (1964); Mercer, Psychological Assessment and
the Rights of Children, in 1 ISSUES IN THE CLASSIFICATION OF CHILDREN 130 (N.
Hobbs ed. 1975); Reschly, Nonbiased Assessment, in SCHOOL PSYCHOLOGY:
PERSPECTIVES AND ISSUES. 215, 230-35 (G. Phye & D. Reschly eds. 1979); Samuda,
Problems and Issues in Assessment of Minority Group Children, in MAINSTREAMING
AND THE MINORITY CHILD 65 (R. Jones ed. 1976); Williams, Black Pride, Academic
Relevance & Individual Achievement, 2 COUNSELING PSYCH. 18 (1970). See generally
Testing and Public Policy, 20 AM. PSYCH. 857 (special issue: M. Amrine ed. 1965);
Assessing Minority Group Children, 11 J. SCH. PSYCH. 294 (special issue: B. Phillips
ed. 1974). See also authorities cited note 118 infra.
8. CENTER FOR LAW AND EDUCATION, CLASSIFICATION MATERIALS (rev. ed. 1973)
[hereinafter cited as CLASSIFICATION MATERIALS]; D. KIRP & M. YUDOF,
EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW (1974); Bersoff & Miller, Ethical and Legal Issues
in Behavioral Assessment, in DESCRIBING LEARNER CHARACTERISTICS OF
HANDICAPPED CHILDREN AND YOUTH 131 (D. Sabatino & T. Miller eds. 1979); Kirp,
Schools as Sorters: The Constitutional and Policy Implications of Student Classifica-
tions, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 705 (1973); Ruch & Ash, Comments on Psychological
Testing, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 608, 610, 615 (1969); Shea, An Educational Perspective of
the Legality of Intelligence Testing and Ability Grouping, 6 J.L. & EDUC. 137 (1977);
Sorgen, Testing and Tracking in Public Schools, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 1129 (1973); Yudof,
Equal Educational Opportunity and the Courts, 51 TEX. L. REV. 411 (1973); Note,
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seen as tools of discrimination denying full realization of the
constitutional rights of racial and ethnic minorities. 9 As a result, since
the mid-1960's there has been much litigation and legislation affecting
the administration, interpretation, and use of psychological tests.
This Article will examine psychological testing in the public
schools. It will survey recent judicial examinations of educational
practices, consider the role of psychological testing in efforts to block
desegregation, and evaluate current legislation concerning the testing
process. The Article will then examine the implications for personality
testing of the test subjects' privacy rights, and finally, discuss how
Legal Implications of the Use of Standardized Ability Tests in Employment and
Education, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 691 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Legal Implications];
Comment, Ability Grouping in Public Schools: A Threat to Equal Protection?, 1
CONN. L. REV. 150 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Ability Grouping]; Note, The Legal
Implications of Cultural Bias in the Intelligence Testing of Disadvantaged School
Children, 61 GEo. L.J. 1027 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Cultural Bias]; Note, Hobson v.
Hansen: Judicial Supervision of the Color-Blind School Board, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1511
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Judicial Supervision]; Note, Segregation of Poor and
Minority Children into Classes for the Mentally Retarded by the Use of IQ Tests, 71
MICH. L. REV. 1212 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Segregation]; Comment, Equal
Protection and Standardized Testing, 44 Miss. L.J. 900 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Equal Protection]; Comment, Constitutional Law - Limiting the Use of Standardized
Intelligence Tests for Ability Grouping in Public Schools, 51 N. C. L. REV. 1564 (1973);
Note, Equal Protection and Intelligence Classifications, 26 STAN. L. REV. 647 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Intelligence Classifications]; Note, Educational Testing: A
Challenge for the Courts, 1973 U. ILL. L.F. 375 [hereinafter cited as Educational
Testing]; Note, Constitutional Requirements for Standardized Ability Tests Used in
Education, 26 VAND. L. REV. 789 (1973). See generally Horowitz, Unseparate But
Unequal - The Emerging Fourteenth Amendment Issue in Public School Education,
13 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1147 (1966); Kirp, Law, Politics, and Equal Educational
Opportunity: The Limits of Judicial Involvement, 47 HARV. EDUC. REV. 117 (1977);
McClung, Competency Testing: Potential for Discrimination, 11 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 439 (1977); Teitelbaum & Hiller, Bilingual Education: The Legal Mandate, 47
HARv. EDUC. REV. 138 (1977). For a discussion of psychologists' perspectives on the
law's impact, see Oakland & Laosa, Professional, Legislative, and Judicial Influences
on Psychoeducational Assessment Practices in Schools, in PSYCHOLOGICAL AND
EDUCATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF MINORITY CHILDREN 21 (T. Oakland ed. 1977).
9. "Such devices are now being used by deceptive, inept, or simply indifferent
school boards to smokescreen the daily violation of individual rights." Cultural Bias,
supra note 8, at 1040. There appears to be no case law and little discussion of the role
tests play in sex discrimination among students in the public schools. Sex
discrimination is barred by 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1977). Implementing regulations to that
statute forbid a recipient of federal funds to:
[A]dminister or operate any test or other criterion for admission which has a
disproportionately adverse effect on persons on the basis of sex unless the use
of such test or criterion is shown to predict success accurately and alternative
tests or criteria which do not have such a disproportionately adverse effect are
shown to be unavailable.
45 C.F.R. § 86.21 (1978). See also Flaugher, The Many Definitions of Test Bias, 33 AM.
PSYCH. 671, 674 (1978).
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psychologists may be made more accountable through access to
records.
JUDICIAL SCRUTINY OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Because the use of tests to identify, evaluate, and place children is
a time-honored educational prerogative, authorized by school boards
and performed by school personnel, "[a] threshold issue is whether
courts should involve themselves in [such] matters at all."10 There was
a time when the behavior of school officials went virtually unexamined
by the courts. Pleading lack of expert knowledge, judges were wary of
interfering with the discretion of administrators to educate their
students. For example, sustaining the exclusion of an allegedly
mentally retarded child in 1893, a Massachusetts court stated:
The management of the schools involves many details; and it
is important that a board of public officers. . having jurisdiction
to regulate the internal affairs of the schools, should not be
interfered with or have their conduct called into question before
another tribunal.. . . A jury composed of men of no special fitness
to decide educational questions should not be permitted to say that
their answer is wrong.'1
But while the 1954 landmark desegregation decision, Brown v.
Board of Education,'2 "significantly altered this allocation of
authority, [it did so] only where issues of race were concerned
... A decade ago the Supreme Court was still warning:
[J]udicial interposition in the operation of the public school
system of the Nation raises problems requiring care and
restraint .... Courts do not and cannot intervene in the
resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily operation of
school systems and which do not directly and sharply implicate
basic constitutional values. 14
However, the past ten years have seen a marked increase in
judicial involvement in schools. Educators' total immunity from
10. Segregation, supra note 8, at 1225.
11. Watson v. City of Cambridge, 157 Mass. 561, 563, 32 N.E. 864, 864-65 (1893).
See also State ex rel. Beattie v. Board of Educ., 169 Wis. 231, 233, 172 N.W. 153, 154
(1919) (upholding exclusion of physically handicapped child who allegedly had "a
depressing and nauseating effect upon the teachers and school children.").
12. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
13. Kirp, Law, Politics, and Equal Educational Opportunity, supra note 8, at 118.
14. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
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judicial scrutiny may be said to have ended with the Supreme
Court's 1969 declaration that "students in school as well as out of
schools are 'persons' under our Constitution ... possessed of
fundamental rights which the State must respect."15 Since then the
Supreme Court has decided such issues as the reach of compulsory
education laws, 16 the requirements of due process prior to the
infliction of disciplinary 7 and academic sanctions,1 8 the immunity
of school officials from money damage liability for violations of
students' civil rights, 9 the allocation of financial resources to pupils
in poor school districts,2° the education of non-English speaking
children, 2' the permissibility of sex-separate high schools,22 the
legality of special admissions programs for minorities, 23 the
obligation of colleges and universities to admit handicapped
students,24 and, most recently, the validity of system-wide remedies
to reduce school segregation.25
15. Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969)
(upholding the first amendment right of students to wear armbands in demonstra-
tions against the Vietnam War).
16. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (upholding religious sect's claim that
compulsory education requirement endangered first amendment right to free exercise
of religion).
17. Compare Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (public school authorities
have right to impose corporal punishment on disruptive school children without prior
hearing) with Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (student has right to a hearing prior
to short term suspension).
18. Board of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978) (university
authorities have right to dismiss student for "academic" causes without prior hearing
when student has been informed of faculty dissatisfaction with her performance).
19. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975) ("A school board member is not
immune from liability for damages under § 1983 if he knew or reasonably should have
known that the action he took . . .would violate the constitutional rights of the
student affected, or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a
deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to the student.").
20. San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (upholding
constitutionality of state's method of financing public education in proportion to
amount of taxes paid, where system led to. disparities in funding among school
districts).
21. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (non-English-speaking school children
entitled to English language instruction under 1964 Civil Rights Act).
22. Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 430 U.S. 703 (1977), aff'g by an equally divided
court 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976).
23. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
24. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
25. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 99 S. Ct. 2941 (1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v.
Brinkman, 99 S. Ct. 2971 (1979) (Dayton II).
The lower courts, but not yet the Supreme Court, have decided such issues as
the right of the handicapped to public school education, e.g., Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405
F. Supp. 946 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972);
Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D.
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However, the significant victories that students won, culminat-
ing in Goss v. Lopez26 and Wood v. Strickland27 in 1975, appear to
have ended. In the past three terms the Supreme Court, led by
Justices Powell - a former school board president - and Rehnquist,
has reemphasized the importance of judicial restraint and reiterated
its support for the discretion of school personnel to make important
decisions that affect students' lives. Finding that schools were not
within the ambit of the eighth amendment's ban on cruel and
unusual punishment, the Court in Ingraham v. Wright28 refused to
bar corporal punishment or to require a hearing prior to its
imposition. Speaking for a divided Court, Justice Powell noted that
the Court was reviewing a "legislative judgment, rooted in history
and reaffirmed in the laws of many States, that corporal punishment
serves important educational interests. ' 29 Although he admitted that
school authorities could choose to abandon physical discipline and
that its elimination might be welcomed as a societal advance, he
upheld the right of school officials to administer it "reasonably." In
Board of Curators of the University of Missouri v. Horowitz3° the
Court held that due process did not require a hearing prior to the
dismissal of a medical student completing her fourth year of
training, even though it found that "dismissal from a graduate
medical school was more severe than the 10-day suspension to which
the high school students were subjected in Goss.' ' 31 Goss was a
Pa. 1972); the proper identification of learning disabled children, e.g., Frederick L v.
Thomas, 419 F. Supp. 960 (E.D. Pa. 1976), affl'd, 557 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1977), returned to
state court for assessment of damages, 578 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1978); the right of schools
to exclude handicapped children, Stuart v. Nappi, 443 F. Supp. 1235 (D. Conn. 1978);
the distribution of sex questionnaires to pupils by high school newspaper staff,
Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978); the
liability of school officials for failure to educate children to a certain level, Doe v. San
Francisco Unified School Dist., Civ. No. 36851 (Cal. Ct. App., Aug. 6, 1976); the
assessment of minority group children, Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 1211
(E.D.N.Y. 1978); Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (order granting
preliminary injunction), aff'd, 502 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1976), No. C-71-2270 R.F.P. (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 16, 1979) (decision on merits), appeal docketed, No. 80-4027 (9th Cir. Jan, 17,
1980); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Smuck v.
Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
26. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
27. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
28. 430 U.S. 651 (1977). See generally Comment, Ingraham v. Wright: Corporal
Punishment in Schools Passes Constitutional Tests, 37 MD. L. REV. 594 (1978).
29. 430 U.S. at 681.
30. 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
31. Id. at 86 n.3.
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disciplinary determination requiring fact-finding, while Horowitz
was denominated an academic evaluation:
Such a judgment is by its nature more subjective and evaluative
than the typical factual questions presented in the average
disciplinary decision.... The determination whether to dismiss
a student for academic reasons requires an expert evaluation of
cumulative information and is not readily adapted to the
procedural tools of judicial or administrative decisionmaking.
• * * We decline to further enlarge the judicial presence in the
academic community and thereby risk deterioration of many
beneficial aspects of the faculty-student relationship. We
recognize, as did the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court over
60 years ago, that a hearing may be "useless or harmful in
finding the truth as to scholarship. '3 2
Horowitz, then, may have some important implications for the
use of psychological tests. Where tests are employed for academic
purposes, as almost all are, courts may be reluctant to scrutinize
their use. Further, Horowitz emphasizes the need for unfettered
"expert evaluation of cumulative information." To a lesser degree,
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke33 also stands for
judicial restraint. Bakke permits unencumbered individualized
32. Id. at 89-90 (citations omitted). Cf. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 319 n.53 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) (racial quotas unconstitutional but racial
considerations permitted in the admission of students to professional training; "So
long as the university proceeds on an individualized, case-by-case basis, there is no
warrant for judicial interference in the academic process."). One student commentator
has similarly stated, "[Mlost courts have been lenient in dealing with classifications
affecting educational.rights; school boards have been given wide latitude so long as
their policies remain untainted by racial motivation." Judicial Supervision, supra
note 8, at 1512; see cases collected at id. n.13.
33. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). The Bakke opinion was severely fragmented. Justices
Stevens, Rehnquist, Stewart, and Chief Justice Burger found that the Medical School
of the University of California at Davis had violated the ban on racial discrimination
in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4 (1976). Id. at
408-21 (Stevens, Stewart, Rehnquist, JJ., & Burger, C.J.). Justices Brennan, White,
Marshall, and Blackmun disagreed, finding that Title VI's prohibition on discrimina-
tion was no broader than that of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment, and that the Davis program was not unconstitutional. Id. at 328-79
(Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.). In his pivotal opinion, Justice Powell
agreed with the Brennan group that the question was a constitutional one, but
concluded that the Davis program was unconstitutional. He found, however, that race
could be treated as a factor in university admission decisions. Id. at 281-320 (Powell,
J.) There was thus a 5-4 majority for each of two holdings: that Allan Bakke should
be ordered admitted to the medical school, and that a school can constitutionally
consider race in its admission procedure, at least under certain circumstances. See
generally 92 HARv. L. REv. 131 (1978).
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academic decisionmaking so long as impermissible racial or ethnic
considerations are not part of the decision and the process itself
violates no statute. It is just these purposes for which tests have been
deemed useful - case-by-case appraisals of educational deficits and
instructional needs performed by designated professionals based on
assembled data.
By asserting the broader implications of the cited cases, a major
constraint on the use of psychological tests - the restriction with
regard to racial and ethnic impact - has also been stated.34 As shall
be shown, testing has been intimately involved in the history of
racial and ethnic discrimination in the public schools.
TESTING AND DISCRIMINATION 35
The Pupil Placement Laws
The Supreme Court's ringing declarations in Brown v. Board of
Education 6 began the slow process of desegregation in the South.
Many southern states attempted to forestall the process by creating
mechanisms that would prevent black children from attending
previously all-white schools.37 One such mechanism was the so-
34. Educational Testing, supra note 8, at 386-87:
To seek constructive judicial review of special education programs
requires the court to step outside its usual realm of expertise. There is great
danger in the temptation to deal with problems formalistically or mechanical-
ly through the routine application of legal doctrine .... The issue of testing
will be an exceedingly difficult area for courts to consider, especially when the
issue becomes one of the biases in the operation of special education
programs.. . . [Tihe courts cannot inquire into whether a given test is good or
bad, but must determine whether a system is reasonably calculated to further
the purposes of education. If a system is not furthering the purposes of special
education, and if it is predominantly minority group children who are affected
by the flawed system, then the court must achieve the delicate task of
protecting interests without usurping the functions of the school board.
35. This section will be devoted almost exclusively to race and the attempted use
of tests to hamper integration efforts in the South. During the early part of the
twentieth century, some psychologists helped foster ethnic discrimination by arguing
incorrectly that low test scores of certain immigrants were attributable to genetic
differences rather than to socioeconomic class differences. See L. KAMIN, supra note 7;
Kamin, supra note 7.
36. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Supreme Court declared that "segregation is a denial
of... equal protection," id. at 495; that public education "must be made available to
all on equal terms," id. at 493; and that to separate black children from white "solely
because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority . . . that it may affect their
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone," id. at 494.
37. "The myriad of new pupil assignment laws, 'interposition' plans, and other
ingenious schemes demonstrated the truth of the popular saying - 'as long as we can
legislate we can segregate."' Yudof, supra note 8, at 465. See generally Meador, The
Constitution and the Assignment of Pupils to Public Schools, 45 VA. L. REV. 517
(1959); Note, The Federal Courts and Integration of Southern Schools: Troubled
Status of the Pupil Placement Acts, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1448 (1962).
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called pupil placement acts,38 which relied heavily on the use of
intelligence and achievement tests.39
The pupil placement acts prescribed criteria by which local
school boards could make decisions about students seeking intradis-
trict school transfers. In reality, they served to screen black
applicants and block their transfers. Among such apparently
innocuous criteria as the availability of space and transportation,
also considered were scholastic aptitude, intellectual ability, and the
effect of admission upon prevailing academic standards at the
prospective school. 4° When Alabama's School Placement Act was
held constitutional, 41 school systems received the imprimatur of the
Supreme Court to consider intelligence and achievement when
evaluating transfer applications of black students.
42
38. ALA. CODE tit. 52, §§61(1)-(12) (1958); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§80-1519 to -1547
(1960); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 230.232 (1960); LA. REV. STAT. §§ 17:101-:110 (Supp. 1961);
Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 6334-01 to -08 (Supp. 1960); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115-176 to -179
(1960); S.C. CODE §§21-230, 21-247 to -247.7 (Supp. 1960); TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 49-1741 to -1764 (Supp. 1962); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 290(a) (Supp. 1962); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 22-232.1 -232.31 (Supp. 1962).
39. The use of tests to prevent integration did not begin, however, in the South. In
1869 Indiana provided separate schools for black and white children, but the schools
for black children did not reach the upper grades. Indiana law permitted black
children to enter the advanced grades of all-white schools only if they could pass an
examination. When a black child contested the process that denied him admission to
the graded white school, the Indiana Supreme Court concluded that since "no such
examination was passed ... this bars a right to admission . .. on the ground of
proficiency in study." State ex rel. Mitchell v. Gray, 93 Ind. 303, 305 (1883). The court
apparently considered itself powerless to act unless corruption or malice were shown:
"The Legislature has ample power to regulate these matters, and it is for us to respect
and enforce the law as it is written on our statute books." Id. "[C]ourts cannot
undertake the government of ... school affairs." Id. at 304.
40. Dove v. Parham, 181 F. Supp. 504, 510 n.5 (E.D. Ark. 1960). Other criteria
included the effect of admission of the child upon the academic progress of other
students, the possibility of breaches of the peace within the community, the child's
home environment, and the morals, conduct, health and personal standards of the
pupil. Id.
41. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 162 F. Supp. 372 (N.D. Ala.),
affl'd, 358 U.S. 101 (1958) (three judge district court asserted that the law "furnishes
the legal machinery for an orderly administration of the public schools in a
constitutional manner by the admission of qualified pupils upon a basis of individual
merit without regard to their race or color."). The Supreme Court made clear that it
was affirming the judgment only "upon the limited grounds on which the District
Court rested its decision," i.e., that in advance of its application it was not possible to
say that the law, constitutional on its face, would be unconstitutionally administered.
358 U.S. at 101.
42. Though the pupil placement acts were the first formal state-initiated means
for delaying integration, less formal local policies had already been reviewed by the
courts. The Dallas, Texas Board of Education had found that there were differences in
the scholastic aptitudes of white and black children in elementary and secondary
grades. On that basis it refused to order the end of segregated schools. In Borders v.
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The acts were sustained as expressions of state sovereignty by
which states could experiment with methods of achieving gradual
and well-regulated integration.43 Intellectual criteria were judged to
be "unquestionably valid in and of themselves," 44 and the use of
tests was uniformly upheld.45 The plaintiffs never challenged the
validity of the tests, nor did the courts. The only concern of the
federal courts at the time was whether the placement acts were used
to make transfer decisions "purely" upon racial considerations. 46
Test use was enjoined only when the courts found that the tests were
administered solely to black children who wanted to attend "white"
schools and thus were employed as overt attempts to avoid
desegregation. 47 Occasionally, a court lost patience as it was forced
Rippy, 247 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1957), the Fifth Circuit found that black children were
excluded from schools of their choice solely on the basis of race and thus were denied
equal protection and due process. It stated, however, that "pupils may, of course, be
separated according to their degree of advancement or retardation, their ability to
learn,... or for any other legitimate reason, but each child is entitled to be treated as
an individual without regard to his race or color." Id. at 271. Accord, Youngblood v.
Board of Pub. Instr'n, 230 F. Supp. 74, 76 (N.D. Fla. 1964).
43. Parham v. Dove, 271 F.2d 132 (8th Cir. 1959), remanded, 181 F. Supp. 504
(E.D. Ark. 1960).
44. Dove v. Parham, 181 F. Supp. 504, 520 (E.D. Ark. 1960).
45. E.g., Jones v. School Bd., 278 F.2d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1960) ("It is not contended
by the appellants . . .that intelligence or scholarship attainments may never be
properly applied in determining the particular schools that children shall attend....
In the absence of a showing that these factors are used in such a way as to deprive
individuals of their constitutional rights, they are, of course, not objectionable on
constitutional grounds."); Evans v. Ennis, 281 F.2d 385, 395 (3d Cir. 1960) ("It was not
our intention ... to exempt the . . . plaintiffs -who may presently actively seek
integration from the usual processing of the school system relating to their
capabilities, scholastic attainments"); see Norwood v. Tucker, 287 F.2d 798, 803 (8th
Cir. 1961). Among the tests ratified were the California Achievement Test, Pettit v.
Board of Educ., 184 F. Supp. 452 (D. Md. 1960); the California Test of Mental
Maturity, Dodson v. School Bd., 289 F.2d 439 (4th Cir. 1961); the California Test of
Personality, Augustus v. Board of Pub. Instr'n, 306 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1962); and the
Iowa Silent Reading Test, Dodson v. School Bd., 289 F.2d 439 (4th Cir. 1961).
46. Parham v. Dove, 271 F.2d 132, 137 (8th Cir. 1959).
47. E.g., Norwood v. Tucker, 287 F.2d 798, 808-09 (8th Cir. 1961) (where blacks
were compelled to undergo a series of tests covering education, psychology, religion,
ethics, and law the court found that the criteria for transfer were being applied "for
the purpose of impeding, thwarting, and frustrating integration," and held that "the
standards and criteria of the pupil assignment law must be applied objectively in the
making of initial assignments of all students ... ."); Dodson v. School Bd., 289 F.2d
439, 443 (4th Cir. 1961) (academic criteria applied only to black high school pupils is
"patently discriminatory"); Jones v. School Bd., 278 F.2d 72, 77 (4th Cir. 1960) ("If the
criteria should be applied only to Negroes seeking transfer or enrollment in particular
schools and not to white children, then the use of the criteria could not be sustained.");
see Augustus v. Board of Pub. Instr'n, 306 F.2d 862, 869 (5th Cir. 1962); Youngblood v.
Board of Pub. Instr'n, 230 F. Supp. 74, 76 (N.D. Fla. 1964); Dove v. Parham, 181 F.
Supp. 504, 520 (E.D. Ark. 1960). Cf. Calhoun v. Latimer, 321 F.2d 302, 316-17 (5th Cir.
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to review one scheme after another that some inventive school board
had created:
[T]he District has ... made its processes of application of the
statute consist in having applicants for transfer subjected to
such devices as the California Mental Maturity Test, the Iowa
Silent Reading Test, the Otis Quick Scoring Test of Mental
Ability, the California Language Test, the Bell Adjustment
Inventory, and other such things - which, at least in the
elementary area of public education, are new adornments upon
the entrance doors to school houses and classrooms.
* * * [I]n what the District has done and proposes to continue
doing, application of these devices is not going to be made to the
students generally of the system but only to such individuals as
undertake to engage in application for a transfer - which in the
realities of the District here simply means, to Negro students
seeking to enter a white school. 48
But, in the main, courts acted gingerly in these early cases. As
stated by one commentator, "[M]ost federal courts were careful to
delve into matters of school policy only after drawing the parameters
of their inquiry to avoid any encroachment upon the school boards'
discretionary authority. ' 49 They made clear that their function was
not "to make educational policy, [to] resolve conflicts in educational
theory," ° or to declare tests "unfair or unacceptable as a matter of
law."' 51 Only when "educational principles and theories serve[d] to
justify [the preservation of] an existing system of imposed segrega-
tion" 52 were testing programs enjoined as barriers to the vindication
of the constitutional rights secured in Brown. Test administration
that applied to everyone and that led to regrouping among and
1963) ("Personality interviews to determine probable success or failure in the schools
to which transfer and assignment is sought may not be utilized where such a practice
relates only to Negro pupils . . . nor may any scholastic requirement whatever be
used where applied only to Negro students seeking transfer."), vacated and remanded
on other grounds, 377 U.S. 263 (1964). The Atlanta School Board used another
dissembling device. While achievement tests were given routinely to all children,
those requesting transfers had to attain a grade level score at least equal to the
average of the class in the school to which transfer was requested. This practice was
also declared unlawful in Calhoun. Id. at 304-05.
48. Dove v. Parham, 282 F.2d 256, 260 (8th Cir. 1960).
49. Cultural Bias, supra note 8, at 1036.
50. Dove v. Parham, 181 F. Supp. 504, 519 (E.D. Ark. 1960).
51. Jones v. School Bd., 179 F. Supp. 280 (E.D. Va. 1959).
52. Dove v. Parham, 282 F.2d 256, 258 (8th Cir. 1960).
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within schools was free from judicial scrutiny. 53 In the early 1960's,
when the courts were attempting to make school systems begin the
process of desegregation, charges that tests themselves were racist,
culturally biased, and discriminatory had not yet been heard.
The Ghost of Brown
In what has become a famous footnote, the Supreme Court in
Brown v. Board of Education54 cited the works of several behavioral
scientists to support its conclusion that segregation retarded the
educational and cognitive development of black children.55 The
reference to the studies created a controversy that still exists
concerning their relevance and validity and the methodology that
produced them.5 6
The first and most significant test of Brown's footnote eleven
took place in Georgia when black children sought to enjoin a county
board of education's continued operation of a de jure dual school
system. In Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Board of Educa-
tion,5 7 two white children intervened on behalf of white students as a
class to show that the alleged segregation was not determined solely
on the basis of color "but rather upon racial traits of educational
significance as to which racial identity was only a convenient
index."58 The white children sought to prove that differences in
learning rates, cognitive ability, behavioral traits, and capacity for
education in general were so great that not only was it impossible for
black and white children to be educated effectively in the same room
but that "to congregate children for such diverse traits in schools
. . would seriously impair the educational opportunities of both
white and Negro and cause them grave psychological harm."59
53. See, e.g., id. at 260. It may not be a coincidence that "from 1957 until 1966, the
use of standardized tests doubled." Equal Protection, supra note 8, at 900 (citing W.
MEHRENS & J. LEHMAN, STANDARDIZED TESTS IN EDUCATION 5 (1969)).
54. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
55. Id. at 494 n.11.
56. E.g., Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REv. 150 (1955); Levin, School
Desegregation Remedies and the Role of Social Science Research, 42 L..& CONTEMP.
PROB. 1 (1978); Levin & Moise, School Desegregation Litigation in the Seventies and
the Use of Social Science Evidence: An Annotated Guide, 39 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 50
(1975); Yudof, supra note 8, at 437-39, 444-45. See generally K. KLUGER, SIMPLE
JUSTICE 705-07 (1975).
57. 220 F. Supp. 667 (S.D. Ga. 1963), rev'd, 333 F.2d 55 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 933 (1964).
58. Id. at 668.
59. Id.
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To prove their contentions the intervenors called several expert
witnesses, among whom were two professors of psychology, R.
Travis Osborne and Henry Garrett. Osborne had evaluated all black
and white students in the sixth, eighth, tenth, and twelfth grades in
the defendant school district over approximately a ten-year period
using a battery consisting of the California Achievement Tests
(CAT) and the California Mental Maturity Tests (CTMM).60 On the
basis of his assessment, Osborne testified that black children were
two to four years behind their white peers in reading and arithmetic
and had a median I.Q. of 81, compared to a median I.Q. of 103 for
white children, despite the fact that black teachers had more
education and experience than did their white counterparts. Further,
Osborne stated that black children fell behind a white control group
matched for age and mental ability in school achievement. He
concluded from these data that educational separation for the two
groups was necessary if, as the district court paraphrased it, "the
schools are to endeavor to adapt to the different learning potentials
of each." 61
Garrett verified Osborne's results and stated they were represen-
tative of the nation as a whole. He asserted that to educate both
races together would be "a source of frustration [that would] be
compensated for by anti-social class behavior. '6 2 The court summa-
rized Garrett's conclusions as follows:
[D]ifferences in educability between Negro and white children
were inherent and ... only minor changes could be achieved by
educational readjustment or other environmental change. There
was no scientific possibility that learning rate differences of the
degree shown by Dr. Osborne's tests and the confirming
national studies were either caused by or could be substantially
altered by the students' environment.63
60. Osborne characterized the CAT as a set of nationally accepted achievement
tests in reading comprehension and vocabulary, mathematical reasoning and
fundamentals, and the application of mathematical concepts. Id. The CTMM was
described as a "nationally accepted standard indicator of the ratio between mental
and chronological age.. . ." Id. However, a recent critique of the CAT asserts that it
does not measure what it purports to measure. J. SALVIA & J. YSSELDYKE, supra note
4, at 133. For generally lukewarm reviews of the CTMM, see L. CRONBACH, supra note
7, at 277; G. ROBB, L. BERNARDONI & R. JOHNSON, 8upra note 7, at 289-91.
61. 220 F. Supp. at 671.
62. Id. at 672.
63. Id. It may be some indication of the naivete of the plaintiffs' attorneys who
litigated these early desegregation-testing cases that they stipulated that "the
opinions of Dr. Garrett were authoritative in his field of experimental and differential
psychology." Id.
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The district court admitted this and other testimony 64 because it
concluded that the findings in Brown with regard to psychic damage
suffered by black children did not control in the case before it. It held
that "the existence or non-existence of injury to white or black
children from integrated or segregated schooling is a matter of fact
for judicial inquiry and was so treated in Brown." 65 Thus, because
under the principle of stare decisis future courts were bound only
with regard to matters of law, the issue of injury was justiciable.66
The court concluded: "[T]he differences in test results between
the white and Negro students is [sic] attributable in large part to
hereditary factors [and] failure to attain the existing white
standards would create serious psychological problems of frustration
on the part of the Negro child, which would require compensation by
attention-creating anti-social behavior. '67 Although the court
acknowledged that one-third of the black children had achievement
and intelligence test scores comparable to whites, it found that
"selective integration would cause even greater psychological harm
to the individual Negro children [who] would be inescapably
conscious of total social rejection by the dominant group."68 As for
the lesser achieving blacks, integration would "greatly increase any
existing sense of inferiority [causing] substantial and irremovable
psychological injury ... "69 Believing that the white intervenors
64. Another psychologist testified that the rate of truancy and antisocial behavior
generally could be diminished if a classroom were organized "around a socially
homogeneous group of children having relatively similar learning rates." This
opinion was based on data that showed that "one-third of all Negro truants gave
inability to keep abreast of their school work as the reason for their running away
from home." Id. at 675. Other witnesses claimed that variations in intellectual ability
between blacks and whites were innate because of differences in brain size,
proportion, and structure, and that racial mixing increased pre-existing hostility
especially where there were differences in physical appearance and learning rates. Id.
at 673-74.
65. Id. at 678.
66. The district court criticized the conclusions reached in Brown. Id. at 678-80.
As noted, text accompanying note 56 supra, there has been controversy since 1954 as
to the need for and meaning of the psychological data. One commentator has
concluded that finding an empirical basis for the decision was unnecessary. Yudof,
supra note 8, at 437. "The evidence is too complex, unreliable, unpersuasive, and
contradictory to allow the fashioning of broad constitutional principles, even if it were
possible to disentangle the psychological and educational components of segregation
and attribute injurious consequences to either." Id. at 445. "Brown and its progeny are
fundamentally based on ethical principles . .. [i.e.,] normative, or mixed normative
and factual, statements about how a just society should function." Id. at 446.
67. 220 F. Supp. at 683.
68. Id. at 684.
69. Id.
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had successfully disproved the factual findings in Brown, the court
dismissed the black children's complaint, concluding that "classifi-
cation ... on the basis of coherent groups having distinguishable
educability capabilities" was reasonable and consonant with the
equal protection principle that reasonable classifications are those
that secure "the maximum result in the educational process for all
students and the minimum injury to any."70
The black plaintiffs in Stell appealed, and the Fifth Circuit
reversed.71 Judge Griffin Bell, speaking for the court, found that
Brown was not limited to its facts and that all courts were bound by
its holding that segregated schools were constitutionally impermissi-
ble. He admonished the judiciary "that no federal court may refrain
from acting as required by that decision even if such court should
conclude that the Supreme Court erred either as to its facts or as to
the law."' 72 Nevertheless, he deferred to the judgment of educators:
"[T]here is no constitutional prohibition against an assignment of
individual students to particular schools on a basis of intelligence,
achievement or other aptitudes upon a uniformly administered
program, but race must not be a factor in making the assignments.
However, this is a question for educators and not courts." 73
Savannah's plan was faulty not because of the testing program or
the inadequate bases on which the experts drew their conclusions,
but because black children were to be classified regardless of their
individual abilities. "Therein is the discrimination. The individual
Negro student is not to be treated as an individual and allowed to
proceed along with other individuals on the basis of ability alone
without regard to race. '74
70. Id. The court did not examine the purposes of grouping to discern whether
they were merely subterfuges for de jure racial segregation. Under equal protection
doctrine racial classifications are given strict scrutiny and upheld only if the state can
show that there is a compelling justification for them and that there is no less drastic
means for accomplishing the state's asserted goal. E.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 618 (1964). Most other classifications that differentiate among groups of persons
are subjected only to the more relaxed level of the rational basis test, the one the court
invoked here. See note 185 infra.
71. 333 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1964).
72. Id. at 61-62.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 62. While the Stell case was pending in the Fifth Circuit, a federal
district court in northern Florida entertained a similar desegregation case. Young-
blood v. Board of Pub. Instr'n, 230 F. Supp. 74 (N.D. Fla. 1964). Opposing a motion for
summary judgment by the black plaintiffs, the school district - relying on the district
court's opinion in Stell as precedent - proffered what the court called "a considerable
volume of statistics . . . tending to establish . . . that there are inherent racial
differences in intelligence, aptitude, and in rate of intellectual attainment ...
justify[ing] the use of a racial index as one criteria in making assignment of pupils to
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Just three weeks after the Fifth Circuit's ruling that data on the
injurious effects of integration were immaterial, a district court in
Mississippi permitted the defendant school district and white
intervenors in a suit very similar to Stell to present evidence offered
by "seven distinguished scientists" as to the physical, intellectual,
and educational inferiority of black children. 75 Apparently more
sophisticated in court than its predecessors, this school system
sought to counter the argument that the I.Q. tests used to justify the
separation of the races were culturally biased:
A special test was . . .made to determine whether intelli-
gence tests unduly favored white pupils because of containing
cultural questions which might be less familiar to Negro
families. The results were . . . contrary to the "Cultural
Hypothesis" in that the Negro group scored relatively higher on
those questions which had been rated by educators as being
highly cultural in content.76
On the basis of what it called "overwhelming, undisputed, and
unchallenged evidence," the court concluded that the "differences
between Caucasians and Negroes are genetically determined and
cannot be changed materially by the environment." 77 Yet, despite
these findings and its belief that the determinations in Brown were
matters of fact that could be relitigated, the court reluctantly found
itself bound by the Fifth Circuit's holding in Stell and permanently
enjoined the operation of the dual school system. The school district
specific schools." Id. at 76. Predicting the Fifth Circuit's reversal, the court concluded
that "Stell ... is not in accord with the requirements of the.. . Fifth Circuit['s prior]
opinions ...," id. at 75, and ignored the data. It granted the plaintiffs summary
judgment motion as to the pupil assignment plan, stating that any procedure that
embodied "a universal testing basis for assignment may not be administered in a
manner which would defeat the essential requirement that factors of race are not to be
considered." Id. at 76.
75. Evers v. Jackson Mun. Separate School Dist., 232 F. Supp. 241, 246 (S.D. Miss.
1964), affl'd, 357 F.2d 653 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 961 (1966). The scientists
included several psychologists, who were not named in the court's opinion. The
evidence was very similar to that presented in Stell: methodological criticism of the
psychological studies cited in Brown, proof of increased hostility between the races as
the result of compulsory intermixing in groups having a high degree of self-identity,
and disparity in achievement and ability. The court also heard testimony concerning
a longitudinal study of black and white children initially matched for I.Q. in which it
was found after three years that the blacks were "one year apart in terms of I.Q.,
measured by the same tests." Id. at 247.
76. Id. at 248. For further discussion of test bias, see text accompanying notes 111
to 148 infra.
77. Id. at 251.
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appealed to the Fifth Circuit, but one of that circuit's panels,
irritated by cases that "tax the patience of the court," tersely
affirmed the lower court's opinion, interring "the popular myth that
Brown was decided for sociological reasons untested in a trial
"78
Hobson v. Hansen79 and the Attack on Group Ability Tests
Almost without exception, the tests and results that led expert
witnesses to conclude that black children were genetically inferior
went unchallenged by attorneys fighting to enforce desegregation.
They argued only that such evidence and the conclusions drawn
from it were immaterial and irrelevant,8° and appellate courts left
such issues unexamined. States, now educated by decisions in the
first decade after Brown, repealed or drastically altered the pupil
placement acts, and school systems cautiously tested all children
and developed "freedom of choice" plans, which, on the surface,
made it easier for blacks to attend desired schools. As long as race
was not the evident criterion on which decisions were made, judicial
restraint and support for school system discretion continued.
The inevitable conclusion from these cases was that testing to
measure academic ability was perfectly permissible. For example, a
federal court in the South in 1966 stated: "IT]he practice of
separating study groups or classes into accelerated or slow sections
is a matter for educators. 'Discrimination' bears no stigma in
connotation. It is 'racial discrimination' in public education which
must be excised from the American culture." '81 One district court
apparently read prior opinions as not only permitting but prescrib-
78. Jackson Mun. Separate School Dist. v. Evers, 357 F.2d 653, 654 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 961 (1966). See United States v. Board of Educ., 301 F. Supp. 1024
(S.D. Ga. 1969). There the district court permitted the testimony of psychologists
concerning the disparity between black and white children with regard to intelligence
and achievement (on the CAT and CTMM) and the conclusion that cultural difference
and socioeconomic status have little to do with the disparity. The court reluctantly
ignored the data in arriving at its decision to enjoin the further operation of
segregated schools in Lincoln County, finding itself bound by Stell and Jackson. Id.
at 1029. However, the court reacted angrily to those constraints: "Under latter-day
Fourteenth Amendment interpretation, scholastic aptitude means nothing. Total
integration of schools, regardless of consequences to the system, is all that counts.
The higher courts apparently look no further." Id.
79. 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967).
80. E.g., Evers v. Jackson Mun. Separate School Dist., 232 F. Supp. 241, 244 (S.D.
Miss. 1964).
81. Miller v. School Dist. No. 2, Clarendon County, S.C., 256 F. Supp. 370, 375
(D.S.C. 1966).
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ing testing.82 It approved a portion of a school board's integration
plan prohibiting students from being assigned or transferred to any
school or class in which the mean I.Q. score exceeded that of the
student. To effectuate the plan the court "enjoined and required [the
school system] to maintain and enforce distinctions based upon age,
mental qualifications, intelligence, achievement and other aptitudes
upon a uniformly administered program. 8 3 The injunction was
quickly dissolved, however, when the Fifth Circuit reversed, stating
that "the order of the trial court directing the Board of Education to
assign pupils according to intelligence tests was beyond the power of
the court. '8
4
It was against this background that Judge Skelly Wright's
revolutionary opinion in Hobson v. Hansen appeared. 8 5 The case
dealt with the constitutionality of intraschool district disparities in
financial and educational resources that favored white children. 86 Its
most important issue, however, was the propriety of placement
through standardized tests of a disproportionate number of black
children in lower academic tracks and white children in upper
tracks. The defendant, the District of Columbia school system, cited
Stell and its progeny as support for the validity of its procedures.8 7
The court distinguished those cases, calling them "completely
inapposite.., because in none of them did the courts have occasion
82. Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Bd. of Educ., 255 F. Supp. 83 (S.D. Ga.
1965), on remand from 333 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1964), rev'g 220 F. Supp. 667 (S.D. Ga.
1963), discussed at text accompanying notes 37 to 74 supra.
83. Id. at 99.
84. Stell v. Board of Pub. Educ., 387 F.2d 486, 491 (5th Cir. 1967). The court added
cryptically: "No person has the constitutional right to attend schools in classes which
are divided according to ability or intelligence quotients." Id. It went on to admonish
the lower courts that "there is no constitutional authority for federal courts to impose
their ideas of school management on boards of education as to these matters." Id. But,
without realizing future implications of its action, the Fifth Circuit permitted the
school to assign children to special classes or schools for the physically handicapped,
retarded, and gifted on bases related to the function of those schools. Id. at 496.
85. 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175
(D.C. Cir. 1969). Commentators have been uniform in their judgment of the case's
importance. "[T]he most far-reaching judicial foray into school classification .... "
Sorgen, supra note 8, at 1139; "[Tlhe. . .Court ... reached a conclusion so profound
and far-reaching that, if followed by other courts, . .. could radically alter the
educational system of almost every urban school in the nation." Ability Grouping,
supra note 8, at 150; "[M]ay presage a period of increased judicial scrutiny of
educational policies .. " Judicial Supervision, supra note 8, at 1511.
86. See Kirp, Law, Politics, and Equal Educational Opportunity, supra note 8, at
129; Legal Implications, supra note 8, at 737.
87. 269 F. Supp. at 514 n.212. See text accompanying notes 57 to 74 supra.
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to consider whether the tests used were in fact accurate in
ascertaining innate ability."88
The track system in Washington, D.C. was instituted two years
after the Supreme Court decided Boiling v. Sharpe,8 9 a companion
case to Brown.90 Unlike many southern school systems, the District
had integrated its schools very quickly.91 Soon after the integration
was implemented, however, teachers began reporting severe aca-
demic deficiencies in black children.92 It was an attempt to remedy
these deficiencies that led the superintendent of schools to institute
the track system. A commentator has described the system:
The idea was to segregate children of the same ability in the
same classes so that all could attain optimum development. Each
student was placed in Honors, Regular, General, or Basic'93' program
with emphasis on college preparation in the higher groups and on
blue collar jobs in the lower. There was to be some overlap between
tracks, e.g., a student might be in Honors mathematics and only
Regular reading. Also there was to be continuous re-evaluation of
the students' ability with correction of any remediable education
problems accounting for present poor performance.94
Despite its recognition of the superintendent's good intentions, 95
what led to the court's condemnation of ability grouping was its
finding of disproportionality. "As a general rule, in those schools
with a significant number of white and Negro students a higher
proportion of the Negroes will go into the Special Academic
88. 269 F. Supp. at 514 n.212.
89. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
90. The cases ir Brown arose in four states, Boiling in the District of Columbia.
Although the District was not bound by the fourteenth amendment's prohibition of
denial of equal protection through state action, in Boling the Supreme Court
interpreted the fifth amendment's prohibition of deprivation of due process by the
federal government so as to encompass the principle of equal protection. 347 U.S. at
498-99.
91. By September 1954, 73% of the schools were racially mixed. Hobson v.
Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 442 (D.D.C. 1967).
92. The court called them "the casualties of de jure segregation." Id. at 443.
93. "Basic" was also called the Special Academic Track, a euphemism for classes
for the educable mentally retarded. The criteria for placement in the Special Academic
Track were inability to keep up with the normal curriculum, emotionally disturbed
behavior, an I.Q. of 75 or below, and substandard performance on achievement tests.
Id. at 446-48.
94. Legal Implications, supra note 8, at 738.
95. The court found that the superintendent was motivated primarily by a desire
to correct an educational problem and that the track system was not merely a
subterfuge to avoid desegregation. It stated that it was not resting "its decision on a
finding of intended discrimination." 269 F. Supp. at 443. See also id. at 512 n.208.
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[Educably Mentally Retarded (EMR)] Track than will white stu-
dents."96
What concerned Judge Wright, and what is pertinent here, was
his finding that "the proper operation of the track system practically
demands reliance on test scores: ' 97
[Bletween kindergarten and 12th grade a student will receive the
following group tests: (1) a first-grade readiness test . . ; (2) a
reading and spelling achievement test (second grade); (3) one
achievement test and one aptitude test in each of three grades
(sixth, ninth, and 11th). In addition, optional aptitude tests may
be given in the seventh, ninth, 10th or 12th grades; ...
Individual tests ... are confined almost entirely to those
students recommended for placement in the Special Academic
Track.98
Although the stated criteria for entrance into any one of the
tracks included teacher and counselor evaluation of maturity,
stability, physical condition, and grades, the court found that
"testing looms as a most important consideration in making track
assignments."99 The findings that the track system had a negative
impact on black children and that their placement was determined
primarily by test scores triggered the court's extensive inquiry into
96. Id. at 456. The data on which the court's conclusion was based are reproduced
below:
Ratio of Negroes to Whites
School Total School Enrollment in Special Academic Track
Year % Negro % White % Negro % White
Elementary 1964 89.5 10.5 95.0 5.0
1965 91.0 9.0 95.0 5.0
Junior High 1964 87.6 12.4 94.7 5.3
1965 89.5 10.5 96.4 3.6
Id. (Table H). "Stated otherwise, as of October 1965, 3.3% of the white students injunior high school were in the Special Academic Track whereas 10.2% of the Negroes
were in that Track." Id. at n.68. Based on frequency data found in Table A of the
opinion, id. at 450, this author has calculated chi squares from the data in Table H.
All are significant beyond the .01 level.
97. Id. at 475.
98. Id. at 476. Among the tests given were the Metropolitan Readiness and
Achievement Tests, the Sequential Tests of Educational Progress, the School &
College Ability Tests, the Stanford Achievement Tests, the Tests of General Ability,
the Tests of Educational Ability, the Flanagan Aptitude Classification Tests, and the
Otis Quick-Scoring Mental Ability Test, Beta. Id. at 518-19.
99. Id. at 475.
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the nature and limitations of standardized tests.10° As one commen-
tator noted:
Analysis of the testing issue focused upon two concerns. First,
the court examined test structure and found on the grounds of
expert testimony that the skills measured by the test instruments
were not innately intellectual but rather acquired through cultural
experience. Accordingly, it stated, in order to demonstrate "ability"
to learn the student must have had an opportunity to learn the
requisite skills, which were in fact measures of the pupil's
"cumulative experiences in his home, his community and his
school." Since culture bias were built into the tests by standardiza-
tion on norming groups which were predominantly white and
middle-class, the disadvantaged child obviously would not score as
well on the intelligence tests as his white counterpart from a
background more conducive to the acquisition and development of
the verbal and nonverbal skills measured by the test ...
The court next considered the impact of culture-biased testing
upon the disadvantaged child. Elaborating upon the environmental
and psychological indices of the disadvantaged child's situation
within society, it explored possible educational effects of the testing
upon students. In this regard, the court expressed concern over
teacher evaluations based upon false opinions of intelligence pro-
jected by low test scores, a particular danger where teachers'
universal reliance upon such tests was emphasized by a school
policy mandating use of their results °101' The court found that the
effects of mislabeling were cyclical, beginning with the lower
evaluation of a child's ability and constant reinforcement of that
evaluation."°
After ninety pages of discussion, summary, and fact-finding,
Judge Wright turned to the key legal issue of the case, whether
ability grouping in the District of Columbia violated the equal
protection clause. In Carrington v. Rash,10 3 a case decided two years
prior to Hobson, the Supreme Court had held that "mere classifica-
100. Another important finding was that despite the school's assertions to the
contrary, the children in the lower tracks were almost always permanently relegated
to those positions. Id. at 458-68. "Movement between tracks borders on the
nonexistent." Id. at 463. See also id. at 512-13.
101. Another explanation for the low test scores offered by one of the experts and
given credence by the court was test anxiety, i.e., apprehension about ability to score
well and fear of what the performance might mean to the test interpreters. The court
found that such reactions were more likely to be found in black disadvantaged
children than in their white advantaged counterparts. Id. at 482.
102. Cultural Bias, supra note 8, at 1044-45.
103. 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
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tion . . . does not of itself deprive a group of equal protection. '" 10 4
Following that decision, Judge Wright acknowledged that "not all
classifications resulting in disparity are unconstitutional. If classifi-
cation is reasonably related to the purposes of the government
activity involved and is rationally carried out, the fact that persons
are thereby treated differently does not necessarily offend." 105 He
then undertook to determine whether ability grouping, a form of
classificatory activity, had a rational basis. At the outset, he decided
that discrimination on the basis of ability could be defended only if
judgments about ability were based on measures that assessed
children's capacity to learn, i.e., their innate endowment, not their
present skill levels. On that basis, ability grouping could "be
reasonably related to the purposes of public education. ' 10 6 But
because the law "has a special concern for minority groups," the
existence of any practices that have the appearance of "invidious
discrimination" would impose a "weighty burden" on the school
system to explain why poor and black children disproportionately
populate the lower tracks.10 7 The only explanation the court would
accept for the racial disparities was that the assessment devices on
which the classifications were made accurately reflected students'
innate capacities to learn. It having already been found that tests
did not do so, ability grouping was doomed:
While government may classify persons and thereby effect
disparities in treatment, those included within or excluded from
the respective classes should be those for whom the inclusion or
exclusion is appropriate; otherwise the classification risks
become wholly irrational and thus unconstitutionally discrimi-
natory. It is in this regard that the track system is fatally
defective, because for many students placement is based on
traits other than those on which the classification purports to be
based. 108
Judge Wright's next words were to have a profound effect on the use
of psychological tests during the next decade:
The evidence shows that the method by which track
assignments are made depends essentially on standardized
104. Id. at 92.
105. 269 F. Supp. at 511.
106. Id. at 512.
107. Id. at 513. For a discussion of the level of scrutiny under equal protection
analysis used by the court and the problem of burden of proof, see note 185 and text
accompanying notes 186 to 206 infra.
108. Id.
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aptitude tests which, although given on a system-wide basis, are
completely inappropriate for use with a large segment of the
student body. Because these tests are standardized primarily on
and are relevant to a white middle class group of students, they
produce inaccurate and misleading test scores when given to
lower class and Negro students. . . . [T]hese students are in
reality being classified ... [on] factors which have nothing to
do with innate ability.10 9
Thus, Judge Wright ordered that "the track system ... simply must
be abolished""10 and permanently enjoined its operation.
A Critique of the Psychometric Underpinnings of Hobson
With one blow Judge Wright's decision in Hobson severely
wounded two sacred cows, ability grouping and standardized
testing. Although extensive comment on the educational implica-
tions of the former is not within the scope of this Article,"' some
brief remarks are in order. It is unclear whether Judge Wright
ordered the dismantling of the track system under all conditions or
only as it was then being implemented by the defendants. Although
his order appears to call for abolition, Judge Wright had conceded
earlier that ability grouping could be a rational practice. What the
court complained of was its inflexibility, its stigmatizing effect on
the black and the poor, its failure to provide students in lower tracks
resources expended on those in upper tracks, and its failure to
provide compensatory education for those in the General and Special
tracks, thus relegating those students to permanent inequality. On
appeal, Judge Wright's order was interpreted in the light most
favorable to the board of education so that it would not hamper the
flexibility of the new board or frustrate its attempts to improve the
District's school system." 2 Thus, although the appellate court did
not modify Judge Wright's order to abolish tracking, it did interpret
109. Id. at 514.
110. Id. at 515.
111. For educational and legal perspectives on ability grouping, see W. FINDLEY &
M. BRYAN, ABILITY GROUPING: 1970 (1971); M. GOLDBERG, A. PASSOW & J. JUSTMAN,
THE EFFECTS OF ABILITY GROUPING (1966); Heathers, Groupings, in ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH 559 (R. Ebel ed. 1969); Kirp, Schools as Sorters, supra
note 8, at 725-31; Shea, supra note 8; Sorgen, supra note 8, at 1132-37; Judicial
Supervision, supra note 8, at 1518-22 (and references collected therein); Educational
Testing, supra note 8, at 376-78. There are, however, some important subsequent
cases concerning ability grouping. See text accompanying notes 151 to 164 infra.
112. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 189 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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it as referring only to the track system "as it existed at the time of
the decree." 113
Although Hobson was criticized on several counts,114 from the
psychometric point of view the court's gravest error was its
insistence that grouping can only be based on tests that measure
innate ability.115 No psychologist who has written on the subject
believes that tests measure hereditary endowment solely." 6 Howev-
er, there was a second reason for the court's condemnation of group
tests. The court asserted that the tests were culturally biased because
they were standardized on white middle-class children and thus
measured psychological and environmental factors unrelated to the
true abilities of black children." 7
The court was echoing the universal claim among test critics
that standardized tests are heavily biased against poor racial and
ethnic minorities because they fail to take into account differences in
dialect, value orientation, acquired information, or the importance of
the situation or social setting in which tests are administered, and
113. Id.
114. E.g., Kurland, Equal Educational Opportunity: The Limits of Constitutional
Jurisprudence Undefined, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 595 (1968); Judicial Supervision, supra
note 8.
115. See, e.g., Ability Grouping, supra note 8, at 160; Judicial Supervision, supra
note 8, at 1519-20; Intelligence Classifications, supra note 8, at 665 n.89, 671 n.116;
Educational Testing, supra note 8, at 380; 20 STAN. L. REV. 1249 (1968).
116. Cleary, et al., supra note 7, at 17; e.g., id. at 22: 'I]ntelligence as measured is
not a capacity. It is a behavioral trait and one highly dependent on past learning,
whether the test is a standard test of intelligence or a 'culture-fair' test." The report
from which this quotation was taken, prepared at the request of the American
Psychological Association's (APA) Board of Scientific Affairs, was highly criticized
by persons representing two minority groups within the APA, but none of the critics
argued that the quoted assertion was untrue. Most minority group psychologists
believe that current standardized tests measure little, if any, hereditary endowment.
Bernal, supra note 7; Jackson, supra note 7. See A. ANASTASi, supra note 7, at 350
("Most intelligence tests can... be regarded as measures of scholastic aptitude."); D.
HEBB, A TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY 246-53 (1958); APA Task Force on Employment
Testing of Minority Groups, Job Testing and the Disadvantaged, 24 AM. PSYCH. 637,
640 (1969) ("Aptitude tests . .. measure developed abilities, reflecting the interiction
between an individual's experiences and his innate endowments."); Anastasi, Some
Implications of Cultural Factors for Test Construction, in TESTING PROBLEMS IN
PERSPECTIVE, 453, 456 (A. Anastasi ed. 1966). Not even Arthur Jensen, the most
prolific and publicized of the hereditarians, believes that an intelligence test score
reflects innate ability only. A. JENSEN, BIAS IN MENTAL TESTING (1980); Jensen, How
Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement?, 39 HARV. EDUC. REV. 1 (1969).
The argument among psychologists and other scientists concerns the relative weight
to be assigned to hereditary and environmental factors. See generally R. CANCRO,
INTELLIGENCE: GENETIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL INFLUENCES (1971).
117. 269 F. Supp. at 514. Such tests have been called "Anglocentric." J. MERCER,
LABELING THE MENTALLY RETARDED 13-15 (1973); Mercer, supra note 7, at 138-39.
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thus they consistently underpredict the potential ability of those
children.118 But, if the assumption in Hobson that tests can and
should measure innate ability is false, then the condemnation of
tests as not reflecting the dominant culture may be misconceived.
The consensus - although not the unanimous view - among
psychologists, as reflected in the report of the American Psychologi-
cal Association Ad Hoc Committee on the Educational Uses of Tests
with Disadvantaged Students, is:
[W]hat the tests have measured with greater or lesser validity
and comprehensiveness . . . is the possession of abilities that
are demonstrated to be useful in predicting future learning....
By and large, when properly applied and interpreted, they have
predicted future learning for all segments of our society with
modest but significant validity and generalizability.11 9
Thus, tests may be useful in measuring how well students have
acquired the skills taught by the school system and how well they
may do at the next level in the educational hierarchy. 12° The tests,
rather than reflecting cultural inferiority, are indicative of the
educational - not genetic - deficiencies of minority children and,
,118. See, e.g., Baca & Cervantes, The Assessment of Minority Students: Are
Adaptive Behavior Scales the Answer?, 15 PSYCH. IN THE SCHOOLS 366 (1978); Baratz
& Baratz, Negro Ghetto Children and Urban Education: A Cultural Solution, 33 Soc.
FDuc. 401 (1969); Bernal, supra note 7; Dent, Assessing Black Children for
Mainstream Placement, in MAINSTREAMING AND THE MINORITY CHILD 77 (R. Jones
ed. 1976); Jackson, supra note 7; Jorgensen, supra note 7; Labov, Academic Ignorance
and Black Intelligence, 229 ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 1972, at 59; Oakland &
Matuszek, Using Tests in Nondiscriminatory Assessment, in PSYCHOLOGICAL AND
EDUCATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF MINORITY CHILDREN 52, 58-62 (T. Oakland ed. 1977);
Rivers, Henderson, Jones, Ladner & Williams, Mosaic of Labels for Black Children, in
2 ISSUES IN THE CLASSIFICATION OF CHILDREN 213, 231-42 (N. Hobbs ed. 1975);
Samuda, supra note 7, at 65; Assessing Minority Group Children (B. Phillips ed.), 11 J.
OF SCH. PSYCH. 291-401 (1973).
119. Cleary, et al., supra note 7, at 24. The use of the term "ability" in this widely
quoted report is unfortunate because it may perpetuate Judge Wright's confusion
concerning what the ideal test should measure, innate ability or present functioning.
It would have been more helpful had the authors substituted a term such as "skills,"
"knowledge," or "overt behaviors" for the word "ability." However, understood in its
entirety, the quoted statement can still be accepted as the consensus in the sense that
most psychologists agree that tests more or less accurately measure present levels of
performance and future learning capabilities. However, insofar as the one standard
deviation difference between black and white children on standardized intelligence
tests are interpreted by the authors of the Report as racial differences that cannot be
ignored, id. at 16, the Report has been called "blatantly racist." Jackson, supra note 7,
at 88.
120. A. ANASTASI, supra note 7, at 342.
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more important, perhaps the inadequacy of public schools in their
present state. "The flaw is in our educational system, from primary
school right through college. A tremendous amount of talent is being
wasted... . [T]ests have been helpful in documenting the severity of
the problem."121 In this respect the "tests are not bigoted villains but
color-blind measuring instruments that have demonstrated a social
problem to be solved."'1 22
The critics who have been concerned about the impact of low test
scores on minority groups and who have repeatedly called for the
abolition of testing have themselves been admonished for failing to
see the inconsistency of their views and for their failure to argue
vigorously enough for changes in the way schools teach:
Low achievement scores reported for groups of minority
students have led to demands not for the improvement of the
educational system but for the abandonment of those "lying"
tests. ... [W]hen the many carefully constructed and widely
used tests are actually inspected for content, almost always that
content is found to consist of legitimate samplings of quite
uncontroversial educational goals, such as the ability . .. to
calculate simple mathematical problems. But the emotionality
stemming from the confusion over the proper interpretation of
the test scores sometimes leads minority spokespersons to take
the position that those tests are asking the wrong questions.
This implies that somewhere there are some right questions and
that in fact there is satisfactory achievement taking place on the
part of our minority students .... It is as if [those spokesper-
sons] are saying that our inner-city schools are in fact being
quite successful after all.
But the interesting thing is that some of the same persons
who will at least implicitly stand by this argument at some
times will at other times be vocal critics of that same school
system, claiming that it has failed the minority population. The
strain on the logic of the argument occurs when those same low
test scores are used to prove the point. 23
121. Green, In Defense of Measurement, 33 AM. PSYCH. 664, 669 (1978). See Kirp,
Schools as Sorters, supra note 8, at 758.
122. Green, supra note 121, at 669. "[Elven though aptitude tests are culturally
biased, they are biased for a reason: the school experience itself is culturally biased."
Ability Grouping, supra note 8, at 161.
123. Flaugher, supra note 9, at 672. But see Martin Luther King Jr. Elem. School
Children v. Michigan Bd. of Educ., 451 F. Supp. 1324 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (Equal
Educational Opportunities Act may guarantee instruction in "Black English" to black
students).
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The problem lies in defining the nature of the test. If the test is
perceived as a measure of achievement, then a low score calls for
additional effort on the part of the school to remedy the problem. The
bias occurs when the low score is perceived as a measure of pure
aptitude. In that case, the low score "may be interpreted as an
indication that there is insufficient capacity on that test taker's part
to achieve; therefore, any additional educational effort would be
wasted."'1 24 Insofar as the District of Columbia was failing to provide
the educational resources to help low-scoring children compensate
for academic deficiencies, the proper remedy should have been
improvement of the manner in which the children were taught, not
the abolition of the tracking system.125
By definition, achievement and intelligence tests will always fail
to meet Hobson's demand for assessment devices devoid of
environmental bias. Given what they purport to measure, they
inevitably reflect the social setting of the test taker.
[A]ll behavior is thus affected by the cultural milieu in which the
individual is reared and since psychological tests are but
samples of behavior, cultural influences will and should be
reflected in test performance. It is therefore futile to try to devise
a test that is free from cultural influences. 26
Efforts to produce culture-free tests or to reduce content bias
have met with little success. "Nonverbal or performance tests are
now generally recognized as falling short of the goal of freedom from
cultural influences, and attempts to develop culture fair verbal tests
... are recognized as failures."' 27 "On the WISC [Wechsler
Intelligence Scale for Children], for instance, black children usually
find the Performance tests as difficult or more difficult than the
Verbal tests; this pattern is also characteristic of children from low
socioeconomic levels."'128 "[I]t is sobering but instructive to recognize
124. Id.
125. Of course, any recommendation for compensatory education may have to
overcome the argument that in-school achievement has little to do with the resources
of the school but is rather a reflection of the political, social, and economic
environment in which the child lives. See C. JENCKS, INEQUALITY (1972).
126. A. ANASTASi, supra note 7, at 345 (emphasis in original).
127. Reschly, supra note 7, at 231. "The apparent inability of culture-fair tests to
yield similar means and standard deviations for persons from different racial-ethnic
groups and social classes or to yield suitably high levels of concurrent and predictive
validity contributed to their disuse." Oakland & Matuszek, supra note 118, at 62.
128. A. ANASTASI, supra note 7, at 348 (references omitted).
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that minority children do poorly even on so-called culture-free tests
")129
There has been relatively less research concerning content bias
in tests. Criticism focuses on the questions themselves: "They ask
questions about things like the distance from Boston to London, how
to keep from being lost in the wilderness, the author of Macbeth, the
cause of icebergs melting, and such. They ask for the definition of
words which are much more frequently used in white than in black
culture."'130 But, contrary to popular thought, such widely criticized
questions on the revised version of the WISC (WISC-R) comprehen-
sion subtest as, "What is the thing to do if a boy (or girl) much
smaller than yourself starts to fight with you?" are actually easier
for black children than they are for white.131 Eliminating thirteen
items perceived to be biased from a widely used eighty-two item
elementary reading test "did not improve the performance of schools
with high minority populations relative to their performance on the
original 'biased' version."'1 32 Deleting what appear to be idiosyn-
cratic items from group ability tests resulted only in "making the
test considerably more difficult for everyone, since many of the items
that [show] the widest discrepancy between groups [are] moderate to
low in overall difficulty."' 133
Even if tests are of some use in indicating the erosion of
academic skills, they may still be biased with respect to the
complementary processes of prediction and selection, the other uses
for which supporters believe tests have validity.134 Prediction is more
129. Kirp, Schools as Sorters, supra note 8, at 758. See references collected id. at
758 n.265.
130. Jorgensen, supra note 7, at 35.
131. Reschly, supra note 7, at 232. The implication is that bullying is accepted
behavior among blacks. See Kirp, Schools as Sorters, supra note 8, at 758 n.265.
132. Flaugher, supra note 9, at 675.
133. Id. Cf. Green, supra note 121, at 668 ("Careful attempts to find [culturally
biased] items have had slim success. With few exceptions, the same group differences
occur for each item."). But see Oakland & Matuszek, supra note 118, at 59.
134. See, e.g., BUREAU OF EDUC. FOR THE HANDICAPPED, DEVELOPING CRITERIA
FOR THE EVALUATION OF PROTECTION IN EVALUATION PROCEDURES PROVISIONS
(1978); Cleary, et al., supra note 7; Cleary, Test Bias: Prediction of Grades of Negro
and White Students in Integrated Colleges, 5 J. EDUC. MEAS. 115 (1968); Cole, Bias in
Selection, 10 J. EDUC. MEAS. 237 (1973); Cronbach, Equity in Selection - Where
Psychometrics and Political Philosophy Meet, 13 J. EDUC. MEAS. 31 (1976);
Darlington, Another Look at "Cultural Fairness", 8 J. EDUC. MEAS. 71 (1971);
Darlington, A Defense of "Rational" Personnel Selection and Two New Methods, 13 J.
EDUC. MEAS. 43 (1976); Flaugher, supra note 9; Hunter & Schmidt, Critical Analysis
of the Statistical and Ethical Implications of Various Definitions of Test Bias, 83
PSYCH. BULL. 1053 (1976); Kennedy, Rationality, Emotionality, and Testing, 16 J.
SCH. PSYCH. 16, 19-22 (1978); Linn & Werts, Considerations for Studies of Test Bias, 8
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pertinent to the topic of selection for higher education and
employment, and extensive discussion would be beyond the scope of
this Article. Several points, however, should be made.
First, the issue of cultural bias in selection based on test scores is
complex and controversial, and the opinions on it contradictory, 135
although there is some consensus that tests cannot be fair unless
they predict with equal accuracy for all groups.136 Second, studies
investigating the ability to predict academic achievement from
standardized tests indicate that "minority groups and people of
J. EDUC. MEAS. 1 (1971); McNemar, On So-Called Test Bias, 30 AM. PSYCH. 848 (1975);
Novick & Ellis, Equal Opportunity in Educational and Employment Selection, 32 AM.
PSYCH. 306 (1977); Novick & Petersen, Towards Equalizing Educational and
Employment Opportunity, 13 J. EDUC. MEAS. 77 (1976); Oakland, Predictive Validity
of Readiness Tests for Middle and Lower Socioeconomic Status of Anglo, Black and
Mexican American Children, 70 J. EDUC. PSYCH. 574 (1978); Petersen & Novick, An
Evaluation of Some Models for Culture-Fair Selection, 13 J. EDUC. MEAS. 3 (1976);
Sawyer, Cole & Cole, Utilities and the Issue of Fairness in a Decision Theoretic Model
for Selection, 13 J. EDUC. MEAS. 59 (1976); Schmidt & Hunter, Racial and Ethnic Bias
in Psychological Tests: Divergent Implications of Two Definitions of Test Bias, 29
AM. PSYCH. 1 (1974); Thorndike, Concepts of Culture-Fairness, 8 J. EDUC. MEAS. 63
(1971); Reschly, Comparison of Bias in Assessment with Conventional and Pluralistic
Measures (unpublished paper presented at the Annual Convention of the Council for
Exceptional Children) (May 1978).
135. See, e.g., Petersen & Novick, supra note 134, at 23-24:
[The many models for test bias] are each explications of general concepts of
what constitutes fair use of tests in a selection situation. There seems to be
nothing in the literature that clearly indicates when, if ever, one of the models
is preferable to the other five models. Thus, the practitioner has no clear
guidance in the choice of a culture-fair selection model. Further, we have
suggested that [several models] and their converses are internally contradic-
tory.
As stated in Ysseldyke, Implementing the "Protection in Evaluation Procedures"
Provisions of Public Law 94-142, in BUREAU OF EDUC. FOR THE HANDICAPPED,
DEVELOPING CRITERIA FOR THE EVALUATION OF PROTECTION IN EVALUATION
PROCEDURES PROVISIONS 150 (1978):
Several investigators have reviewed the models of test fairness and have
concluded that there is little agreement among the several models. It is readily
apparent that major measurement experts have been essentially unable to
agree on a definition of a fair test, let alone identify a test that is fair for
members of different groups. There is little agreement on the concept of
nondiscriminatory assessment.
See Flaugher, supra note 9, at 671: "[Alspects [of test bias] are widely disparate and
frequently stem from entirely different universes of discourse"; Schmidt & Hunter,
supra note 134, at 1; cf. Hunter & Schmidt, supra note 134, at 1069 (ethical positions
regarding test bias were shown "to be irreconcilable").
136. Reschly, supra note 7, at 233-34. This position must be distinguished,
however, from the one that asserts that tests are only fair if there are no mean score
differences between population subgroups. That position is considered "untenable" in
that "such a definition eliminates a priori any possibility of real group differences on
various psychological traits ...." Schmidt & Hunter, supra note 134, at 1.
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lower SES [socioeconomic status] are generally predicted just as well
as are upper-middle SES Caucasians.' 1 37 The WISC-R Full Scale I.Q.
Score predicts school achievement similarly for white, black, and
Chicano elementary and junior high school children.13s Third, when
test bias is measured by certain forms of statistical analysis, the
result is that in some situations the standardized test overpredicts
success for minorities and underpredicts success for whites. 139
Fourth, other definitions of test bias, which seek to correct
disproportionate selection procedures by statistical adjustments in
test scores, cutoff points, and prediction formulas or by establishing
quotas, have not only met with disapproval by those in measure-
ment 140 but may run afoul of Bakke's proscription of the use of
explicit and purposeful racial criteria for selection purposes.141
Finally, and perhaps most important, reliance on psychometric
models of test bias without consideration of the social and ethical
consequences of test use ignores the concerns of significant
segments of society. While the Ad Hoc Report 142 defended the
technical adequacy of tests for prediction and selection, it failed to
137. Kennedy, supra note 134, at 19-20.
138. Reschly & Reschly, Validity of WISC-R Factor Scores in Predicting
Achievement and Attention for Four Sociocultural Groups, 16 J. SCH. PSYCH. (in
press). However, the WISC-R predicted less well for native American children. The
correlations themselves fell within the usual range of .40 to .60 found between I.Q. and
school achievement. Correlation between the WISC-R and Reading Scores on the
Metropolitan Achievement Test were .56, .62, and .55 for white, black, and Chicano
children respectively. Correlations between the I.Q. test and teacher ratings as
measured by a ten-item Academic Scale were .35, .45, and .38 for the same groups. In
Larry P. v. Riles, No. C-71-2270 R.F.P. (N.D. Cal. Oct. 16,1979), appeal docketed, No.
80-4027 (9th Cir. Jan. 17, 1980) (Riles II), the court rejected such studies to support the
validity of I.Q. tests for minorities. The court would only consider studies in which
I.Q. test results were correlated with classroom grades, not with other standardized
tests. Slip op. at 71. Riles II is discussed in the text accompanying notes 279 to 351
infra.
139. The principal method used in this computation is called "regression
analysis." It permits researchers to predict one characteristic of an individual from
one or more other characteristics. For example, school achievement may be predicted
from intelligence test scores. J. WERT, C. NEIDT & J. AHMANN, STATISTICAL METHODS
IN EDUCATIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH 226 (1954). The most widely
followed discussion of the subject is in Cleary, Test Bias: Prediction of Grades of
Negro and White Students in Integrated Colleges, 5 J. EDUC. MEAS. 115 (1968). The
technique there described was adopted by the APA Ad Hoc Committee on Educational
Uses of Tests with Disadvantaged Students. Cleary, et al., supra note 7, at 25-32. See
A. ANASTASI, supra note 7, at 192.
140. E.g., A. ANASTASI, supra note 7, at 197; Hunter & Schmidt, supra note 134. For
criticism of those techniques (which the authors call "group parity models") by a
psychometrician and legal scholar, see Novick & Ellis, supra note 134.
141. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
142. Cleary, et al., supra note 7.
19791
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
consider what minority groups charged was the egregious misuse of
tests having a negative impact on the lives of minorities. 143 "[T]o
defend tests on the basis of evidence of common regression systems
or to attempt to separate the issues of technical adequacy from those
of social consequences is insufficient." 144 Recent attempts to
examine the ethical, legal, and social implications of various models
of test bias are valuable additions to the literature. 145 In essence,
even the selection of a model to measure and ameliorate test bias is
ultimately a value judgment.146 Justice Powell, writing in Bakke,
appears to have opted for what may be called "qualified individual-
ism,' 47 i.e., that considerations of race and ethnicity may be
appropriate under some circumstances but not when selection is
based solely on those characteristics. 41
Aftermath of Hobson
A significant finding by Judge Wright in Hobson was that
reliance on group ability tests contributed to the misclassification of
approximately 820 of 1272 students.149 Evidence of the misclassifica-
tion was provided by the school system itself. In 1965, two years
prior to the Hobson decision, the school superintendent had ordered
that no student could be assigned to the EMR track without an
evaluation, usually an individual test by a psychologist. When
clinicians reassessed the children in the Special Academic Track
they found that almost two-thirds were not genuinely retarded. In
this light, Hobson could be seen as a vindication of the use of
individual tests by school and clinical psychologists.150 Nevertheless,
143. Bernal, supra note 7; Jackson, supra note 7.
144. Reschly, supra note 7, at 235.
145. See, e.g., Hunter & Schmidt, supra note 134; Novick & Ellis, supra note 134.
146. For example, one may choose a group-parity model so as to reduce the effects
of past discrimination or mitigate current skill deficits in minority groups. Or, one
may choose a model that insures that the primary consideration is equal opportunity
for individuals, regardless of race. Both may be considered to have high social utility,
but each will have different consequences for minorities.
147. The term was coined by Hunter & Schmidt, supra note 134, at 1054, but used
for different purposes.
148. "Fairness in individual competition for opportunities, especially those
provided by the State, is a widely cherished American ethic." Regents of Univ. of Cal.
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 319 n.53 (1978); see Hunter & Schmidt, supra note 134, at
1053-54, 1066-69.
149. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 490 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Smuck
v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See also 408 F.2d at 197.
150. Of course, there were no data that validated the determinations of the
clinicians based on those individual tests. The tests themselves were not identified in
the opinion or in the affirmance.
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after Hobson both ability grouping and testing of all kinds came
under intense judicial scrutiny.
In 1970 a second series of cases challenging the pupil placement
process began with Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School
District.'5' Title VI of the Civil Rights Act 15 2 had been in effect for
six years, and, faced with southern intransigence, 153 the Supreme
Court declared that freedom of choice plans that failed to eliminate
racial discrimination "root and branch" were unconstitutional 5 4
and that school boards were "obligated to terminate dual school
systems at once and to operate [unitary schools] now.' 1 55 In
Singleton, without explanation and without exploration of the
validity of either ability grouping or testing, the Fifth Circuit held
that achievement testing for the purpose of assigning students to
schools could not "be employed . . . until unitary school systems
have been established."'156 This holding was expanded in Lemon v.
Bossier Parish School Board,157 a case in which the court found that
a semester of desegregation was not long enough to permit a school
system to consider standardized testing for the purpose of pupil
assignment. The Fifth Circuit again declined to rule on the validity
of testing per se even though it had been asked to do so by the black
plaintiffs. It simply stated that "when a school district . . . has
operated as a unitary system for a sufficient time.., we will then
decide that complex and troubling question" of test validity. 158
The issue was more refined in Moses v. Washington Parish
School Board,159 in which a federal district court explored the
constitutionality of ability grouping within schools. The school
151. 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1970), rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. Carter v.
West Feliciana School Bd., 396 U.S. 290 (1970), vacated in part, 396 U.S. 226 (1969).
The case decided by the court of appeals was a consolidation of 17 separate district
court cases. Certiorari to the Supreme Court was denied in two of those cases. 396 U.S.
1032 (1970).
152. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1974): "No person in the United States shall, on the ground
of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
federal financial assistance."
153. From 1954 to 1964 only 2.14% of black students attended desegregated schools
in the 11 southern states. D. KImP & M. YUDOF, supra note 8, at 307.
154. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1967).
155. Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969).
156. 419 F.2d at 1219. Two identical rulings followed in United States v. Sunflower
County School Dist., 430 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1970), and United States v. Tunica County
School Dist., 421 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1970).
157. 444 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir. 1971).
158. Id. at 1401.
159. 330 F. Supp. 1340 (E.D. La. 1971), aff'd, 456 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1972).
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board, upon being ordered to integrate, decided to create homogene-
ous classes in all schools based solely on reading achievement. The
expert witnesses who testified at trial all agreed that if homogeneous
grouping was to function soundly, classification should be based on
multidimensional assessment and that assignment for all subjects
grounded only on reading test scores was "the worst form of
grouping."'16 As in Hobson, the court found that the program was
not genuinely compensatory, 161 that there was little between-track
fluidity, and that the lower tracks were almost totally populated by
black students. Without determining the per se validity of standard-
ized tests, and after acknowledging that "courts are not school
boards and do not derogate unto themselves the formulation of
educational policies,' 6 2 the court held that assignment of black
students "on the basis of presently used testing" violated the equal
protection clause and enjoined the use of such testing.1 3 For the first
time in this series of cases, the court provided a rationale for its
ruling. Though it condemned neither ability grouping nor testing, it
found the assessment process discriminatory against black students
who had been "educated in admittedly inferior [and segregated]
schools [and who were now called upon to compete with] white
students educated in superior schools for position in top sections."' 6 4
160. Id. at 1343.
161. The school system claimed that although it did not provide any added
instruction, the homogeneous grouping plan was compensatory by permitting slow
students to be placed with other slow students and to be exposed to regular school
materials at a slower pace. Id.
162. Id. at 1345.
163. Id.; 'resting used to resegregate students in a recently desegregated school
system is not permissible." Id.
164. Id. Accord, McNeal v. Tate County School Dist., 508 F.2d 1017, 1019 (5th Cir.
1975). This view has been criticized:
The evidence is conflicting as to whether blacks were psychologically or
academically harmed by segregation. It is also difficult to argue that black
children attending school in 1972 are victims of the discrimination of the
1950's directed against other black children. Even assuming a lingering
injury, there is conflicting evidence as to whether integration will undo that
injury. Nonetheless, in the absence of persuasive evidence to the contrary,
courts have steadfastly rejected ability grouping as an adequate response to
the Brown mandate.
Yudof, supra note 8, at 451. But see Kirp, Schools as Sorters, supra note 8, at 763. This
criticism, of course, is only relevant where black plaintiffs challenging tests and
tracking were not themselves the victims of segregated education in second-rate
schools.
Ironically, in McNeal v. Tate County School Dist., 508 F.2d 1017, 1019 (5th
Cir. 1975), a case in which the Fifth Circuit approved the analysis in Moses, ability
grouping was determined not by standardized tests, but by teacher evaluations of
pupil performance. Tracking was barred unless the school district could validate its
system. Thus, it did not seem to matter what the particular scheme was in these cases;
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The Ninth Circuit, unlike the Fifth, looked to Hobson for
authority but, in contrast to Hobson, found individual testing
unsatisfactory. 165 The first Ninth Circuit case was Diana v. State
Board of Education, 66 a class action in which nine representative
Mexican-American elementary school students challenged their
placement in EMR classes. Their school district classified pupils as
what concerned the courts was the use of apparently racially neutral methods of
classification in a discriminatory fashion. Tests were subsumed in the general
condemnation of the school districts' attempts to maintain segregation through
subterfuge.
165. There were, however, two district court cases arising in the Ninth Circuit that
resembled their Fifth Circuit counterparts. In Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ.,
311 F. Supp. 501 (C.D. Cal.), affl'd, 427 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
943 (1971), the district court found that interclass grouping within integrated schools
based in part on achievement and intelligence test scores violated the fourteenth
amendment. The defendant school system agreed that those tests were "racially
discriminatory, based as they are primarily on verbal achievement." Id. at 519.
However, "because of the delicate educational nature of decisions concerning
grouping" the court only urged the defendant to reexamine its grouping policies
carefully. Id. at 504. In Johnson v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 339 F. Supp.
1315 (N.D. Cal. 1971), vacated and remanded, 500 F.2d 349 (9th Cir. 1974), the court
enjoined San Francisco from "authorizing, permitting or using tracking systems or
other educational techniques or innovations without effective provisions to avoid
segregation." Id. at 1325. In Berkelman v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 501
F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1974), however, a Ninth Circuit panel held that it was
constitutional for a college preparatory high school to admit only those students
whose academic achievement placed them in the top 15% of their junior high school
class even though this excluded a disproportionate number of black and Spanish-
American students. Distinguishing Hobson, the court asserted that the unadmitted
students who thus had to attend the regular comprehensive high schools were not
denied a quality education. Further, the court noted that the classification system in
question depended upon past achievement, impartially measured, rather than on test-
based predictions that isolated students of lower ability. Finally, the court found that
the plaintiff students would suffer little psychic injury in attending schools in which
the majority of city students were enrolled. While it was bothered by the racial and
ethnic disproportionality, "uncertainty on this score ... does not mean that the
maintenance of [the elite school] is itself unconstitutional or that conditioning
admission on the basis of past academic achievement is unconstitutional." Id. at 1268.
The reasoning of the court with regard to selection based on past versus predicted
achievement is somewhat specious. In both cases, the evaluation data were being used
to predict future behavior. While it is true that in the one case the data forecast high
ability, and in the other, lack of ability to do even grade appropriate work, here, like
Hobson, past achievement was used to predict future achievement. Implied also in
Berkelman is the judgment that grade point averages are more objective and valid
than are standardized achievement tests. While grades themselves may be based on
subjective and irrelevant evaluations, even test advocates acknowledge that "the best
single predictor of a future academic record is usually the past academic record..
Cleary, et al., supra note 7, at 34; accord, L. CRONBACH, supra note 7, at 289.166. C.A. No. C-70-37 R.F.P. (N.D. Cal., filed Feb. 3, 1970). The case led to a
stipulated agreement and thus no decision was reported. For copies of the complaint
and the consent decree, see CLASSIFICATION MATERIALS, supra note 8, at 199-229.
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educably retarded if they scored between 55 and 70 on the WISC or
between 52 and 68 on the Stanford-Binet. 167 The plaintiffs contended
that the tests were unrelated to their ability to learn, culturally
biased, too dependent on verbal skills, improperly standardized (only
whites constituted the norm group), and inappropriately adminis-
tered because Spanish-speaking children were tested solely in
English by a non-Spanish-speaking examiner. The outcome was
significant ethnic disproportionality in the county's EMR program;
Spanish surnamed students constituted a little over eighteen percent
of the student population but accounted for nearly one-third of the
children in EMR classes. 168
The plaintiffs' most damaging evidence was provided by a
bilingual psychologist who retested the children. When reexamined
in Spanish and English, Diana, the named plaintiff, achieved an
I.Q. score of 79, forty-nine points higher than when initially tested.
Seven of the other eight plaintiffs also scored at or above the cutoff
score the district had set for EMR placement.169 In the face of these
data, the California Department of Education agreed to a consent
decree that stipulated the following changes in its method of
evaluating bilingual children:170 (1) all children whose primary
language was not English would be tested in both their primary
language and in English; (2) unfair verbal items - certain
vocabulary and informational questions, for example - would be
eliminated; (3) all Mexican-American and Chinese children in EMR
classes would be reevaluated in their primary language and only as
to those items that measured nonverbal skills; and (4) the state
167. The difference is accounted for by the difference in standard deviations for the
tests, 15 points on the WISC and 16 points on the Stanford-Binet. In both instances,
however, the criterion would be two to three standard deviations below the mean of
100.
168. Similar results were found in California as a whole. See CLASSIFICATION
MATiRIALS, supra note 8, at 203; Cultural Bias, supra note 8, at 1033 n.21.
169. The remaining child had an I.Q. score of 67 on the WISC. The range of the
nine scores was 67 to 89, derived from the WISC. The mean was approximately 77.
The California State Department of Education's own study in 1969 produced similar
results. Of 47 Mexican-American children in urban and rural school districts, 42 who
were retested on the Spanish version of the WISC scored above the state-mandated
cutoff point. The mean difference was 13.15 points (68.61 to 81.76). Twenty-seven of
the. children scored above 80. California State Dep't of Education, Spanish-Speaking
Pupils Classified as Educable Mentally Retarded, 7 INTEGRATED EDUC. 29-31 (1969).
170. CLASSIFICATION MATERIALS, supra note 8, at 226. The state also agreed that
counties would provide supplemental education so that EMR-placed children could be
reintegrated into regular classes. In addition, any school district that had a
significant disparity of Mexican-American children in its regular and EMR classes
would have to justify that disparity. Id.
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would develop revised I.Q. tests reflecting Mexican-American culture
and normed only on Mexican-American children.
Although it is difficult, under any circumstances, to accomplish
the second item171 and although the fourth has never been
accomplished, the rationale behind the decree is sound. Testing non-
English-speaking or bilingual children in a language they do not
fully understand and, on that basis, labeling them as retarded, is
recognized as an egregious example of cultural bias. 72 Perhaps the
most far-reaching outcome of Diana was that major provisions of the
consent decree were incorporated into the California Education
Code. 73
In Covarrubias v. San Diego Unified School District,174 the
testing issue was broadened to include charges of racial, cultural,
and environmental bias as well as inappropriate administration of
I.Q. testing for EMR placement. Like Diana, Covarrubias was settled
by a stipulated agreement, but in addition to seeking to enjoin the
continued use of I.Q. tests the black and Mexican-American
plaintiffs asked for $400,000 in punitive damages for the district's
171. See text accompanying notes 127 to 133 supra.
172. See, e.g., Cleary, et al., supra note 7, at 21-22, who call this "test misuse," and
Flaugher, supra note 9, at 677, who sees it as an example of "atmosphere bias." Use of
an intelligence test in this manner has been distinguished from a use in which the
purpose is to assess a child's current status in understanding English and ability to
manipulate stimuli thought important by the dominant culture. See Cleary, et al.,
supra note 7, at 22.
173. By 1971 the legislature had enacted laws declaring the following: (1) there
should be no disproportionality in EMR classes with regard to socioeconomic, racial,
or ethnic status, CAL, EDUC. CODE § 56504 (West 1978); (2) all intelligence tests
administered for the purpose of placement in EMR programs should be given in the
language in which the child is most fluent, id. § 56505; (3) no child should be placed in
an EMR class if he or she scores higher than two standard deviations below the norm
on a nonverbal intelligence test (or nonverbal portion of a verbal/nonverbal test)
unless an admissions committee unanimously agrees in writing after considering all
pertinent information that the child belongs in a class for retarded students, id.
§ 56506; (4) no child should be placed in an EMR class unless given a comprehensive
evaluation by a properly certified school psychologist, including not only an
intelligence test but data from a developmental history, educational evaluation, and
adaptive behavior scale, id. § 56508; (5) no evaluation or placement should take place
without written consent of the parents, id. § 78804-05. With regard to § 56508,
adaptive behavior is a measure of the extent to which the person can play "a full
complement of social roles appropriate for his age and is performing in those roles in
a manner comparable to that of other persons of his age in the society." J. MERCER,
supra note 117, at 137. In 1974 the state was ordered by the court to undo all
disproportionality in EMR classes with regard to Mexican-American children. Kirp,
Kuriloff & Buss, Legal Mandates and Organizational Change, in 2 IssuEs ON THE
CLASSIFICATION OF CHILDREN 319, 364 (N. Hobbs ed. 1975).
174. Civ. No. 70-394-S (S.D. Cal., filed Feb. 1971) (settled by consent decree, July
31, 1972).
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mislabeling and misplacement of children in EMR classes. Although
the plaintiffs were awarded only nominal damages, the case set a
precedent by establishing the appropriateness of both equitable
relief and monetary damages in misclassification litigation.175 A
third testing case in this circuit, Guadalupe Organization, Inc. v.
Tempe School District No. 3,176 also ended in a settlement in which
the school system agreed to reevaluate all children placed in EMR
classes, to test bilingual children in their primary language, and to
use more information than intelligence test scores in placement
decisions. 177
Larry P. v. Riles: Preliminary Injunction Phase
If Hobson was the seminal case of the 1960's, Larry P. v. Riles178
deserves similar status for the 1970's. The trial court's decision on
the merits, which took eight years to reach, threatens the continued
administration of individual intelligence tests and the existence of
EMR classes, particularly as they involve minority children. As the
rationale of the decision will almost certainly guide future litigation
concerning psychological assessment, the case warrants detailed
examination. The case has had two phases - the granting of a
175. In a similar misclassification suit, Stewart v. Phillips, C.A. No. 70-1199-F (D.
Mass., filed Sept. 14, 1970), plaintiffs asked for $20,000 in compensatory damages for
each child improperly placed in EMR classes in the Boston school system. The suit
triggered the passage of a new special education act in Massachusetts, MAss. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 71B, §§ 1-14 (West Supp. 1978). As of February 1980 the case was
finally being prepared for trial.
176. Civ. No. 71-435 (D. Ariz., filed August 9, 1971) (settled by consent decree, Jan.
24, 1972). In a subsequent action, plaintiffs' claim that the school's bilingual
instructional program violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment, Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970), and the
Equal Education Opportunity Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1703 (1974), was rejected.
Guadalupe Org'n, Inc. v. Tempe Elem. School Dist. No. 3, 587 F.2d 1022 (9th Cir.
1978).
177. The most important case concerning bilingual education is Lau v. Nichols,
414 U.S. 563 (1974), in which Chinese students charged that the San Francisco school
system failed to provide bilingual language instruction to all children in need of such
programs. The Supreme Court agreed, relying solely on Title VI of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970), and the regulations promulgated under that
provision, 45 C.F.R. § 80 (1974). By basing its decision on nonconstitutional grounds,
the Court not only reinforced the right of bilingual children to a "meaningful
education," 414 U.S. at 566, but perhaps more significantly, gave its imprimatur to
both Title VI and HEW's regulations, thus spurring the development of other
regulations bearing on the issue of psychological testing.
178. 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (order granting preliminary injunction),
aff'd, 502 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1974), No. C-71-2270 R.F.P. (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1979)
(decision on the merits), appeal docketed, No, 80-4027 (9th Cir. Jan. 17, 1980).
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preliminary injunction in 1972 (Riles J),179 and the decision on the
merits in 1979 (Riles I1).180
In 1971 black children attending San Francisco schools filed suit
in federal district court charging discrimination in their placement
in EMR classes as a result of having scored lower than 75 on state-
approved intelligence tests. The plaintiffs claimed they were not
mentally retarded and that the tests used to place them were
culturally biased. They alleged that the resultant classification
violated the equal protection clause and requested a preliminary
injunction restraining the school system from using I.Q. tests to
determine EMR placement of black children.
Adopting the approach used in Diana v. State Board of
Education,181 the plaintiffs presented affidavits from several black
psychologists who had retested the children. Although they
administered the identical tests initially given plaintiffs, the
psychologists did so only after they made attempts to establish
rapport, took pains to reduce distraction, and reworded items in
language considered more consistent with the children's cultural
background. Scoring procedures were changed so that the children
were given credit for nonstandard answers that were judged to show
an intelligent approach to solving the problem. The consequence of
these efforts was that on retesting all of the plaintiffs scored above
the 75 I.Q. cutoff point.
To show the irreparable injury required for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction, 18 2 the plaintiffs made several assertions.
Injury was claimed to be caused by plaintiffs' placement in a
program in which the curriculum was poor, teacher expectations low,
ridicule from peers high, and where placement was permanently
noted in the school's cumulative records, creating a stigma that
might affect future schooling, employment, and military enlist-
ment.i8 3 The school system defended the EMR program by pointing
to its relatively easier curriculum, slower pace, lack of pejorative
labels - the classes were characterized "ungraded" or "adjustment"
179. 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972), affl'd, 502 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1974).
180. No. C-71-2270 R.F.P. (N.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 1979), appeal docketed, No. 80-4027
(9th Cir. Jan. 17, 1980). See text accompanying notes 279 to 351 infra.
181. C.A. No. C-70-37 R.F.P. (N.D. Cal., filed Feb. 3, 1970). See text accompanying
notes 166 to 173 supra.
182. See generally 0. Fiss, INJUNCTIONS 168 (1972).
183. Plaintiffs also charged that harm would be especially great since reevaluation
of their intellectual status occurred only once every three years. However, between the
time of filing and the consideration of injunctive relief, California's code was revised
to require annual reevaluation. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56501 (West 1978).
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- and the opportunity for reintegration into the mainstream on the
basis of yearly evaluations.
The court rejected the defendant's position, concluding that
"even if a student remains in an EMR class for only one month, that
placement is noted on his permanent record, his education is
retarded to some degree and he is subjected to whatever humiliation
students are exposed to for being separated into classes for the
educable mentally retarded."'11 4 In the court's view, therefore, any
wrongful placement would constitute irreparable harm.
The key aspect of Riles I was the court's determination of the
equal protection issue. The plaintiffs contended that because the
testing practices of the San Francisco school system disproportion-
ately harmed black children, their use by the defendants violated the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 8 5 They did not
184. 343 F. Supp. at 1308.
185. The equal protection clause provides that no state shall "deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
It comes into play only when the alleged inequality is the result of state action, as are
all actions of public schools for fourteenth amendment purposes. See Brown v. Board
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). It is not sufficient for a plaintiff to show that a
particular practice treats different individuals differently, Griffin v. County School
Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964), or that it fails to achieve equality with mathematical
precision, Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911). Rather, the courts
will only hold classifications unconstitutional if they find them to be "invidious" or
"arbitrary" and only after examining the circumstances in each case, the nature of
individual interests involved, the purported state interest at stake, and the particular
groups affected. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626
(1969).
In the main, courts have used two standards or tests when a state statute or
.practice is called into question as offending the equal protection clause. The usual
standard has been designated as the rational basis test or the relaxed standard of
review. Under this test a state may differentiate among persons as long as the
classification bears some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose.
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S: 420, 425 (1961). The state may justify its
classificatory scheme by showing that it reasonably seeks to fulfill the purpose for
which it is developed. This constraint does not impose a significant burden upon the
state. In practice, there is considerable deference to legislative prerogative. Courts will
not only presume that the state had a reasonable basis for enacting a particular
measure, but will often hypothesize the government's purpose behind its classification
mechanism in cases in which it fails to state its rationale explicitly. E.g., Williamson
v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955). Moreover, courts have traditionally placed
the burden on the plaintiff to show that the state's action is arbitrary and
unreasonable. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). The second test, commonly
called the compelling state interest test or the strict scrutiny standard, is much more
difficult for the state to meet. When applied, the state must show a compelling or
overriding reason for its practice, the practice must be precisely tailored to accomplish
its purpose, and there must be no less drastic means for fulfilling its objective. Dunn
v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). The strict
scrutiny test is triggered in either of two cases - when the state's classification
scheme impairs the exercise of a fundamental right or when it affects certain groups
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contend that education was a fundamental right of which they were
deprived, nor did they assert that the classification of black children
as retarded was discrimination based explicitly on race. Rather, they
asserted that although placement in EIR classes was accomplished
through a purely intelligence-based classification, the method of
classification led to a disproportionate impact on black children. It
was undisputed that although blacks constituted only 28.5 percent of
all students in the San Francisco school system, 66 percent of all
students in the EMR program were black. Similarly, though blacks
comprised 9.1 percent of the California school population, 27.5
percent of all school children in the state in ElVIR classes were black.
The plaintiffs urged rejection of traditional equal protection
analysis, which forced them to shoulder the burden of proving that
the classification process was arbitrary and irrational. They claimed
known as "suspect classes." Fundamental rights are those either specifically
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights - e.g., speech, press, religious expression, and trial
by jury - or those not expressly stated but which are considered critical to the
preservation of basic civil and political rights - e.g., interstate travel, privacy, and
voting. With regard to the suspect class, it is not meant that the group has suspicious
attributes but rather that the classification is suspect because it unduly burdens
certain carefully defined categories of people considered to be "saddled with such
disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or
relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary
protection from the majoritarian political process." San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973); see United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152 n.4 (1938). To date, only national ancestry, alienage, and race are considered
suspect classes. The apparent bases for the denomination of these groups as suspect is
that the characteristics they possess are congenital and essentially immutable, that
classifications affecting them stigmatize the class in the eyes of society, and, through
no fault of their own, they are, or have been, politically impotent. See Intelligence
Classifications, supra note 8, at 653-54. Significant consequences flow from the
Supreme Court's description of a right as fundamental or a class as suspect. Either
identification has been tantamount to a court's finding that the challenged practice
violates the equal protection clause. "[Tihe determination of whether someone needs
the special protection of the compelling interest standard thus involves complex
policy evaluation. The Court, therefore, has been noticeably reluctant to expand the
range of fundamental interests and suspect classifications." Note, Constitutional
Requirements for Standardized Ability Tests in Education, supra note 8, at 804. See
text accompanying notes 227 to 231 infra.
Recently, the Supreme Court appears to have developed an intermediate
standard of review, requiring states to show "some ground of difference having a fair
and substantial relation to the object of the legislation." Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76
(1971). This test has been employed most often when the Court has scrutinized
practices that have allegedly discriminated between the sexes, e.g., Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); see Redish, Legislative Response to the Medical Malpractice
Insurance Crisis: Constitutional Implications, 55 TEX. L. REV. 759, 773-79 (1977), but'
it has also been used where a non-suspect classification operates to the detriment of a
disadvantaged class of persons, De La Cruz v. Tormey, 582 F.2d 45, 59 n.10 (9th Cir.
1978); Berkelman v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 501 F.2d 1264, 1267 (9th Cir.
1974).
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that the burden should shift instead to the defendant school system
to demonstrate the rationality of its procedures.
The plaintiffs had strong precedential support in cases of an
analogous nature. In the past, courts had shifted the burden when
qualification tests for jury service led to disproportionately low
numbers of blacks on grand and petit juries186 and when school
board policies with regard to delineation of school boundaries
resulted in disproportionate predominance of one race within
schools. 8 7 Perhaps the most persuasive and apt precedent for a shift
in burden was Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,' 88 a case decided by the
Supreme Court the year before Riles I. There, in an employment
discrimination action brought under Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, 8 9 black employees challenged the use of intelligence
tests as a condition of employment or transfer to certain positions
for which they were otherwise qualified. The employer claimed that
although the test criterion may have had a discriminatory effect in
that fewer blacks were hired or promoted, it had had no intent to
discriminate. The Supreme Court, however, interpreted Title VII as
proscribing "not only overt discrimination but also practices that are
fair in form, but discriminatory in operation."'190 Despite the lack of
any evidence that promotion policies were designed to prevent the
advancement of black employees - to the contrary, the court found
some evidence of special efforts by the employer to aid blacks - the
Court declared that "good intent or absence of discriminatory intent
does not redeem . . . testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in
headwinds' for minority groups. .... ",191 Once the discriminatory
effect was shown, the Court placed the burden in Title VII cases on
the employer to show "that any given requirement ... ha[d] a
manifest relationship to the employment in question."'1 92
186. E.g., Carmical v. Craven, 457 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1971).
187. E.g., United States v. School Dist. 151, 286 F. Supp. 786 (N.D. Ill.), affl'd, 404
F.2d 1125 (7th Cir. 1968).
188. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
189. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1974). Title VII prohibits discrimination in employment
because of race, color, sex, or national origin. In 1972 the Act was amended to cover
employment by state and local governments. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2(2), 86 Stat. 103 (1972).
190. 401 U.S. at 431.
191. Id. at 432.
192. Id. It has been suggested that this case not only led to a shifting of the burden
of proof but raised the standard of proof to more than mere rationality. The phrase
"manifest relationship" was seen as a "new equal protection test more stringent than
rational relationship but less stringent than compelling state interest." Cultural Bias,
supra note 8, at 1062. For a later case restating the principles in Griggs, see Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
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The court in Riles I found the reasoning of the jury, school, and
employment cases to be persuasive.193 Underlying the burden shift
in those decisions, it said, were three principles easily analogized to
the facts in Riles I. First, there was a "strong judicial and
constitutional policy against racial discrimination."'194 Although the
school system was not classifying students explicitly on the basis of
race, in de facto discrimination cases there was "this same distrust
of laws which harm blacks as an identifiable class.' 95 Second, even
when there was no intent to discriminate, there was the "existence of
a positive duty to avoid racial imbalance"' 96 on the part of school
officials. Finally, disproportionality in EMR placement could not
have occurred without discrimination, given the presumption that
intelligence was randomly distributed among all races:
Since it does not seem to be disputed that the qualification for
placement in regular classes is the innate ability to learn at the
pace at which those classes proceed ... such random distribu-
tion can be expected if there is in turn a random distribution of
these learning abilities among members of all races.197
Concluding its lengthy analysis, the court decided it would shift
the burden of proof to the school system if the plaintiffs could
demonstrate that racial imbalance existed in the composition of
EMR classes and that the challenged intelligence tests were the
193. The Supreme Court has since held, however, that the "discriminatory effect"
analysis used in these cases applies only to actions brought under the Civil Rights
Act and not to those brought under the Constitution. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229 (1976). See notes 215 to 222 and accompanying text infra.
194. 343 F. Supp. at 1309.
195. Id. The court found support in Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C.
1967), for this justification. Further, the court noted that if San Francisco was indeed
making explicitly racial classifications, it would have a "near impossible burden to
sustain." 343 F. Supp. at 1309.
196. Id. at 1310. While the court did not refer to it, there was also support for this
assertion in Swann v. Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971), in which the Supreme
Court held that when a school system failed to achieve desegregation, courts had the
"broad power to fashion h remedy that will assure a unitary school system."
197. 343 F. Supp. at 1310. In fact, San Francisco had explicitly eschewed any
theory of genetic inferiority. The school system did suggest that since black parents
tended to be poor, and that poor pregnant women were likely to suffer from dietary
deficiencies, it was plausible that a disproportionate number of black children would
suffer from retarded brain development. The court, having before it no evidence to
support these hypotheses, rejected them and concluded that "there can be no basis for
assuming otherwise than that the ability to learn is randomly spread about the
population." Id. at 1311.
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primary determinant for placement in those classes. 198 Satisfied that
the data as to imbalance were undisputed and unequivocal, 199 the
court proceeded to determine whether the primary basis for EMR
placement was the I.Q. test.
California's Education Code did, in fact, require a comprehen-
sive evaluation.m Students could not be placed in a program for the
retarded unless their intelligence test scores were two standard
deviations below the mean and a school psychologist had assessed
their developmental history, cultural background, school achieve-
ment, and adaptive behavior. 201 Nevertheless, the court concluded
that the school district placed emphasis on I.Q. scores; they
"loom[ed] as a most important consideration in making assignments
to EMR classes.' ' 20 2 From California statutes prohibiting placement
in programs for the retarded unless the I.Q. score was substantiated
by other data, the court inferred that it was the score that served as
the major placement determinant.
The plaintiffs, having satisfied both elements of the court's test,
successfully shifted the burden to the defendant to justify its use of
I.Q. tests and to "demonstrate the rational connection between the
tests and the purpose for which they are allegedly used. '203 The
198. Id. One commentator has suggested another reason for shifting the burden
that could have been, but was not, relied on by the court. It has been held that where
facts lie almost exclusively within the knowledge of one of the parties, the burden is
on that party to support or rebut the existence of that fact. Thus, in this case, if the
plaintiffs could show racial disparities in EMR placement, the information necessary
to account for the discrepancy was peculiarly within the means of the defendant
school system. Sorgen, supra note 8, at 1156.
199. ' S]tatistics often tell much, and courts listen." Alabama v. United States, 304
F.2d 583, 586 (5th Cir.), aff'd per curiam, 371 U.S. 37 (1962). Accord, Armstead v.
Starkville Mun. Separate School Dist., 461 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1972).
200. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 6902.085 (West 1975). In 1976 and 1977 California revised
and recodified its education laws. The statute controlling placement of children in
classes for the retarded now appears in substantially the same form as the 1975
version at CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56506 (West 1978).
201. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56506. The statute recognized that at the time no norms
had been established and validated for adaptive behavior. It thus permitted home
visits and interviews to act as a substitute. Since then, two adaptive behavior scales
have been published. N. LAMBERT, M. WINDMILLER, L. COLE & R. FIGUEROA,
MANUAL FOR AAMD ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR SCALE - PUBLIC SCHOOL VERSION (1974
Version), discussed in J. SALVIA & J. YSSELDYKE, supra note 4, at 371-73; J. MERCER
& J. LEWIS, SYSTEM OF MULTICULTURAL PLURALISTIC ASSESSMENT (1978) (available
from the Psychological Corporation, 757 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017).
202. 343 F. Supp. at 1313.
203. Id. at 1311. The burden of proof issue is of more than theoretical interest in a
case such as this because that determination may decide the ultimate outcome of the
case:
Because of the unsophisticated nature of present testing technology, it is
extremely difficult for either side to clearly show that the test is valid or
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school system candidly agreed that the tests were racially and
culturally biased but justified their continued use on the ground that,
in the absence of suitable alternatives, they were the best means
available for the purpose of classifying students as retarded. 20 4 The
court stated: "[T]he absence of any rational means of identifying
children in need of such treatment can hardly render acceptable an
otherwise concededly irrational means, such as the I.Q. test as it is
presently administered to black students." 205 It held that the
defendants failed to sustain "their burden of demonstrating that I.Q.
tests are rationally related to the purpose of segregating students
according to their ability to learn in regular classes, at least insofar
as those tests are applied to black students." 20 6 The school system's
practices were adjudged to violate the equal protection clause. The
court enjoined any future placement of black children in EMR
invalid. Therefore, the party who has the burden of proving the validity of
such tests is at a distinct disadvantage. If the burden of proof did not shift, it
would be as difficult for the plaintiff to show that the test is invalid as it is for
the defendant to show that it is valid. . . . This shift in the burden of proof
may be more important in the final analysis than whether the strict scrutiny
standard or the rational relationship standard is applied.
Equal Protection, supra note 8, at 911.
Burden shifting in the context of classifications racially neutral on their face
has been criticized. "[I]t is peculiarly inappropriate to make important social policy
judgments, involving massive institutional changes, turn on the legal formalism of
the burden of proof." Yudof, supra note 7, at 450. Another commentator believes that
the court erred in not requiring the plaintiffs to show the presence of a third element
before it shifted the burden, "ITihat the use of the tests for black and poor children
was not rationally related to any other legitimate educational purpose [than only
intellectual capacity]," i.e., separating fast learners from slow learners. Segregation,
supra note 8, at 1233. Furthermore, the commentator questioned whether courts
should shift the burden under circumstances in which only disproportionate impact is
shown. Id. See Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 538 (1972). There, the Supreme
Court refused to shift the burden and applied traditional equal protection doctrine to a
state's administration of a welfare program that heavily and negatively affected
black and Mexican-American families. The Court criticized the data merely as a
"naked statistical argument." But see Kirp, Schools as Sorters, supra note 8, at 759.
("[S]ince classification decisions do affect a student's educational career, a demonstra-
tion that the aptitude tests which are employed can accurately predict school
performance for different types of students is an appropriate legal burden for the
school to bear.").
204. San Francisco also sought to defend the disproportionality by claiming that
the racial imbalance was the result of white parents more frequently than blacks
placing their retarded children in private schools and of districting practices that in
the past had led to the locating of EMR classes in predominantly black schools. Both
contentions were rejected as lacking any substantiation in the record. 343 F. Supp. at
1313.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1314.
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classes on the basis of criteria that relied primarily on the results of
intelligence tests and led to racial imbalance in such classes. 2°7
Carefully wording its injunction, the court condemned only the
existing method of testing black children. Despite plaintiffs' request,
the court refused to order reassignment of black children already in
EMR classes and upheld the practice of segregating such students.2°
The court of appeals had no difficulty in affirming the trial court's
opinion, holding that "the carefully limited relief granted [was]
justified by the 'peculiar facts' of this case. '20 9
Riles I may represent a modification of traditional equal
protection doctrine. The court's language indicated that the
defendant could meet its burden merely by showing a minimally
reasonable relationship between the practice of classification and
the goal of placement. However, despite the use of this conventional
language, the court may have required more than simple rationality.
Use of the "best means available" would clearly meet the rational
basis test given a permissible end, but the court, in rejecting that
defense, seemed to demand a showing of a greater congruence
between the means and the end.210 The question raised by the court,
207. For an empirically-based defense of the part school psychologists played in
the evaluation of these children, see Meyers, Macmillan & Yoshida, Validity of
Psychologists' Identification of EMR Students in the Perspective of the California
Decertification Experience, 16 J. SCH. PSYCH. 3 (1978).
208. This was contrary to what would later be a strong mandate to place
handicapped children in regular classrooms to the extent possible. See Education for
All Handicapped Children Act, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 20 U.S.C. § 1412, 89 Stat. 781
(1976). That Act's implementing regulation, 45 C.F.R. § 121a.550 (1977), states: "[T]o
the maximum extent appropriate, handicapped children ... are [to be] educated with
children who are not handicapped.. . ." From one perspective to the extent that Riles
I preserved EMR classes, the case was a retreat from Hobson in which the EMR track
itself was abolished. But on this point the court reversed itself in Riles II. See text
accompanying notes 279 to 351 infra.
209. 502 F.2d 963, 965 (9th Cir. 1974). After the Ninth Circuit's decision was issued,
the plaintiffs moved to modify the class and the terms of the preliminary injunction.
The court agreed and filed an order on December 13, 1974, expanding the class to
include "all Black California school children who have been or may in the future be
classified as mentally retarded on the basis of I.Q. tests." Larry P. v. Riles, No.
C-71-2270 R.F.P., slip op. at 6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 1979). The State of California
decided to go even further. In 1975 it issued a memorandum and accompanying
resolution stating that until further notice none of the I.Q. tests then on its approved
list, which included, among others, the WISC and Stanford-Binet, could be used to
place any child, regardless of race, in EMR classes. Memorandum of the Cal. Dep't of
Educ., Feb. 5, 1975.
210. See Kirp, Schools as Sorters, supra note 8, at 769-70; Cultural Bias, supra note
8, at 1062-63; Intelligence Classifications, supra note 8, at 670-71; see generally
Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrines on a Changing Court: A Model
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1972).
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translated into psychologists' terms, remains: what level of validity
will meet a "substantial congruence" test? "It has not yet been
determined what correlation coefficient will satisfy the various
standards of review that have been applied in the [school] testing
cases."21' Validity coefficients that psychologists find acceptable
may not pass constitutional muster. One court has ruled that "when
a program talks about labeling someone as a particular type and
such a label could remain with him for the remainder of his life, the
margin of error must be almost nil.' ' 212 "Nil" implies almost nearly
perfect coefficients. Few, if any, psychometric instruments yield
reliability, much less validity, coefficients above .95.
Riles I, concerned only with the propriety of a preliminary
injunction, raised many legal and psychometric questions that were
not answered until the trial on the merits five years later. The trial
lasted more than six months, produced 10,000 pages of testimony,213
and was not concluded until two years after it had begun. The
outcome in Riles H was affected by two decisions of the Supreme
Court defining the constitutional standard for proving discrimina-
tion in equal protection cases and by the passage of legislation
concerning the civil rights of handicapped and retarded persons. In
light of their importance for Riles II, the decisions and legislation
are examined below.
Subsequent Supreme Court Decisions and Their Effect On Riles II
Three elements in Riles I assumed importance as a result of
subsequent Supreme Court decisions. First, the plaintiffs claimed
that the defendants .had infringed their constitutional rights, not
211. Equal Protection, supra note 8, at 905 n.28. Concerning employment dis-
crimination cases brought under Title VII, the situation is somewhat less confused
because of the variety of statutory, regulatory, and professional standards available
to provide evidence of job relatedness. E.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1978) (EEOC Guidelines
on Employee Selection Procedures).
212. Merriken v. Cressman, 364 F. Supp. 913, 920 (E.D. Pa. 1973). In one case
teachers challenging the use of GRE scores for hiring purposes made a prima facie
showing that the test had a disproportionately negative impact on black applicants.
The court ruled that the school had failed to meet the rational relation test, and stated
that "the GRE score requirement was not a reliable or valid measure for choosing
good teachers." Armstead v. Starkville Mun. Separate School Dist., 461 F.2d 276, 280
(5th Cir. 1972). The court's finding was based on the fact that the cutoff score would
eliminate some good teachers. Apparently, even a few false negatives could serve to
render a test arbitrary in the court's view.
213. Brief excerpts of the testimony were published in 8 APA MONITOR 4 (1977) & 9
APA MONITOR 15 (1978).
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that they had violated a federal or state statute.214 Second, the court
ruled that injury resulted only from an intelligence classification
that had a discriminatory effect, not from an intent to discriminate.
Third, the court relied heavily on Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 215 to
support its decision that the defendant had the burden of persuasion
concerning the reasonableness of its testing practices.
The Supreme Court's 1976 decision in Washington v. Davis216
had significant impact on both the decision in Riles II and on future
testing litigation brought on grounds similar to those in that case.217
Davis arose when two black applicants for positions as police
officers intervened in a suit against the District of Columbia and its
police department and the United States Civil Service Commission,
contending that the written personnel test used by the police
department excluded a disproportionately high number of black
214. In 1977, however, the court granted plaintiffs' motion to amend their
complaint to include several statutory bases for their claims: Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1974); § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29
U.S.C. § 794 (1974); The Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1401
(1970); and several sections of the California Education Code.
215. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
216. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
217. There were other less significant testing cases between 1972 and 1976. In
Copeland v. School Bd., 464 F.2d 932 (4th Cir. 1972), plaintiffs complained that a
disproportionate number of black children were assigned to classes for the retarded
and learning disabled on the basis of unnamed psychological tests. The court
considered special education programs, even though they isolated students, to be
sound educational practices as long as placement occurred in a nondiscriminatory
manner. The court found the record bare as to the reliability, validity, and
nondiscriminatory attributes of the examinations used, and remanded the case to the
trial court for determinations on these matters. A similar complaint was lodged by
black and Mexican-American children placed in special schools for the retarded in a
district that had previously operated a system segregated by law. Arvizu v. Waco Ind.
School Dist., 373 F. Supp. 1264 (W.D. Tex. 1973). The court ordered the school to
review its testing practices to assure that assignments were made nondiscriminatorily
and that children in EMR classes whose primary language was not English would be
tested in their nftive language. In Morales v. Shannon, 366 F. Supp. 813 (W.D. Tex.
1973), Mexican-American children disproportionately placed in classes for the
learning disabled in another Texas school system claimed a denial of equal
educational opportunity in violation of the fourteenth amendment. The court, finding
no evidence of discriminatory intent and determining that placement was made on
the basis of objective data (not described), found no constitutional violation. Despite a
finding of evidence of past discrimination and without inquiring into the validity of
the intelligence and achievement tests used for placement in both EMR and programs
for the gifted, a Wisconsin district court found insufficient evidence to prove that
black children were inappropriately placed in the former or refused placement in the
latter. Amos v. Board of School Directors, 408 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. Wis. 1976). The
paucity of litigation generally in the mid-1970's may be explained by the passage of
federal legislation providing nondiscriminatory evaluation for handicapped children.
See notes 235 to 272 and accompanying text infra.
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applicants.218 The court of appeals applied the legal standards
applicable to Title VII that had been developed in Griggs to resolve
the intervenors' constitutional argument that the use of the test
invidiously discriminated against blacks and hence denied them due
process, including equal protection, guaranteed by the fifth amend-
ment. In a decision that surprised and angered many civil rights
advocates, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision,
rejecting the contention that the constitutional standard for
adjudicating claims of racial discrimination was identical to the
statutory standard under Title VII: "[Olur cases have not embraced
the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to
whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitu-
tional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact.
219
The Court declined to use the more rigorous standard of Title VII
in applying the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 220 The probing
judicial review under the Civil Rights Act, and its consequent
lessened deference to the "seemingly reasonable acts of administra-
tors," was inappropriate "under the Constitution where special
racial impact, without discriminatory purpose, is claimed."'22' The
Court was concerned that many statutes could be invalidated under
a constitutional rule providing that a statute that was designed to
serve neutral ends but which burdened one race more than another
would be upheld only if there were a compelling justification. 222  :
According to the Court, even under the rule established in Davis,
a statute or practice need not reveal explicitly an intent to
218. The action in which intervention was permitted was brought by black police
officers challenging the promotional policies of the department as racially discrimina-
tory. The intervenors claimed that the test administered was not related to job
performance and had a discriminatory impact in screening out black candidates.
Ruling on class motions for summary judgment on the recruiting aspect of the case,
the district court found that a showing sufficient to shift the burden to the defendants
had been made. It concluded, however, that plaintiffs were not entitled to relief. It
pointed to the department's active recruitment of blacks and the fact that 44% of
recent recruits and of officers were black, a percentage equal to the percentage of
blacks in the department's recruiting area. The court rejected the assertion that the
test was culturally slanted and found it reasonably related to requirements of the
training program. See 426 U.S. at 235-36. The court of appeals reversed the summary
judgment in favor of the defendants entered by the district court.
219. Id. at 239.
220. The fourteenth amendment applies only to action by the states. Because this
case arose in the District of Columbia, it was the fifth amendment that was
applicable. However, the Court made explicit that its decision embraced constitutional
challenges to alleged discrimination under both the fifth and fourteenth amendments.
Id. at 248-49.
221. Id. at 247.
222. Id. at 248.
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discriminate to be challengeable nor would a law's disproportionate
impact be irrelevant. 223 Under the Constitution invidiously discrimi-
natory purposes may be inferred from the totality of relevant facts:
evidence of systematic exclusion of one race; unequal application of
the law; a demonstration that the disproportionality is difficult to
explain on nonracial grounds; 224 or a showing that the natural and
foreseeable consequence of the state's action would have a discrimi-
natory impact.225 Nevertheless, although disproportionate impact
may be relevant, "it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial
discrimination forbidden by the Constitution. Standing alone, it does
not trigger the rule... that racial classifications are to be subjected
to the strictest scrutiny and are justifiable only by the weightiest of
considerations. 226
In the second significant post-Riles I decision, San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez,227 the Supreme Court held
that education is not a fundamental right for purposes of equal
protection analysis. Plaintiffs asserted that Texas' school financing
procedures that created disparate inter-istrict expenditures violated
the equal protection clause. More particularly, they argued that since
wealth classifications were suspect, and education a fundamental
right, the Supreme Court should use the compelling state interest
test to scrutinize the financing system. The Court rejected this
argument and, applying only the rational basis test, upheld the
state's practices. 22s It refused to recognize wealth as a suspect
classification and held that education was not a fundamental right.
Because inequitable funding did not totally deprive children of
educational opportunities, "no charge fairly could be made that the
system fails to provide each child with an opportunity to acquire the
basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of
speech and of full participation in the political process. '229
The Supreme Court's decisions in Rodriguez and Davis severely
undercut the chances of the plaintiffs in Riles gaining eventual
victory on the merits. Given that education could no longer be
considered a fundamental right and that when a constitutional
223. Id. at 239.
224. Id. at 239-42.
225. See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 99 S. Ct. 2941 (1979); Dayton Bd. of
Educ. v. Brinkman, 99 S. Ct. 2971 (1979) (Dayton H); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v.
Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977) (Dayton 1).
226. Id. at 237.
227. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
228. Id. at 37.
229. Id.
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injury was alleged minority plaintiffs must prove intent to
discriminate, 230 it was unlikely that the Riles court could employ the
same reasoning that was persuasive at the preliminary injunction
stage. Plaintiffs could not hope to convince the court to employ the
compelling state interest test in the absence of infringement of a
fundamental right or a classification based on race. Further, proving
discrimination was more difficult when intent rather than effect was
at issue.231
The Supreme Court's decisions since 1973 have made it difficult
to challenge testing procedures on constitutional grounds. School
systems have a significantly greater chance to prevail when their
practices are attacked under the fourteenth amendment than when
they are challenged under state or federal statutes.232 Thus, it is
significant that while the Court was restricting the reach of the
equal protection clause, Congress enacted a series of laws that
continue to have considerable impact on the practice of psychologi-
cal assessment in the public schools.
Federal Legislation
Courts develop rules of conduct in piecemeal fashion and only
after litigants have presented legally cognizable issues. Rulemaking
bodies such as legislatures and government agencies, on the other
hand, need not wait for-complaining litigants. When, among other
reasons, problems need a broader solution than courts can provide,
230. In cases in which proof of a constitutional violation requires evidence of a
discriminatory purpose, the burden of establishing the impermissible purpose is
generally placed on the plaintiff. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270-71 & n.21 (1977).
231. For suggestions on how intent may be proved, see Dayton Bd. of Educ. v.
Brinkman, 99 S. Ct. 2971 (1979) (Dayton 11); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 99 S. Ct.
2991 (1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 420 (1977) (Dayton 1);
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266-68 (1977);
Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 1211, 1282-84 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). See also
Comment, Proof of Racially Discriminatory Purpose Under the Equal Protection
Clause: Washington v. Davis, Arlington Heights, Mt. Healthy, and Williamsburgh, 12
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 725 (1977); Comment, Reading the Mind of the School Board:
Segregative Intent and the De Facto/De Jure Distinction, 86 YALE L.J. 317 (1976).
232. Perhaps the clearest example of this is Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), in
which Chinese parents alleged that the San Francisco school system denied. their
children equal protection in failing to provide bilingual instruction. Though the
parents brought the claim under the fourteenth amendment, the Supreme Court chose
to rely solely on the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970), to find
discrimination on the basis of national origin. Under the act, intent to discriminate
need not be shown. Finding that "[d]iscrimination is barred which has that effect
even though no purposeful design is present," 414 U.S. at 568, the Court concluded
that the school system denied the plaintiffs a meaningful opportunity to participate in
a' public educational program in violation of the act. Id. at 567-68.
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or they affect many people, lawmakers enact statutes and adminis-
trators promulgate regulations that have comprehensive effect. This
process is evident with regard to special education and psychological
testing. Legislation for the handicapped and those misclassified as
handicapped directly affects the assessment practices of psycholo-
gists. The involvement of the federal government in the education of
handicapped children began in 1966233 but did not become intensive
until 1974, when Congress passed the Education of the Handicapped
Amendments, more commonly known to educators as Public Law
93-380.234
1. Education of the Handicapped Amendments of 1974
Public Law 93-380 reflected the impact of the litigation of the
preceding decade concerning the exclusion of handicapped children
from public schools235 and the discriminatory evaluation and
placement practices used against minority children. Its provisions
concerning special education,236 however, are now only of historical
interest as they were amended significantly by Public Law 94-142 in
1975.237 Public Law 93-380 did place school systems on notice that
for the first time federal financial assistance for special education
would be contingent on the development by state educational
agencies of plans establishing "a goal of ... full educational
opportunity to all handicapped children"23 8 and a means of
233. In that year, Title VI was added to the Elementary and Secondary Education
Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-750, § 161, 80 Stat. 1204 (1966), amending Pub. L. No.
89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965) (establishing the Bureau of Education for the Handicapped).
For a history of the federal government's development of legislation for the
handicapped, see Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 1211, 1224-30 (E.D.N.Y. 1978);
Note, The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, N.Y.U. J. L. REF. 110,
119-20 (1976). A parallel development occurred at the state level. By 1979, 49 states by
law provided free public education to their handicapped citizens. See Connor &
Connors, Children's Rights and Mainstreaming of the Handicapped, in CHILDREN'S
RIGHTS: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 67, 69 (P. Vardin & I. Brody eds. 1979).
234. Pub. L. No. 93-380, §§611-621, 88 Stat. 579 (1974) (codified at 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1401-1461 (Supp. IV 1974)), amending 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1970).
235. E.g., Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972); Pennsylvania
Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
236. Public Law 93-380 was an omnibus bill containing seven titles, of which only
Title VI(B) affected special education. Other titles amended the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act, reaffirmed policies concerning equal educational opportun-
ity, and consolidated certain other education programs. Of particular relevance is a
portion of Title V that established the Family Education Rights and Privacy Act,
discussed in the text accompanying notes 426 to 434 infra.
237. Education for All Handicapped Children Act, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773
(1975). See text accompanying notes 242 to 266 infra.
238. 20 U.S.C. § 1413(12)(A) (Supp. IV 1974).
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"insuring that handicapped children and their parents or guardians
are guaranteed procedural safeguards in decisions regarding
identification, evaluation, and educational placement. ,"239 One
such safeguard was that parents were to be given the right to
"examine all relevant records with respect to . . . classification or
educational placement, and obtain an independent educational
evaluation of the child.''24° To prevent misclassification of minority
children, school systems were to develop methods for insuring that
any assessment devices used "for the purposes of classification and
placement of handicapped children will be selected and administered
so as not to be racially or culturally discriminatory. ' 2 41 These broad
mandates were particularized in Public Law 94-142, discussed
below.
2. Education for All Handicapped Children Act 242
Public Law 94-142, the Education for All Handicapped Children
Act, is a grant-giving statute providing financial support to state
and local education agencies for special education services if they
meet certain detailed eligibility requirements. The purpose of the Act
isto
assure that all handicapped children have available to them...
a free appropriate public education which emphasizes special
education and related services designed to meet their unique
needs, to assure that the rights of handicapped children and
their parents or guardians are protected, to assist States and
localities to provide for the education of all handicapped
children, and to assess and assure the effectiveness of efforts to
educate handicapped children. 243
239. Id. § 1413(13).
240. Id. § 1413(13)(A)(ii).
241. Id. § 1413(13)(C).
242. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461
(1978)).
243. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(c) (1978). The means for achieving these purposes are set out
in the rest of the statute and the implementing regulations drafted by the Office of
Education in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. 45 C.F.R.
§ 121a.1-.754 (1977). Because of the difficulty in defining and assessing children
suspected of learning disability, see 41 Fed. Reg. 52, 404 (1976), Congress ordered
HEW to develop procedures for identifying and evaluating such children. These
regulations were not published with the main body of regulations and appear at 42
Fed. Reg. 65,082 (1977). They require a multidisciplinary evaluation including
observation of the child's academic performance in the regular classroom setting. 45
C.F.R. § 121a.540, .542. See text accompanying notes 391 to 395 infra.
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Public Law 94-142 places constraints on the administration of
psychological tests and provides standards for evaluating children
suspected of having handicaps. Under the implementing regulations
a school system must obtain written parental consent before
conducting a "preplacement evaluation. '244 The consent form must
state the purpose of the evaluation and describe each evaluation
procedure or test the school proposes to use.245 Other kinds of
assessment, such as large-scale screening to identify those children
who might need more intensive individual psychological evaluation,
fall outside the definition of preplacement testing, although parents
do have the right to be notified that such screening will occur.246 It is
likely that observation to assess classroom atmosphere and
interactions, or for screening purposes, also would not require
consent, because involvement of children in these processes is
relatively insignificant. Even covert observation of public behavior
does not sufficiently infringe privacy rights as to require informed
consent.247 Further, because the possibility of labeling and place-
ment is remote, the need for strict procedural protections, like
consent, is minimal. However, when a particular child becomes the
focus of an assessment, the purpose of which is to determine the
need for special education placement, then parental consent seems
required for all procedures, including testing, interviewing, and
observation. 248
In an earlier draft the regulations gave parents the power to veto
preplacement evaluations. 249 That proposal failed to take into
account the possibility of conflicting interests between a parent and
a child in need of special education. It would have been possible
under the proposed rules for parents without valid reasons to deny
children access to psychological services and remedial intervention
244. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.504 (1977). Under the statute itself, only notice, not consent,
was required. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(c) (1978).
245. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.505(a)(3) (1977). Methods for implementing this provision
have been suggested by Bersoff, The Implementation of Procedural Safeguards Under
Pub. L. 94-142, in DEVELOPING CRITERIA FOR THE EVALUATION OF DUE PROCESS
PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS PROVISIONS 65, 98-100 (Bureau of Educ. for the Handi-
capped ed. 1978).
246. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.504(a)(1) (1977).
247. Bersoff, Legal and Ethical Concerns in Research, in RESEARCH FOR
COUNSELORS 386 (L. Goldman ed. 1978).
248. While the regulations require comprehensive reevaluations of handicapped
children every three years, 45 C.F.R. § 121a.534(b) (1977), they do not mandate consent
for this purpose. Such consent has been recommended, however. Bersoff, supra note
245, at 92.
249. 41 Fed. Reg. 56,990 (1976) (proposed regulation § 121a.404(b)).
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by special educators. 25° The final regulations are preferable because
they permit schools to act as children's advocates by providing
alternative mechanisms to challenge parental refusal to consent.251
It might have been more efficient and economical to develop less
rigorous requirements to deal with parents' refusal to consent to
preplacement evaluations because such requirements place con-
straints on school systems and create delay in providing services.
Actions that precede placement, such as the administration of
psychological tests, must await the outcome of hearings called to
determine if the right of parents to act as care givers and
decisionmakers for their children should be supplanted by the
school. However, the rationale behind the regulations is sound. By
requiring parental consent, allowing school officials to challenge
refusal to consent, and developing a forum in which both sides will
be heard by a neutral adjudicator, the regulations serve the interests
250. The regulations require a preplacement evaluation before any programming
decisions can be made. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.531 (1977). Further, parents must consent to
initial admission to special education as well as to the initial evaluation. Id.
§ 121a.504(b)(ii).
251. Depending on state statutes, the regulations establish two means that
education agencies can use to initiate impartial adjudications to override parental
vetoes, state neglect laws, or hearing procedures developed in Public Law 94-142.
Some states already have provisions concerning parental consent. For example,
Maryland's State Department of Education Bylaws declare: "Parents ... have the
right of prior informed consent regarding their child's psychological evaluation,...
special education programming and placement in accordance with procedures
established by each local education agency." Code of Bylaws, Md. State Bd. of Educ.
§ 13.04.01.03. Under this law, parents apparently do possess veto power. However, the
school system may have recourse to state parental neglect statutes. A school
administrator in some states may file a neglect petition when parents refuse to
consent to evaluation or placement. Maryland law defines a neglected child as one
"whose parent ... legally responsible for his care does not adequately supply him
with ... education .... MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-801 (1974). In these
instances, anyone having knowledge of facts regarding neglect may file a complaint
with the juvenile, or other appropriate, court. Such action will trigger an inquiry into
possible neglect and can result in a hearing in which the court may appoint a
guardian of the child for the limited purpose of consenting to evaluation or placement.
The procedure, while lengthy, does allow school systems to provide needed services in
those cases in which parents refuse to consent, and state laws, bylaws, or regulations
require consent.
Where no state law exists requiring consent, a refusal to consent may be
overridden by following hearing and appeal procedures delineated in other sections of
the regulations implementing Public Law 94-142. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.503(c)(2)(i),
.506-.511 (1977). These provisions require that a hearing be conducted before an
impartial adjudicator.. Both parents and the school may be represented by attorneys
and have the opportunity to present evidence and confront, cross-examine, and
compel the attendance of witnesses. After the hearing is completed, the hearing officer
must issue a written decision based on the facts. Either party may appeal the decision
to a state hearing panel and ultimately to the courts.
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of all the parties: the parents, whose constitutional right to direct
their children's upbringing is protected;252 the school, which can
carry out its statutory duty to provide an appropriate education for
handicapped children; and, most important, the children, whose
future is determined by the actions of the adults around them.
Public Law 94-142 reaffirmed Public Law 93-380's mandate
concerning nondiscriminatory evaluation. To be eligible for funding,
states must establish procedures to insure that testing and
evaluation devices are neither culturally nor racially discrimina-
tory.253 The implementing regulations clarify this requirement:
Tests and other evaluation materials:
(1) Are provided and administered in the child's native
language or other mode of communication . . ;
(2) Have been validated for the specific purpose for which
they are used; and
(3) Are administered by trained personnel in conformance
with the instructions provided by their producer
254
The most ambiguous of these provisions is section (2). The
regulations require test validation but not test validity. Even if one
infers that both are necessary, the regulations do not specify to what
level of validity a test must conform. There are few judicial or
statutory guidelines concerning standards of validity in school
testing,255 and there is little agreement on the general concept of
nondiscriminatory assessment.256
252. E.g., Parham v. J.R. & J.L., 99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972).
253. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(5)(c) (1978). Similar assurances are required elsewhere. The
Office for Civil Rights has interpreted Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000d (1974), to compel all school systems receiving federal financial
assistance to develop procedures preventing disproportionate overinclusion or
underinclusion of children of any race, color, national origin, or sex in all special
programs. Office for Civil Rights, Memorandum for Chief State School Officers and
Local School District Superintendents (August 1975). For a fuller discussion of federal
regulations in this context, see Oakland & Laosa, supra note 8, at 28-37.
254. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.532(a) (1977).
255. See text accompanying notes 211 & 212 supra. The Senate Report summariz-
ing and explaining the provisions of Public Law 94-142 merely reiterates the basic
requirement of nondiscriminatory evaluation without providing guidance as to the
section's meaning. S. Rep. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1975). Larry P. v. Riles,
No. C-71-2270 R.F.P. (N.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 1979), appeal docketed, No. 80-4027 (9th Cir.
Jan. 17, 1980), provides a definition of validity. See text accompanying notes 296 to
298 infra.
256. See text accompanying notes 115 to 149 supra.
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Other provisions also affect psychological and educational
assessment. Children with sensory, manual, or speaking impair-
ments must be given tests that measure genuine aptitude or
achievement, not simply impairments.257 Further, all assessment is
to be comprehensive, multifaceted, and multidisciplinary.25s Evalua-
tions for placement must be conducted by persons from the fields of
education, medicine, and psychology, who assess children "in all
areas related to the suspected disability, including, where appro-
priate, health, vision, hearing, social and emotional status, general
intelligence, academic performance, communicative status, and
motor abilities." 259 Tests that are "merely. . . designed to provide a
single general intelligence quotient" 260 may not be used, nor can a
single procedure be "used as the sole criterion for determining an
appropriate educational program for a child."261 As salutary as this
latter protection is, it is relatively meaningless in a situation such as
Riles where the issue was the use of I.Q. scores as the primary, not
the sole, determinant for placement. Few, if any, schools use only an
intelligence test for this purpose.
To insure that all provisions are given effect, both the statute262
and the regulations 26 3 enable parents "to present complaints with
respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or
educational placement" 264 of their children. The complaints are
presented in an impartial administrative hearing in which parents
have the right to compel the attendance of, and to cross-examine,
witnesses involved in the assessment and programming decisions. 265
Psychologists called to testify may have their credentials, and their
methods, interpretations, and recommendations subjected to the
closest scrutiny.266
257. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.532(c) (1977).
258. Id. § 121a.532(a).
259. Id. § 121a.532(e) & (f).
260. Id. § 121a.532(b).
261. Id. § 121a.532(d). In making placement decisions, the school is required to
"draw upon information from a variety of sources, including aptitude and
achievement tests, teacher recommendations, physical condition, social and cultural
background, and adaptive. behavior." Id. § 121a.533(a)(1).
262. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1978).
263. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.500-.514 (1977).
264. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(E) (1978).
265. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.508 (1977).
266. See J. ZISKIN, COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY
(1975) (instructing attorneys on how to challenge the credentials, expertise, and
psychometric soundness of psychologists' evaluation devices); Comment, The
Psychologist as Expert Witness: Science in the Courtroom?, 38 MD. L. REV. 539 (1979).
See also Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health'
Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527 (1978).
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3. Rehabilitation Act of 1973267
In section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which was
enacted to promote the education and training of handicapped
persons, Congress declared:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United
States .. . shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance. 26
This language embodies "the first Federal civil rights law protecting
the rights of handicapped persons and reflects a national commit-
ment to end discrimination on the basis of handicap. ' 269 Section 504
is almost identical to Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and may
be just as comprehensive. 270 Unlike Public Law 94-142, the require-
ments of section 504 are not triggered solely by receipt of funds
under a specific statute, but protect handicapped persons in all
institutions receiving federal financial assistance. Any school
system, public or private, receiving federal monies for any program
or activity whatsoever is bound by its mandates.
In mid-1977, regulations implementing the broad right-granting
language of section 504 were issued.271 In addition to general
principles already established under Public Law 94-142, they include
rules for the evaluation of children suspected of being handicapped,
which require preplacement evaluations, validated tests, and multi-
disciplinary comprehensive assessment. 272
One possible advantage of section 504 is that it may give a
private right of action to plaintiffs challenging the assessment
practices of school officials. Because section 504 so resembles the
1964 Civil Rights Act, it may be assumed that the remedies available
under the act would also be available under section 504. Regents of
University of California v. Bakke273 left inconclusive whether Title
267. 29 U.S.C. §§701-794 (1975).
268. Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 394 (1973), as amended by Pub. L. No.
95-602, § 119, 92 Stat. 2982 (1978) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §794 (1979)).
269. 42 Fed. Reg. 22,676 (1977).
270. See note 232 supra.
271. 45 C.F.R. §§84.1-.61 (1977).
272. 45 C.F.R. § 84.35 (1978). Because they so closely track the Public Law 94-142
regulations, see text accompanying notes 254 to 261 supra, they will not be repeated
here.
273. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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VI of the Civil Rights Act establishes a private cause of action. The
Court avoided the issue whether Section 504 itself afforded such a
right in Southeastern Community College v. Davis,28 4 the first case
in which it had the opportunity to construe the meaning of that
provision.275 However, lower courts have interpreted Section 504 to
enable individuals to bring private causes of action for discrimina-
tion in education,276 transportation, 277 and employment. 278
Larry P. v. Riles: Decision on the Merits279
Federal legislation protecting handicapped persons and other
civil rights statutes had a significant effect on the outcome of Riles
II. The plaintiffs twice amended their complaint to allege claims
based on several federal statutes20 in addition to their equal
274. 99 S. Ct. 2361 (1979).
275. Id. at 2366 n.5. Cf. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 420 n.27
(1978) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing the legislative history of section 504 as support
for his conclusion that a person may maintain a cause of action under Title VI).
276. E.g., Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1977); Larry P. v. Riles, No.
C-71-2270 R.F.P. (N.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 1979), appeal docketed, No. 80-4027 (9th Cir.
Jan. 17, 1980); Boxall v. Sequoia Union High School Dist., 464 F. Supp. 1104 (N.D.
Cal. 1979); Stemple v. Board of Educ., 464 F. Supp. 258 (D. Md. 1979), appeal docketed,
No. 79-1208 (4th Cir. March 30, 1979); Howard S. v. Friendswood Ind. School Dist.,
454 F. Supp. 634 (S.D. Tex. 1978); Barnes v. Converse College, 436 F. Supp. 635 (D.S.C.
1977).
277. E.g., United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 558 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977); Lloyd
v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977).
278. E.g., Whitaker v. Board of Educ., 461 F. Supp. 99 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Drennon v.
Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Gurmankin v. Costanzo,
411 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd on other grounds, 556 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977); cf.
Coleman v. Darden, 595 F.2d 533 (10th Cir. 1979) (implying private cause of action
against private employers but holding no such right against federal agency).
Title V of the Rehabilitation Act was amended in November 1978, specifically
permitting remedies identical to those in the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Pub. L. No.
95-602, § 120(a), 92 Stat. 2982, 2987 (1978) (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)(2)). One
court, equating the amendment with the restrictions on remedies with that of Titles
VI and VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, has construed the amendment to preclude a
private cause of action under § 504 to redress employment discrimination unless the
primary objective of federal financial assistance is to provide employment. Trageser
v. Libbie Rehab. Center, Inc., 590 F.2d 87 (4th Cir. 1978). The Fourth Circuit's earlier
holding recognizing a private cause of action under § 504 in Davis v. Southeastern
Community College, 574 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 442 U.S. 397
(1979), was distinguished in that the plaintiffs in Davis alleged discrimination in an
educational institution and therefore the restrictive remedies in employment cases
were not germane. But see Hart v. County of Alameda, 21 Empl. Prac. Dec. 233 (N.D.
Cal. 1979).
279. No. C-71-2270 R.F.P. (N.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 1979), appeal docketed, No. 80-4027
(9th Cir. Jan. 17, 1980) (summarized at 48 U.S.L.W. 2298 (Oct. 30, 1979)).
280. See note 214 supra.
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protection claim. 281 Finding these additional claims to be persuasive,
the court held for the plaintiffs on both statutory and constitutional
grounds, permanently enjoining the defendants "from utilizing,
permitting the use of, or approving the use of any standardized
intelligence tests ... for the identification of black E.M.R. children
or their placement into E.M.R. classes, without securing prior
approval by this court. ' ' 282 Presumably because proof of discrimina-
tion under the statutes required plaintiffs to show only that the
state's actions created an impermissible discriminatory impact and
not an intent to discriminate, the court began its analysis by
evaluating the plaintiffs' claims under Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act,2 83 the Rehabilitation Act,284 and the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act.285
In its analysis of plaintiffs' cause of action under Title VI, the
court relied on Lau v. Nichols,286 in which the Supreme Court had
held that English instruction for children whose primary language
was not English amounted to functional exclusion from schooling.
The court reasoned that placement mechanisms for EMR classes
that effectively foreclosed a disproportionate number of black
children from any meaningful education also violated Title VI.287
The defendants were unable to rebut the plaintiffs' prima facie
showing of disproportionate and invidious impact of its assessment
and placement practices: there was no evidence that EMR classes
"actually reflected and tapped a greater incidence of mild mental
retardation" in black children or that the intelligence tests used for
placement in those classes "had been validated for [that] pur-
pose." 28 8
The court reserved most of its statutory analysis for plaintiffs'
claims under section 504 and Public Law 94-142, focusing on the
281. Plaintiffs' amended complaint also alleged violation of the Emergency School
Aid Act of 1978, 20 U.S.C. §§ 3191-3207 (1979). The court held that plaintiffs had not
demonstrated the applicability of the act to California's school system and so
dismissed their claims under those provisions. No. C-71-2270 R.F.P., slip op. at 125
n.75 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 1979). See note 214 supra. The United States Department of
Justice, participating as amicus curiae, asserted that the defendants' conduct also
violated Public Law 94-142 and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
282. Id. at 104.
283. 42 U.S.C. §2000d (1974).
284. 29 U.S.C. §794 (1974).
285. 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (1974).
286. 414 U.S. 563 (1974). See notes 177 & 232 supra.
287. Slip op. at 58-59.
288. Id. at 61.
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nondiscriminatory assessment provisions of these acts,289 particu-
larly the requirement of the regulations that assessment instruments
be "validated for the specific purpose for which they are used. '290
The court's interpretation of these provisions was of crucial
importance in its holding and the shaping of the final remedy;
through it, the court broke new ground.29 1 As it had in Riles I, the
court relied on Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 2 9 2
There, the Supreme Court held that to rebut a prima facie case of
discrimination brought by employees who claim an employer's use of
tests creates a disproportionate impact on minorities, an employer
must show that the test has a "manifest relationship" to the position
for which the test is required.293 If this is done, the burden of
production shifts to the plaintiffs, who may then submit evidence
that alternative selection procedures exist that would serve the
employer's purposes as well without producing discriminatory
effects. 294 In Riles II, the court accepted the burden-shifting
approach but found it impossible to translate Griggs' "manifest
relationship" test to the educational setting:
If tests can predict that a person is going to be a poor employee,
the employer can legitimately deny that person a job, but if tests
suggest that a young child is probably going to be a poor
student, the school cannot on that basis alone deny that child
the opportunity to improve and develop the academic skills
necessary to success in our society. Assignment to E.M.R.
classes denies that opportunity through relegation to a markedly
inferior, essentially dead-end track.295
As an alternative to the "manifest relationship" test, the court
held that the defendant should bear the burden of proving that the
tests used for placement had been validated for black children.
However, it would not accept proof merely that the tests used Were
289. See text accompanying notes 248 to 272 supra. The court also chastised the
state for adopting policies contrary to the least restrictive environment, or
"mainstreaming," provisions of the statutes, 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (1978), 29 U.S.C. § 794
(1974), which require that "to the maximum extent appropriate, handicapped children
. ..are [to be] educated with children who are not handicapped .... 20 U.S.C. § 1412
(1978). Slip op. at 61.
290. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.532 (1977).
291. "There are no cases applying validation criteria to tests used for E.M.R.
Placement." Slip op. at 64.
292. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
293. Id. at 430.
294. Id. at 431.
295. Slip op. at 66.
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able to predict school performance. Rather, it adopted a more
stringent requirement that the tests be shown valid for selecting
children unable to profit from instruction in regular classes with
remedial instruction. 296 The tests would have to identify accurately
children who belonged in what the court characterized as "isolated,
dead-end, stigmatizing E.M.R. programs. ' 297 This kind of validation,
the court found, had not been done. "[D]efendants must come
forward and show that [the tests] have been validated for each
minority group with which they are used.. .. This minimal burden
has not been met for diagnosing the kind of mental retardation
justifying E.M.R. placement. '298
Continuing with the analysis in Griggs, the court found that
alternative mechanisms for determining placement in EMR classes
existed. Between 1975 and the resolution of the case in 1979, there
had been a state-wide moratorium on the use of I.Q. tests to place
children of all races in EMR programs. The state's employees
testified that adequate assessments had been made during that
period without I.Q. tests and that there was no evidence to suggest
that misplacements had occurred. 299 The court found, in fact, that
more time and care had been taken during this period in placing
children in EMR classes:
School psychologists, teachers, and others involved in the
process are now making decisions based on a wide number of
factors, and the evidence suggests that the results are less
discriminatory than they were under the I.Q.-centered standard.
Evaluations can and are taking place through, inter alia, more
thorough assessments of the child's personal history and
development, adaptive behavior both inside and outside of the
school environment, and classroom performance and academic
achievement.30°
296. Id. at 67.
297. Id. at 68.
298. Id. at 69. The few studies that had been brought to the court's attention were
not considered relevant. The court rejected validity studies correlating I.Q. scores with
college grades or with other achievement tests. It would be satisfied only with
research relating I.Q. scores of black children with classroom grades. The one
relevant study cited yielded correlations between I.Q. scores and grades for white
children of .25 and only .14 for blacks. The expert who testified about the study
concluded that the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children had "little or no validity
for predicting the scholastic performance of black or brown children." Id. at 71. Thus,
the court concluded that "the I.Q. tests are differentially valid for black and white
children. . . . Differential validity means that more errors will be made for black
children than whites, and that is unacceptable." Id. at 71-72.
299. Id. at 73.
:300. Id. at 73-74. Several psychologists have argued that systematic observation
of situation-specific behavior - such as that in a classroom - may be a more valid
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Nevertheless, the court warned, alternatives to I.Q. tests themselves
had not been validated, and disproportionate placement, while less
egregious than in the pre-1975 era, was still present. Continued use
of tests would still be needed, not for the purpose of labeling children
as retarded, but for "the development of curricula that respond to
specific educational needs." 3 1 Thus, given the functional exclusion
of black children under Title VI and the state's failure to meet its
burdens under section 504 and Public Law 94-142, the court found
that the defendant had violated those statutes. 302
Because testing for EMR placement had been enjoined in Riles I
on the basis of the plaintiffs' constitutional claims, the court
considered itself obliged to determine whether the plaintiffs
continued to warrant relief under the equal protection clause "where
this litigation commenced. ' ' 3°3 Given Davis and its progeny, the
plaintiffs had a more difficult task under the fourteenth amendment
than they had under their statutory claims: "The difficult question of
intent [had] moved to center stage. ' '3°4 The court believed that the
problem was made more burdensome because of what it perceived to
be the failure of the federal judiciary to delineate a precise formula
for determining intentional discrimination under Davis.305 It wished
to avoid relying solely on an objective test that would measure intent
by establishing that the state's conduct had the natural and
foreseeable consequences of producing a discriminatory effect.30 6
measure of performance than the artificial environment of the testing room. E.g., E.
MASH & L. TERDAL, BEHAVIOR THERAPY ASSESSMENT 261-352 (1976); D. PETERSON,
THE CLINICAL STUDY OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR (1968); R. THARP & R. WETZEL, BEHAVIOR
MODIFICATION IN THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT (1969); M. TILLMAN, D. BERSOFF & J.
DOLLY, LEARNING TO TEACH: A DECISION-MAKING SYSTEM 262-329 (1976).
301. Slip op. at 74. This recommendation comports with the modern commentary
on educational assessment. E.g., J. SALVIA & J. YSSELDYKE, supra note 4, at 472-74;
Bersoff, supra note 7; McClelland, supra note 7.
302. Slip op. at 100-01.
303. Id. at 75. "[Tjhis case began strictly as a constitutional one, and the equal
protection claim has remained central." Id. at 55. The court initially determined that
it would employ the intermediate standard of review. Id. at 76-84. See note 185 supra
and text accompanying notes 352 to 354 infra.
304. Slip op. at 75.
305. Id. at 76.
306. Id. at 77. This approach was suggested by Justice Stevens' concurring opinion
in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976). Several lower federal courts had
used that approach in post-Davis cases, e.g., Arthur v. Nyquist, 573 F.2d 134 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 860 (1978); NAACP v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 559 F.2d 1042 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 997 (1977); United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 532 F.2d
380 (5th Cir.), vacated and remanded sub nom. Austin Ind. School Dist. v. United
States, 429 U.S. 990 (1976), 564 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1977), petition for reh. denied,. 579
F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 3106 (1979); Lora v. Board of Educ., 456
F. Supp. 1211 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), but the Ninth Circuit - whose decisions bound the
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The court concluded that although the plaintiffs would have to
prove more than a foreseeable discriminatory impact, it would not so
narrowly define discriminatory purpose to mean "an intent to harm
black children. ' 30 7 The plaintiffs would have to show an intent to
segregate those children into classes for the educable retarded. 308
This they had accomplished. The court found, after a detailed and
lengthy analysis of California's education system generally and its
programs for retarded children specifically, that the state had been
unable to meet the educational needs of disadvantaged children for
most of its history and viewed placement of blacks in EMR classes
as but one aspect of this failure.30 9 However, it was the EMR
program that received the brunt of the court's condemnation. 310
Relying on either the testimony of the state's own witnesses or on its
documents, the court concluded that EMR classes were "designed to
separate out children who are incapable of learning in the regular
classes" 311 and were not meant to provide remedial instruction so
that children could learn the skills necessary for eventual return to
regular instruction. 312 Given these characteristics, the court consid-
ered "the decision to place children in these classes . . .a crucial
one. Children wrongly placed in these classes are unlikely to escape
as they inevitably lag farther and farther behind the children in
regular classes. '313
The court next reviewed the process by which a disproportionate
number of black children were placed in EMR classes.314 Based on
Riles court - had not yet explicitly adopted the objective test. Soria v. Oxnard School
Dist., 488 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1973). But see De La Cruz v. Tormey, 582 F.2d 45 (9th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 965 (1979). Moreover, a few months prior to Riles II, the
Supreme Court had warned that while "inevitability or foreseeability of consequences
[permits] a strong inference that the adverse effects were desired [it was but] . . .a
working tool, not a synonym for proof." Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279
n.25 (1979). See also Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 99 S. Ct 2941 (1979); Dayton
Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 99 S. Ct. 2971 (1979).
307. Slip op. at 84.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 1.
310. Throughout the opinion the court labeled it "dead-end," "isolating,"
"inferior," and "stigmatizing." Id. at 18, 24, 66, 68, 85, 92, 101.
311. Id. at 16.
312. Id. at 17.
313. Id. at 18-19.
314. The court found that in the 20 school districts in California "accounting for 80
percent of the enrollment of black children, black children comprised 27.5 percent of
the student population and 62 percent of the E.M.R. population." Id. at 23. This
overrepresentation, the court concluded, could have occurred by chance less than one
time in a million. Id. Further, even if one assumed that the incidence of mild mental
retardation was 50 percent greater in black children than white, there was "still less
than a one in 100,000 chance that the enrollment could be so skewed towards black
children." Id. at 24.
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the testimony of the state's witnesses it found that although
California had acknowledged in 1969 that minorities were overre-
presented in EMR classes, it chose for the first time in that year to
order the use of specific standardized individual intelligence tests for
EMR placement.315 The "quick and unsystematic" process by which
tests were selected for use316 failed to consider "critical issues
stemming from I.Q. testing; ' 317 by relying on the most commonly
used tests, the state "opted to perpetuate any discriminatory effects
of those tests.' 318 Before it would decide whether the tests were
indeed discriminatory, the court determined, as it had in Riles I, that
I.Q. tests were the primary determinant in EMR placement,319
relying on the results of the state's own investigation. 320
These initial analyses finally brought the court to the central
issue - the nature of the intelligence tests themselves. Expert
witnesses for both plaintiffs and defendants had agreed in two
crucial respects: first, it was impossible to "truly define, much less
measure, intelligence," instead, "I.Q. tests, like other ability tests, es-
sentially measure achievement . . .;-321 and second, black children
performed significantly less well on intelligence tests than did their
white counterparts.322 Only two percent of white students in
California achieved I.Q. scores below 70, while fifteen percent of
black students did. The court first asked why the tests had not been
modified to remove this disparity in the same way that the
315. Id. at 26. The tests included the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale, the
Wechsler Intelligence Scale, and the Leiter International Performance Scale. The list
was further amended in 1975 to include a number of supplemental intelligence tests.
Id. at 111 n.3, 117 n.39.
316. The list of such tests had been developed by a state department of education
official who was not an expert in I.Q. testing, and who had made his selections on the
basis of a survey of the tests used most frequently by California's school
psychologists and on the recommendations of test publishers. Id. at 27.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 28. The list was approved summarily by the California Board of
Education on the assumption that the selection of tests had been based on expert
opinion with due consideration for the problems of cultural bias. Id.
319. Id. at 30-31.
320. The state's own investigation revealed that about one-third of EMR pupils'
records contained no estimates of adaptive behavior and that over one-quarter were
missing a history of physical and social development. Id. at 33. In contrast, "the
record of the I.Q. scores was clearly the most scrupulously kept record, and it appears
to have been the most important one." Id. The almost exclusive use of I.Q. test results
in EMR placement was contrary to a requirement in the California statute. See text
accompanying notes 200 & 201 supra.
321. Slip op. at 38. Contrast this finding with that made in Hobson. See text
accompanying notes 114 to 122 supra.
322. Slip op. at 38.
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differences between males and females had been excised from early
versions of the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale. Acknowledging
that equalizing scores of minorities and whites might be difficult, it
criticized testing experts for being "willing to tolerate or even
encourage tests that portray minorities, especially blacks, as
intellectually inferior."323
The court examined the possible explanations for the signifi-
cantly disparate scores of blacks and whites on I.Q. tests. Rejecting
genetic32 4 and socio&conomic325 explanations of the disparities in
scores, the court turned to the hypothesis that cultural bias in the
tests caused the disparities. It noted that versions of the Stanford-
Binet and Wechsler scales used prior to the 1970's had been
developed using only white children in the process of deriving norms
against which all children would be measured. That these tests had
been restandardized in the early 1970's to include a representative
proportion of black children did not satisfy the court that they were
valid for culturally different groups: "Mixing the populations
without more does not eliminate any preexisting bias. ' 326 The
process failed to yield data that could be used to compare black and
white children's performance on particular items.327 The court
identified two other indicia of cultural bias. First, to the extent that
black children were more likely to be exposed to nonstandard
English, they would be handicapped in the verbal component of
intelligence tests.328 Second, it posited that certain items were
inherently biased against black children from culturally different
environments when viewed from the perspective of the scoring
323. Id. at 41.
324. The defendants did not rely on this ground. Wilson Riles, superintendent of
the California state department of education, stated that the genetic rationale was
"reprehensible." Id. at 42. However, some state officials did testify that they would not
rule out a genetic explanation, and one defense expert witness, psychologist Robert
Gordon, believed that it was the most cogent reason for I.Q. score disparities between
the races. Id.
325. The defendants contended that differences in scores resulted from the rearing
of poor children, both black and white, in inadequate homes and neighborhoods.
Although the court could accept that poverty might lead to academic deficiencies, it
would not accept the theory that poverty resulted in mental retardation. Why, the
court asked, would inadequate financial resources produce disproportionately more
mildly retarded children - as those found in EMR classes - and not cause a
disproportionate number of children with severe intellectual deficits? Id. at 44. It is
possible that nutritional deficiencies in poor people affect intellectual functioning to a
limited degree but are not serious enough to produce severe or profound retardation.
326. Id. at 46.
327. Id. at 122 n.64.
328. Id. at 47. However, the court admitted that black children also did
significantly less well on some nonverbal tasks. Id. at 123 n.66.
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criteria offered in the examiner's manual. 329 The court concluded
that "to the extent that a 'black culture' exists and translates the
phenomenon of intelligence into skills and knowledge untested by
the standardized intelligence tests, those tests cannot measure the
capabilities of black children." 330 The court charged that the tests
were never designed to eliminate bias against black children and
blamed test developers and users for assuming "in effect that black
children were less 'intelligent' than whites."331
The court had constructed an analytic web from which the
defendants could not extricate themselves. By defining purposeful
discrimination to mean the intent to segregate minority children into
special, isolated classes, the court laid the groundwork for a decision
in favor of the plaintiffs. It judged California's EMR program to be a
substandard, stigmatizing means of education, a virtual prison from
which black children could not easily escape.332 It concluded that on
the basis of intelligence tests mandated by the state EMR classes
had been populated by a disproportionate number of minority
children for a decade. The process by which the tests were chosen
was haphazard, unthinking, and suspect, making "the inference of
discriminatory intent ... inescapable. ' 333 The tests themselves were
seen by both plaintiffs' and defendants' expert witnesses to be
culturally biased, since none of them had been specifically validated
for black children.334 Perhaps most damaging to the defendants'
329. The court chose one item for particular scrutiny. On one of the subtests of the
Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children, the examinee is asked, "What is the thing to
do if a boy/girl much smaller than yourself starts to fight with you?" The scoring
manual gives the most credit for behavior that avoids retaliation. According to one
expert's testimony at trial, this question is answered incorrectly more than twice as
often by young black children than white. Id. at 48. But see text accompanying notes
130 to 133 supra.
330. Slip op. at 50.
331. Id. at 45.
332. "Minority children ... are isolated for virtually the entire school day from
mainstream children, and E.M.R. classes provide an inferior education for children
assigned there . . . ." Id. at 84.
333. Id. at 88. The court stated:
The decision by the State Department of Education in 1969 to compel the use
of standardized I.Q. tests. . . reveals the impermissible intent to discriminate.
... [I]t had profound discriminatory effects. It doomed large numbers of
black children to E.M.R. status, racially imbalanced classes, an inferior and
"dead-end" education, and the stigma that inevitably comes from the use of
the label "retarded." That impact was not only foreseeable but foreseen, and
appropriate inferences must be drawn.
Id. at 85-86. See also id. at 86-87.
334. Id. at 88. The court was strident in its criticism of the state:
Defendants' complete failure to ascertain or attempt to ascertain the
validity of the tests for minority children cannot be ignored. Rather
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position was the court's critical perception of the state's conduct.
Condemning the complacency. and negligence of the state depart-
ment of education in the face of explicit legislative concern about
biased testing and disproportionate enrollment of minorities in EMR
classes, the court charged that the state had not investigated the
problems, had not inquired into significant variances in the racial
and ethnic composition of classes for the retarded, and had failed to
monitor implementation of protections imposed by the legislature to
insure that placement decisions would be made on bases other than,
I.Q. tests.335 The court concluded that the state's conduct "must be
seen as a desire to perpetuate the segregation of minorities in
inferior, dead-end, and stigmatizing classes for the retarded. '336
Thus the plaintiffs were held to have met their burden of proving
discriminatory intent. The defendants could prevail only if explana-
tions for their conduct passed muster under the most exacting of the
equal protection tests. However, the court concluded, "Defendants
can establish no compelling state interest in the use of the I.Q. tests
nor in the maintenance of EMR classes with overwhelming
disproportions of black enrollment. '337
After finding for plaintiffs under both federal statutes and the
Constitution, 338 what remained for the court was to forge proper
remedies. The court permanently enjoined the state from using any
standardized intelligence tests to identify black children for EMR
defendants' actions resulting in the adoption of the I.Q. requirement and the
short list of accepted I.Q. tests can only be explained as the product of the
impermissible and scientifically dubious assumption that black children as a
group are inherently less capable of academic achievement than white
children.
Id.
335. Id. at 88-91.
336. Id. at 92.
337. Id. at 94. Defendants asserted that the tests prevented misclassification rather
than caused it, that there were no real alternatives to I.Q. testing, and that testing
helped promote fiscal planning. All these defenses were brushed aside as post hoc
justifications. Id. What further damaged the defendants' case was that the state had
earlier agreed to eliminate disparities for Hispanic children. Id. at 95; see text
accompanying notes 166 to 173. The court found that the plaintiffs could also prevail
under an intermediate standard of review applicable when a nonsuspect classification
operates to the detriment of a disadvantaged class of persons. Such review would
require that the school system's classification "substantially furthers the purpose" of
providing education. Slip op. at 95-96. See Berkelman v. San Francisco Unified
School Dist., 501 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1974).
338. The court also found that defendants had violated California's constitutional
guarantee of equal protection but found no violation of its education code. Slip op. at
97, 131 n.110.
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placement without first securing its approval.33 9 With regard to
disproportionate placement, the state was ordered to monitor and
eliminate overrepresentation by obtaining annual data documenting
enrollment in EMR classes by race and ethnicity and by requiring
each school district to prepare and adopt plans to correct significant
imbalances. 340 To remedy the harm to those children misidentified,
the defendants were to reevaluate all black children then labeled as
educably retarded without resort to any standardized intelligence
tests that had not been approved by the court.341 Finally, schools
would have to draft individual education plans designed to return all
incorrectly identified children to regular classrooms.342
Critique of Riles II
Riles II is an interesting mixture of judicial innovation and
conservatism. The court conscientiously cited precedent at every step
of its analysis, attempted to conform its decision to the existing law
in its own circuit as well as to that of the Supreme Court, and
carefully - if not always correctly - considered all the viewpoints
presented in the overwhelming amount of testimony. In form and
substance the decision is reminiscent of Hobson v. Hansen,34 3
decided a dozen years earlier. The concern for precedent was
appropriate because Judge Peckham's decision in Riles II is just as
revolutionary in 1979 as was Judge Wright's in 1967. While Hobson
339. In doing so it recognized the changes initiated by California since the
issuance of the preliminary injunction and the complexity and risk of judicial
interference in the administration of education. It also did not wish its condemnation
of intelligence tests to be seen as the "final judgment on the scientific validity" of
such devices. Id. at 102. But these concerns did not dissuade the court from holding
the state responsible for its failure to properly assess and educate black children, and
from fashioning remedies to halt both test abuse and disproportionate enrollment of
blacks in EMR classes. The state board of education would have to petition the court,
after determining that the tests they sought to use were not racially or culturally
discriminatory, that they would be administered in a nondiscriminatory manner, and
that they had been validated for the purpose of placing black children in EMR
classes. The petition must be supported by statistical evidence submitted under oath
and certification that public hearings had been held concerning the proposed tests. Id.
at 104-05.
340. Id. at 105-06. The court required such plans for any school system in which
the rate of black EMR enrollment was one standard deviation above the rate for white
EMR enrollment. The court did not clarify what it meant by this requirement.
341. Id. at 106-07.
342. Id. at 107. Individual education plans are required for all handicapped
children under Pub. L. No. 94-142. See 45 C.F.R. § 121a.340-.349 (1977). The court
refused to order compensatory education for black disadvantaged children already in
regular classes. Slip op. at 108.
343. 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967). See text accompanying notes 79 to 110 supra.
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proscribed tracking and the use of group achievement tests, Riles H
for the first time permanently enjoined the use of the traditional and
most respected tool of the professional psychologist's trade - the
individually administered intelligence test. The case may also have
signalled the end of separate classes for mildly retarded children
whether populated by white or minority children. The court called
EMR classes "educational anachronisms" that focused on labels
rather than individual needs, isolated students, and relegated them
to inferior education rather than providing remedial training
designed to return them to regular classes containing nonhandi-
capped students.34 4
Of equal, though not such dramatic, importance was the court's
attempt to further define the meaning of discriminatory intent
under the equal protection clause in the post-Davis era. Perhaps even
more significant, however, was the court's endeavor to give meaning
to the ambiguous concepts of nondiscriminatory assessment and test
validation. As a result, test publishers and users must now produce
data showing that tests have validity for each discrete group for
which they will be used. Standardization samples that include
minority groups but do not yield separate norms for each race will
not be judged valid. I.Q. test scores will have to be correlated with
relevant measures, not simply scores derived from other standard-
ized ability tests. One wishes that the court had gone further and
guided examiners as to the level of validity - that is, the coefficient
of correlation - required to make a test acceptable345 or how much
disparity between minority and white correlations would be tolerated
before a test was considered discriminatory. Nevertheless, the court
performed a useful service by giving future litigants one judicial
definition of the requirement that tests be "validated for the specific
purpose for which they are used." 346 From a procedural perspective,
one may be surprised at the ease with which the court permitted the
retroactive application of federal law to the facts in this case. Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act was not passed until 1973, and its
implementing regulations did not take effect until June 1977. Public
Law 94-142 was not passed until 1975, and its regulations only took
effect in October 1977. Yet the court permitted the plaintiffs to
344. Slip op. at 109. This was in sharp contrast to Judge Peckham's decision in
Riles I. See text accompanying note 208 supra. No doubt this shift was stimulated by
the least restrictive environment provisions of federal legislation protecting handi-
capped persons.
345. See text accompanying notes 254 to 256 supra.
346. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.532 (1977).
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amend their complaint in a suit the operative facts of which
originated in 1971. 347
Of course, the most significant aspect of Riles II is the court's
permanent injunction of the administration of individual intelli-
gence tests to place black children in EMR classes. The ban was
based almost entirely on the court's finding that the tests were
culturally biased, and the persuasiveness of the court's opinion
depends on the correctness of this finding. Regardless of whether
one applauds or decries the result, however, there are infirmities in
the court's analysis. Riles II defined an unbiased test as one that
yields "the same pattern of scores when administered to different
groups of people. '348 Such a definition is psychometrically unsound.
Tests are fair when they predict with equal accuracy, not with equal
results, for all groups. The court's definition "eliminates a priori any
possibility of real group differences on various psychological traits.
. . .- 349 The court rejected the possibility of genuine differences
between black and white children on the basis of genetic inferiority
and socioeconomic influences. Though the court rested its decision
on the finding that the tests were culturally biased, it provided little
hard data to support such a conclusion and was tentative in
discussing it. In fact, the court's determination that the tests contain
questions biased against poor black children is not uniformly
accepted, and there is some data to suggest that whatever
discrimination there is in tests, lower scores in blacks are not the
result of content bias.3 50 The court was correct in criticizing test
publishers for not adequately standardizing their instruments on
discrete minority populations, but beyond that, its analysis of
cultural discrimination is weak, and the issue is certainly not as
settled as the court appears to think. Nevertheless, the court could
only rest its holding on the data presented to it by the parties. The
state's defense was made difficult by the lack of relevant studies on
differential validity, the absence of systematic research concerning
content bias, and its concession that cultural differences affected
I.Q. scores. 351
The court's equal protection analysis deserves some attention.
Its discussion of the intermediate standard of review - the most
347. But see, e.g., Stemple v. Board of Educ., 464 F. Supp. 258 (D. Md. 1979), appeal
docketed, No. 79-1208 (4th Cir. March 30, 1979).
348. Slip op. at 41.
349. Schmidt & Hunter, supra note 134, at 1. See notes 135 & 136 and
accompanying text supra.
350. See text accompanying notes 127 to 133 supra.
351. Slip op. at 48.
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recently developed form of judicial scrutiny under the fourteenth
amendment 352 - relied almost entirely on one court of appeals
opinion, Berkelman v. San Francisco Unified School District.353
There, the Ninth Circuit concluded that "where a nonsuspect
classification ... is alleged to operate to the detriment of a
disadvantaged class or classes [e.g., black and Spanish-American
students], neither 'strict' nor 'minimal' scrutiny provides useful
guidance as a standard of review. ' '354 But, it is just this kind of
interaction, present also in Riles, that could have led the court to
employ the strict scrutiny test.
In Riles there was an explicit classification based on intelligence
and an implicit classification based on race. While either alone
probably does not raise the standard to strict scrutiny, the
combination of the two might be so stigmatizing as to require
defendants to show more than a rational relationship or even
substantial congruence (as is required under the intermediate
standard of review) between their practices and goals. De facto
racial discrimination in the setting of de jure intelligence classifica-
tion
compounds the psychological injury to the individual and
introduces the factor of a discrete and insular group .... [T]he
two levels of discrimination ... inevitably reinforce each other,
hastening the downward spiral of self-confidence and self-
esteem. The potentially dangerous consequences generated by
the creation of a racial group stereotype based on low
intelligence gives greater force to the stigmatic effect. 355
Thus, minority students who are labeled intellectually defective
suffer a cumulative disadvantage. Society has historically subjected
them to intentional and protracted discrimination on the basis of
race; prevented them from marrying, voting, procreating, and
attending school on the basis of their handicaps; and attenuated
their constitutional rights relative to adults on the basis of their
status as children. 356 If, as one legal scholar has suggested, the equal
352. See note 184 supra.
353. 501 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1974).
354. Id. at 1267.
355. Intelligence Classifications, supra note 8, at 672; cf. Lora v. Board of Educ.,
456 F. Supp. 1211, 1276 ("Where ... the handicapped children are also from minority
groups, the burden of showing a sufficient educational opportunity is especially
high;" allegations of discrimination in the assessment and placement of emotionally
disturbed black and hispanic students).
356. The most recent case reinforcing the notion that children are accorded less
constitutional protection than adults is Parham v. J.L. & J.R., 99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979).
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protection clause, and the Constitution as a whole, were meant to be
"participation-oriented [and] representation-reinforcing, ' 357 then
there is a sound basis for arguing that mentally retarded minority
children deserve the highest protection afforded by the Constitution.
Perhaps because the court believed that its revolutionary
remedies precluded more adventuresome analysis, it lost the
opportunity to rule that strict scrutiny of defendants' action was
appropriate, not only because of the intent to discriminate but
because their conduct impermissibly affected a suspect class of
persons. This approach would not have been entirely novel.
Some commentators358 have suggested that intelligence, like'-
race, national ancestry, and alienage, should be considered a suspect I
classification. Classifications already denominated as suspect are
those that have affected persons burdened either with disabilities or
a history of purposeful unequal treatment or who have been
relegated to a position of political powerlessness - discrete and
insular minorities who command extraordinary protection against
the will of the majority. 359 Intelligence classifications, it has been
claimed, fall within that definition:
Like one's race, . . . a person's intelligence (at least with
regard to innate capacity) is a matter over which he lacks
control.. . . [Aln individual cannot wilfully raise or lower his IQ
more than a few points on a scale. As it does with other
minorities, moreover, the selective disadvantaging of less
intelligent people tends to punish [those in] possession of the
identifying characteristic by perpetuating a cycle of failure and
defeat.... It has been found that those who are classified as
"dull" often begin to exhibit the characteristics associated with
such a classification, regardless of their actual mental capacity,
and so are unnecessarily disadvantaged in life.360
While facially persuasive, the commentators' analogy of intelli-
gence to race is faulty on several grounds. In some cases, an
individual's I.Q. scores can vary widely across time,361 and there is
evidence that parents can train their children to perform better on
I.Q. tests.362 Further, the self-fulfilling prophecy theory implied in
357. Ely, Toward a Representation-Reinforcing Mode of Judicial Review, 37 MD. L.
REV. 451, 471 (1978).
358. Shea, supra note 8, at 173; Intelligence Classifications, supra note 8, at
653-56.
359. See note 185 supra.
360. Intelligence Classifications, supra note 8, at 654-55.
361. Anastasi, supra note 7, at 329-32.
362. Whimbey, You Can Learn to Raise Your IQ Score, 9 PSYCH. TODAY 27 (1976).
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the last sentence of the excerpt has been attacked as not supportable,
at least with regard to students' performance in classrooms. 363
In light of a comment by one Justice, it seems unlikely, however,
that the Supreme Court will consider intelligence a suspect
classification. In discussing whether sex was a suspect classifica-
tion, Justice Brennan differentiated it from "such nonsuspect
statuses as intelligence or physical disability. 36 4 Moreover,
discrimination on the basis of intelligence is not usually directed
at a discrete and insular minority. . . . [I]ntelligence varies
along a spectrum. . . . [M]embers of the group will vary as
arbitrary decisions about scales and cut-off points vary in
particular cases. . . . Given the absence of discreteness, and...
given the perceived lack of insularity, there is little concern that
intelligence classifications deny effective political representa-
tion.36
5
If one views low intelligence as a handicap, however, it may be
easier to argue that intelligence is a suspect classification. 366 Using
the Rodriguez definition, the contention is that handicapped persons
are by definition "saddled with disabilities," 367 are politically
powerless, 36 have suffered a history of purposeful discrimination,369
and are discrete and insular minorities possessing randomly
363. The theory gained national recognition as the result of a study in which it
was allegedly demonstrated that teachers who were erroneously informed that some
of their students were "late bloomers" began treating these normal students as bright.
R. ROSENTHAL & L. JACOBSON, PYGMALION IN THE CLASSROOM (1970). The study has
been severely criticized for its methodological deficiencies. Thorndike, Book Review, 5
AM. EDUc. RESEARCH J. 708 (1968).
364. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality opinion).
365. Intelligence Classifications, supra note 8, at 655.
366. See, e.g., Burgdorf & Burgdorf, A History of Unequal Treatment: The
Qualifications of Handicapped Persons as a "Suspect Class" Under the Equal
Protection Clause, 15 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 855 (1975); Burt, Judicial Action to Aid
the Retarded, in 2 ISSUES IN THE CLASSIFICATION OF CHILDREN 293, 303-12 (N. Hobbs
ed. 1975); Shaman, Persons Who Are Mentally Retarded: Their Right to Marry and
Have Children, 12 FAM. L.Q. 61, 66-70 (1978); Segregation, supra note 8, at 1236. See
also Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237 (1974).
367. San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
368. This is especially true of retarded persons and those considered to be mentally
ill who have been "denied the right to vote by express provisions in state constitutions
and statutes." Burgdorf & Burgdorf, supra note 366, at 906.
369. The strongest evidence of this is compulsory sterilization laws and denial of
access to public schools. Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405 F. Supp. 946, 959 n.9 (E.D. Pa.
1975); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279,
293-95 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
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occurring immutable characteristics and as such are readily identifi-
able:
A group of persons labeled as retarded have in this society
been subjected to discrimination as brutal and dehumanizing as
those imposed on the slave population . .. This society's
willingness to confine retarded human beings in ... terrible
warehouses, and to shut these warehouses from sight by their
remote rural locations, is eloquent testimony that "retarded"
persons - like slaves . . . - have been made nonpersons. If
further confirmation is needed to demonstrate the brutal
dehumanizations this society has practiced on retarded persons
as a class, it is enough to consider the compulsory sterilization
laws enacted during the first decades of this century with the
false and unjustified promise to cleanse this country of
"generations of imbeciles."
Retarded children . .. are as a rule the victims of birth or
developmental defects for which they can bear no just blame.
And, as a class, they are subjected to galling and brutal social
discriminations. 370
The contention that handicapped persons should be entitled to
extraordinary protection under a suspect class status has received
some favorable judicial consideration. The North Dakota Supreme
Court, hearing a claim by a young quadruple amputee with other
physical and sensory defects that she had a right to an education in
the public schools, called the plaintiff's multiple handicaps "just the
sort of 'immutable characteristic determined solely by accident of
birth' to which the 'inherently suspect' classification would be
applied. '371 A federal court in New York acknowledged that
"emotionally disturbed children might be characterized as a suspect
class. . .. "372 When two severely retarded, multiply handicapped
370. Burt, supra note 366, at 303-05. "Handicapped persons are a distinct
minority, frequently isolated from the rest of society. They bear the brunt of social
prejudice and tend to be ... cut off from the political process.. . . [Mlany handicaps
are immutable characteristics occurring on a random basis, punishment for which is
'illogical and unjust.'" Burgdorf & Burgdorf, supra note 366, at 907.
371. In re G.H., 218 N.W.2d 441, 447 (N.D. 1974) (citing Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion)). Much of that quotation, however, comes from
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175, in which the Supreme Court
considered but did not decide whether illegitimacy was a suspect class. Reliance on
Frontiero was probably misplaced given Justice Brennan's remark that physical
disability was not a suspect class. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973)
(plurality opinion).
372. Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 1211, 1275 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
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plaintiffs,3 73 seeking a ruling that they had been deprived of an
appropriate education, asserted that their claims should be strictly
scrutinized, a federal district court found "a certain immediate
appeal to [their] argument." 374 Although it never decided the issue,
the court agreed that "retarded children are precluded from the
political process and have been neglected by the state legislatures.
Moreover the label 'retarded' might bear as great a stigma as any
racial slur. '3 75
However, one can empathize with Judge Peckham's neglect of
this line of analysis. Even though there is "ample evidence to show
that retarded [and handicapped] persons are an unjustly stigmat-
ized, politically vulnerable group and that state policies .. . have
fanned popular social opprobrium," 376 those advocating that
handicapped persons' equal protection claims should be strictly
scrutinized face increased resistance from the Supreme Court to
recognizing new suspect classifications. In the last six years the
Court has denied suspect classification status to wealth,377 sex,378
and illegitimacy, 379 all of which had appeared prime candidates for
that designation in earlier cases.
Thus, while the case for handicapped persons is strong, they
may not have suffered the kind of profound and encompassing
injuries that require "extraordinary protection from the majoritarian
political process. '380 Further, the handicapped may be too amor-
phous a group to meet the test of definability that is required for
consideration as a suspect class. 38 1 Perhaps the more discrete
handicap of retardation would meet that criterion, but even that
category may be too large, for it comprises those who range from
373. One was 21 years old with a reported mental age of 19 months, the other 12
years old with a reported mental age of 15 months. Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405 F. Supp.
946, 948 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
374. Id. at 958.
375. Id. at 959. But see New York Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F.
Supp. 752, 762-63 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
376. Burt, supra note 366, at 305.
377. San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
378. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417
U.S. 484 (1974).
379. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976). Though the Court agreed that
illegitimacy, like race, was a characteristic one did not freely choose nor did it bear
any relation to the individual's ability to participate in and contribute to society, it
found that, unlike race, illegitimacy was not obvious and overtly recognizable, nor
was the history of legal and political discrimination against illegitimates as severe
and pervasive as that against racial minorities. Id. at 505-06.
380. San Antonio Ind4School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
381. See id. at 22.
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barely functioning persons with unmeasurable intelligence, i.e., less
than an I.Q. score of 10, to those whose I.Q. score is two standard
deviations below the mean, i.e., about an I.Q. score of 70. Possibly,
the suspect classification status could apply to the profoundly
retarded,38 2 but that would be of no help to plaintiffs in such cases as
Riles, where the challenge is to the appropriate placement of
educably retarded children who have suffered less at the hands of
the state than the severely impaired.
Finally, what is perhaps most instructive about Riles II is the
court's harsh condemnation of the California state department of
education. The department's unsystematic, hasty, and unsound
methods in developing the list of approved I.Q. tests, its failure to
monitor adequately the placement of minorities in EMR classes, and
its disregardof legislative concern about minority overrepresenta-
tion in inferior programs drew angry and extensive criticism. Riles
II may be another demonstration that conduct on the part of
government officials, perceived as consciously disregarding the
rights of citizens, may lead to landmark decisions that have more
profound consequences than simply the correction of the irregulari-
ties that provoked them.
LITIGATION GENERATED BY STATUTES
It was earlier noted that an intense period of litigation may
culminate in the passage of legislation that incorporates the
principles developed piecemeal in case law and applies them to
broad classes of persons. But, as exemplified in Riles II, legislation
itself may serve as a springboard to future litigation, as parties seek
to define, implement, and enforce its provisions. Federal and state
statutes may evoke what may be called "second generation" issues.
With access to a free public education an established principle, the
questions are how broadly the right may be invoked and what
particular rights are embodied in the general assurance.
In Frederick L. v. Thomas, 383 for example, a federal district court
interpreted the right to education to require school systems to engage
in massive screening and subsequent individual psychological
382. As with the plaintiffs in Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405 F. Supp. 946 (E.D. Pa.
1975), see notes 373 & 374 supra, "[A] court might hold 'intelligence' to be a suspect
class but might invalidate its use only when it imposes the most gross deprivations on
the most vulnerable members of the class." Burt, supra note 366, at 311-12.
383. 419 F. Supp. 960 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 557 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1977), remanded
for further proceedings, 578 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1978) (granting of defendants' motion for
abstention affirmed so that state court could consider claim for damages).
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evaluations for learning disabled children. Frederick L. was a class
action against the Philadelphia school system charging that it had
failed to provide learning disabled children with appropriate
educational programs as required by Pennsylvania's special educa-
tion laws and the federal Constitution.384 Expert witnesses for both
sides testified that the incidence of learning disability in the
defendant school system was three percent, and on that basis
estimated that of the 263,000 students enrolled in the Philadelphia
schools, approximately 7,900 were learning disabled. 38 5 Only 1300
were being served in special programs. 386 The defendants contended
that-the remaining 6,600 were properly "mainstreamed" in regular
classes and did not need special services, as they were referred
neither by their parents nor their teachers for additional help. The
plaintiffs responded that the school could not presume that such
children were being properly served unless the determination was
made on the basis of an appropriate evaluation. They claimed that
failure to perform comprehensive assessments resulted in the
functional exclusion of the 6,600 children, and thus denied them
equal educational opportunity under the fourteenth amendment's
equal protection clause.
The court found for the plaintiffs on the basis of Pennsylvania's
special education laws and regulations. Although it agreed with the
defendants that learning disabled children could be offered minimal
special services and could be provided nothing more than the
monitoring of academic performance in regular classrooms, the court
refused to find that the children could be placed in regular programs
without identification. "There must first be a diagnosis of the child's
exceptionality, and then a determination that mainstreaming under
prescribed conditions will be an appropriate placement. '38 7 The court
ordered the school district to develop a procedure that was
"reasonably calculated to identify all of its learning disabled
students within the near future." 388
The court noted that parent referrals may not be the most
effective means of identifying learning disabled children because
some parents may not know enough about handicaps to realize that
their children need special instruction. It also was concerned that
384. Id. at 962.
385. Id. at 963.
386. Id. at 974.
387. Id. at 973.
388. Id. at 974.
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teachers could not always serve as adequate referral sources.
Testimony had shown that teachers often neglected to request
special services for nondisruptive but academically deficient stu-
dents and that even disruptive pupils were not referred if teachers
believed that there was no existing suitable program for them.389 The
court left to the school district the formulation of a plan for the
identification of all learning disabled students. It would seem,
however, that only system-wide screening of the entire student body
followed by individual testing of those subsequently found to be
possibly learning disabled would suffice. 39° The implications of
Frederick L. are significant. It places further pressure on already
embattled and financially exhausted school systems; it almost
inevitably restricts school psychologists to the role of tester; and,
ironically, while other cases have curbed extensive reliance on tests,
it expands their use greatly.
In light of Frederick L. it is interesting to note that Congress,
when it was considering Public Law 94-142, was concerned that the
vague definition of "specific learning disability" would lead to the
overinclusion of many children, thus inflating the numbers of
handicapped children for whom federal reimbursement was availa-
ble. 391 To prevent overinclusion it placed an upper limit of two
percent on the number of all children that could be labeled as
learning disabled, to be in effect until the Commissioner of
Education published regulations redefining the condition, estab-
lished specific criteria for determining its existence, and developed
procedures for arriving at the diagnosis. The proposed regulations
provided that (1) it was not presently possible to specify all the
components of each learning disability; (2) no generally accepted
diagnostic instruments could be used appropriately with all learning
disabled children; (3) it was not possible to list specific standardized
389. Id. at 973.
390. Id. at 965.
391. For purposes of the Act, Congress defined learning disability in the
traditional words of the exclusionary description found in standard texts:
The term "children with specific learning disabilities" means those
children who have a disorder in one or more of the basic psychological
processes involved in understanding or in using language, spoken or written,
which disorder may manifest itself in imperfect ability to listen, think, speak,
read, write, spell, or do mathematical calculations. Such disorders include
such conditions as perceptual handicaps, brain injury, minimal brain
dysfunction, dyslexia, and developmental aphasia. Such term does not include
children who have learning problems which are primarily the result of visual,
hearing, or motor handicaps, of mental retardation, or of environmental,
cultural, or economic disadvantage.
20 U.S.C. § 1411 (1978).
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instruments to be used in the evaluation of such children; and (4)
regulation of the diagnostic process would be extremely extensive
and impractical. 392
The final regulations retain the original definition with only one
variation,393 and require that any determination of learning
disability be grounded in a severe discrepancy between achievement
and intellectual ability in one of seven areas. 394 Further, they require
that, in addition to the assessment of I.Q. and educational
performance, at least one member of the evaluation team observe the
child's academic behavior in the regular classroom setting.39 The
regulations do little to advance the theory, assessment, or diagnosis
of learning disabilities. Diagnosis is still clearly tied to measured
intelligence as the criterion for ability, with all the problems that
that entails. 396
Another case brought on by legislation is Lora v. Board of
Education,397 in which black and Hispanic emotionally disturbed
students claimed that inadequate and improper psychoeducational
evaluations led to racially discriminatory referral and assignments
to special day schools that were removed frpm the mainstream of
regular educational settings. The assessment of children considered
to be candidates for placement in these schools was the responsibili-
ty of evaluation teams consisting of psychologists, learning
disability specialists, social workers, psychiatrists, and guidance
counselors. 398 Plaintiffs alleged that notwithstanding this procedure,
the defendants placed excessive reliance on tests that were culturally
biased.
392. 41 Fed. Reg. 52,404-05 (1976).
393. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.5(b)(9) (1977). It excluded academic deficiency based on
emotional disturbance as a learning disability.
394. Id. § 121a.541. The areas are oral expression, listening comprehension, written
expression, basic reading skill, reading comprehension, mathematics calculation, and
mathematics reasoning.
395. Id. § 121a.542.
396. E.g., J. SALVIA & J. YSSELDYKE, supra note 4; Coles, The Learning Disabilities
Test Battery: Empirical and Social Issues, 48 HARV. EDUC. REV. 313 (1978).
397. 456 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
398. The evaluation teams, sensitive to the possibilities of cultural and racial bias,
used what the defendants called a "pluralistic" model of assessment. Under this
system, a social worker obtained background information concerning the educational
and developmental history of the child and his family environment, an educational
evaluator assessed the child's academic strengths and weaknesses, a psychiatrist
interviewed the child, where appropriate, a neurologist evaluated the child's
neurological functioning, and a psychologist administered a series of tests to assess
intellectual and emotional functioning. In addition, some children were observed in a
simulated learning environment (the diagnostic classroom). To prevent individual
biases from predominating, the evaluation team met to decide jointly on classification
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Invoking the due process and equal protection clauses, 399 Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,4 Public Law 94-142,401 and
section 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act, 40 2 the court analyzed the
plaintiffs' claims using a right to treatment theory.403 It stated that
"since proper evaluation is ... central to acceptable special
education, a program falling substantially below minimum estab-
lished standards would constitute a violation of the right to
treatment."40 4 The court found that some of the defendants'
assessment practices fell short of those standards; however, the
court did not condemn the tests used or even examine claims of test
bias. Rather, it considered the possibility of discrimination only
insofar as assessments were performed by nonminority profession-
als. It focused its attack primarily on the long waiting lists of
children to be evaluated and placed, the lack of systematic annual
review of students, and the transfer of students from one special
education program to another without a full diagnostic evaluation. It
found that the school violated requirements in Public Law 94-142
and section 504 for triennial reevaluations to determine whether
children should be retained or integrated in the mainstream of
regular education. 40 5 Thus, as in the early southern desegregation
cases, the court did not closely scrutinize the soundness of the
instruments used to assess minority children for placement. Instead,
it condemned omissions in established evaluation procedures and
the lack of personnel to carry them out. Like Frederick L., the
ultimate result was to mandate, rather than restrict, further testing.
Frederick L. and Lora are only two of several cases that have
been brought to the courts since the passage of Public Law 94-142,
the Rehabilitation Act, and complementary state special education
laws.4° 6 Not all of this litigation concerned psychological testing, but
there is little doubt that assessment practices will once again be the
subject of significant litigation.
and placement. Finally, a separate committee reviewed the evaluation unit's decision
in a meeting to which parents were invited. Id. at 1237.
399. Id. at 1232 (citing Hobson and Riles I as support).
400. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1978).
401. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1978).
402. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1975).
403. 456 F. Supp. at 1214-79.
404. Id. at 1285.
405. Id. at 1285-87, 1291.
406. See, e.g., Boxall v. Sequoia Union High School Dist., 464 F. Supp. 1104 (N.D.
Cal. 1979); Stemple v. Board of Educ., 464 F. Supp. 258 (D. Md. 1979); Howard S. v.
Friendswood Ind. School Dist., 454 F. Supp. 634 (S.D. Tex. 1978); Stuart v. Nappi, 443
F. Supp. 1235 (D. Conn. 1978); Kruse v. Campbell, 431 F. Supp. 180 (E.D. Va. 1977),
vacated and remanded, 434 U.S. 808 (1977).
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PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT
Though personality tests may invade the fundamental right of
privacy, in only one case, 40 7 Merriken v. Cressman,40 8 has the effect
of that right on the use of such tests been questioned. The case had
its origins in 1970 when a survey ordered by the Commissioners of
Montgomery County, Pennsylvania and conducted by a company
called Scientific Resources revealed that many children in the
county were using drugs. Most of these children, the study claimed,
possessed certain common characteristics. For example, eighty
percent of the identified drug abusers allegedly felt estranged from
their families. On the basis of such data Scientific Resources
suggested that the County Drug Commission sponsor a drug
prevention program called Critical Period of Intervention (CPI). All
three of the county school districts agreed to participate in the
program.
There were to be two phases in the study - identification and
therapy-intervention. In the first phase, questionnaires were to be
407. Why there is only a single case in this area is not clear. Although ability
testing is more pervasive than personality testing, school systems do use figure
drawings, projective tests, and paper and pencil personality inventories, especially in
the assessment of emotional and behavioral difficulties. E.g., Lora v. Board of Educ.,
456 F. Supp. 1211, 1237 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). Figure drawing tests include the House-Tree-
Person Test and the Draw-A-Person. Projective tests include the Thematic Appercep-
tion Test (in which persons are asked to tell stories about supposedly ambiguous black
and white drawings), the Rorschach Inkblot Test, and the Sentence Completion Test.
Paper and pencil measures include the California Personality Inventory and the
Edwards Personal Preference Schedule. See generally A. ANASTASI, supra note 7, at
493-616; J. SALVIA & J. YSSELDYKE, supra note 4, at 373-80. Perhaps because they do
not impinge on racial and cultural interests they are less vulnerable to challenge. In
any event, as concern for privacy in public institutions heightens and the issue of
discriminatory evaluation becomes defused through legislative regulation, there is a
greater likelihood of increased scrutiny of the administration of tests that are
designed to pierce surface behavior and uncover deep-seated emotional conflicts. This
may be especially true when the tests themselves inquire as to the more private
aspects of parent-child relationships. The Supreme Court has long recognized the
primacy of parent-child relationships as against state intervention. E.g., Parham v.
J.L. & J.R., 99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52 (1976); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923). In that light, the Merriken case can serve as a painful lesson to
mental health professionals who work in school settings. The case has stimulated
ample discussion in the legal and psychological literature. Bersoff, Professional
Ethics and Responsibilities: On the Horns of a Dilemma, 13 J. SCH. PSYCH. 359 (1975);
Moskowitz, Parental Rights and State Education, 50 WASH. L. REv. 623 (1975); 2
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 599 (1974); 13 J. FAM. L. 636 (1973-74); 27 VAND. L. REV. 372
(1974). Much of the discussion in this section is found in somewhat altered form in
Bersoff, supra note 247, at 363.
408. 364 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
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given to eighth grade students and their teachers so that certain
students, deemed potential drug abusers, could become part of the
therapeutic program. 4°9 The second phase of the study was
intervention. When the CPI staff had analyzed all the results, they
would compile a list of children who had significant potential for
becoming drug abusers. The list would then be given to the school
superintendent, who would organize a joint effort among guidance
counselors, teachers, school psychologists, and others to provide
group therapy programs. One of these was called the Guided Group
Interaction, a mandatory program to which the identified students
would be assigned. One of its purposes was to use the peer group as
"a leveler or equalizer insuring that its members do not stray too far
from its ranks. ' 41° When the program was first developed, the school
system did not intend to obtain parental consent for their children's
participation. 41' The study contained no provision for student
consent.41
2
409. Teachers were asked to identify pupils who most and least fit eight
descriptions of anti-social behavior. For example, one description was "This pupil
makes unusual or inappropriate responses during normal school activity." The
student form was to be somewhat lengthier. First, students would be asked to assess
their own behavior, for example, to state which of the following statements best
described themselves: (1) Someone who will probably be a success in life; (2) One who
gets upset when faced with a difficult school problem; (3) Someone who has lots of
self-confidence; (4) A student who has more problems than other students. In the next
part of the questionnaire they would be asked questions about their relationships with
their parents and the behavior of their parents, to indicate, for example, whether one
or both parents "tell me how much they love me" or "make me feel unloved" or "seem
to regret that I am growing up and spending more time away from home." Finally,
the students would select from among their classmates those who fit certain
descriptive statements similar in kind to the ones given the teachers. Id. at 913, 916,
918.
410. Id. at 916.
411. The researchers, however, did plan to send the following letter to each parent:
Dear Parent:
This letter is to inform you that, this fall, we are initiating a Drug
Program called "Critical Period of Intervention" (CPI). The aim of this
program is to identify children who may be susceptible to drug abuse and to
intervene with concrete measures to help these children. Diagnostic testing
will be part of this program and will provide data enabling the prevention
program to be specific and positive.
... We ask your support and cooperation in this program and assure you
of the confidentiality of these studies. If you wish to examine or receive
further information regarding the program, please feel free to contact the
principal in your school. If you do not wish to participate in this program,
please notify your principal of this decision. We will assume your cooperation
unless otherwise notified by you ..
Id. at 917.
412. Id. at 914.
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Sylvia Merriken, the mother of one of the intended participants
in the study, and a therapist in a drug and alcohol rehabilitation
center, complained to the principal of her son's school and to the
school board. The American Civil Liberties Union agreed to
represent Mrs. Merriken to seek an injunction in federal district
court to prevent the school system from carrying out its plans. The
ACLU argued on her behalf that the program would violate the
constitutional rights of both Mrs. Merriken and her son. The court
granted a temporary injunction prohibiting the county from
implementing its proposal until the litigation was completed. Two of
the three schools in Montgomery County discontinued their
participation, leaving only the Norristown system, which Mrs.
Merriken's son attended, as a defendant.
When the suit began, the school system offered to change its
procedure so that written parental consent would be required. As
another attempt to compromise, the school modified the test so that
students who did not want to be included could return an
uncompleted protocol. But the proposal contained no provision for
student consent, and no data were to be provided from which
students could make an informed choice about participating. 413
Of the many constitutional challenges Mrs. Merriken made the
court entertained seriously only the one based on privacy.414 It found
that the highly personal nature of the questionnaire disrupted
family associations and interfered with the right of the mother to
rear her child. It stated that there "is probably no more private a
relationship, excepting marriage, which the Constitution safeguards
than that between parent and child. This Court can look upon any
invasion of that relationship as a direct violation of one's
Constitutional right to privacy. '41 5 Although there was no Supreme
Court precedent, the district court declared that privacy was entitled
to as much constitutional protection as free speech. But who
possessed this right - the student, the parents, or both? Although
the court seemed ready to answer that question when it declared that
"the fact that students are juveniles does not in any way invalidate
their right to assert their Constitutional right to privacy," 416 it
avoided reaching the question whether the lack of consent by
413. Id. at 914-15.
414. The plaintiffs claimed that the CPI Program would violate freedom of
religion, speech, assembly, and the privilege against self-incrimination, as well as the
right to privacy. Id. at 917.
415. Id. at 918.
416. Id.
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children to the invasion of their privacy would be sufficient to
invalidate the research:
In the case at Bar, the children are never given the opportunity
to consent to invasion of their privacy, only the opportunity to
refuse to consent by returning a blank questionnaire. Whether
this procedure is Constitutional is questionable, but the Court
does not have to face that issue because the facts presented show
that the parents could not have been properly informed about
the CPI Program and as a result could not have given informed
consent for their children to take the CPI Test.417
The court evaded two important issues: whether the failure to
secure the child's consent was independently sufficient to discredit
constitutionally the program and whether parents as guardians
could waive their children's constitutional rights by consenting for
them. Instead, the court concentrated on Mrs. Merriken's own right
of privacy and found that she was unable to give genuinely informed
consent to the invasion of her personal life because the parental
permission letter was so inadequate. The court deridingly compared
the letter to a Book-of-the-Month Club solicitation in which a
recipient's silence could be construed as agreement. 418 The letter was
also criticized because it was a selling device that convinced parents
to allow children to participate, not, as it properly should have been,
an objective document telling parents of the potentially negative
features and dangerous aspects of the program. The court then
admonished school officials:
The parents are not aware of the consequences [of participating]
and there is no substitute for candor and honesty in fact,
particularly by the school board who, as the ultimate decision
maker as far as the education of our children is concerned,
should give our citizenry a more forthright approach. The
attempt to make the letter requesting consent similar to a
promotional inducement to buy, lacks the necessary substance to
give a parent the opportunity to give knowing, intelligent, and
aware consent.419
Persons may, of course, waive their constitutional rights, but it
is fundamental that such waivers must be voluntary, knowing,
417. Id. at 919.
418. Id. at 914.
419. Id. at 920.
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intelligent, and made with awareness of possible adverse consequen-
ces.42° Mrs. Merriken had the right to waive her right of privacy by
consenting to the research and intervention program, but because
the request was little more than huckstering, it lacked the necessary
substance to afford her the opportunity to consent meaningfully to
the examination of her personal life.
There were other problems with the program. The promotional
letter promised confidentiality, but the program contemplated the
development of a "massive data bank"421 and the dissemination of
data relating to specific, identifiable students to school superintend-
ents, principals, guidance counselors, coaches, social workers, PTA
members, and school board members. And, even if the school system
had been more circumspect and had constructed means by which the
data were less widely distributed (or not distributed at all), no
promise of confidentiality could take precedence over a subpoena
compelling the disclosure of the material to law enforcement
officials. As the court warned,
[Tihere is no assurance that should an enterprising district
attorney convene a special grand jury to investigate the drug
problem in Montgomery County, the records of the CPI Program
would remain inviolate from subpoenas and that he could not
determine the identity of children who have been labeled by the
CPI Program as potential drug abusers. 422
Parents were not at all informed of this possibility.
Compounding the other problems was the fact that the
identification instruments did not possess enough psychometric
soundness to overcome the hazards that may have flowed from their
use. While there could have been considerable harm done to children
correctly identified, the court was particularly concerned about those
children incorrectly identified. In a statement that should raise the
anxiety level of psychologists, it said, "When a program talks about
labeling someone as a particular type and such a label could remain
with him for the remainder of his life, the margin of error must be
almost nil. '423 The court acknowledged that if the program had
420. E.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1971); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S.
742 (1970).
421. 364 F. Supp. at 916.
422. Id.
423. Id. at 920.
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demonstrated adequate public need and had restricted itself to a
minimal invasion of privacy, it might have passed constitutional
scrutiny. But, after studying all of the evidence, the court struck the
balance in favor of the individual:
[T]he reasons for this are that the test itself and the surrounding
results of that test are not sufficiently presented to both the child
and the parents, as well as the Court, as to its authenticity and
credibility in fighting the drug problem in this country. There is
too much of a chance that the wrong people for the wrong
reasons will be singled out and counselled in the wrong
manner.
424
ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH ACCESS TO RECORDS
In the past test protocols - questions and answer sheets - were
guarded by publishers and administrators to prevent public
disclosure. Members of the American Psychological Association
(APA) could have been expelled from the organization or suffered a
lesser sanction if they violated the APA Code of Ethics provision
that limits access to psychological tests and other assessment
devices to "persons with professional interests who will safeguard
their use. ' 425 Recently, however, test materials have become more
accessible to examinees, in part because of the Family Education
Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), perhaps better known as the
"Buckley Amendment." 426
FERPA provides in part that educational institutions receiving
federal funds under any program administered by the United States
Office of Education must allow parents access to records directly
related to their children and an opportunity to challenge those
records at a hearing.427 Portions of FERPA428 were incorporated in
Public Law 94-142 to provide parents of handicapped children with
the right to inspect and review all education records pertaining to
424. Id. at 921.
425. Am. Psychol. Ass'n, Ethical Standards of Psychologists, 18 AM. PSYCH. 56, 59
(1963).
426. In 1974 Senator James Buckley offered an amendment to Part C of the
General Education Provisions Act (title V of Public Law 93-380), which passed with
little debate. Its consequences were not fully realized until later. Pub. L. No. 93-380,
§ 513, 88 Stat. 571 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1978)), amended by Family Education
Rights and Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 93-568, § 2(a), 88 Stat. 1858 (1978).
427. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(1)(A) (1978).
428. The basic provisions of FERPA are more fully developed in the implementing
regulations. 45 C.F.R. § 99.1-.67 (1978).
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the identification, evaluation, and placement of their children in
special classes. 42
9
Whether test protocols themselves are accessible under these
laws is not yet clear. Education records are defined by FERPA
regulations as documents directly related to a student and main-
tained by an educational agency or institution or by a party acting
for it. 4 - ° Thus, while they may not necessarily bear on education, the
records may include, for example, psychiatric and psychological
reports received from other agencies. They certainly would include
documents created by education agency employees such as the
school psychologist. However, excluded from the definition of a
record are papers "in the sole possession of the maker thereof, and
. . . not accessible or revealed to any other individual .... ,431
Although protocols themselves are usually not shown by the test
administrator to anyone else, information from them usually is.
Most often the only tangible shared evidence of a psychological
assessment is the report that follows testing. Psychologists usually
attend a case conference of school personnel to discuss diagnoses
and recommendations for placement, at which they disclose the
results of testing and give examples of responses. 432 Even if
psychologists maintain the individual test records and responses in
their offices, if the information from them is communicated orally to
others attending the case conferences, it would seem that protocols
can be considered records because they have been "revealed" to
others. As such, they are accessible under FERPA. Such an
interpretation is supported by the statement issued by Senators
Buckley and Pell, joint sponsors of FERPA: "[I]f a child has been
labeled mentally or otherwise retarded and put aside in a special
class or school, parents would be able to review materials in the
record which led to this institutional decision . . . to see whether
these materials contain inaccurate or erroneous evaluations about
their child. ' 433 Section 121a.562 of the regulations implementing
Public Law 94-142 requires that schools permit parents to inspect
and review their children's records collected, maintained, and used
by the education agency in its special education decisionmaking. 434
429. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(A) (1978); 45 C.F.R. § 121a.502 (1977); id. § 121a.562-.569.
430. 45 C.F.R. § 99.3 (1978).
431. Id. § 99.3(b)(1).
432. See, e.g., Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 1211, 1238 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
433. Joint Statement in Explanation of Buckley/Pell Amendment, 120 CONG. REC.
39862 (1974), reprinted in 40 Fed. Reg. 1213 (1975).
434. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.562(a) (1977).
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Psychologists' tests and test results are almost always used in this
process and thus should be accessible.
The accountability inherent in the complaint procedures under
Public Law 94-142 makes disclosure of test questions possible in
another way. It can be anticipated that attorneys representing
parents (or the school system if parents introduce the results of an
independent evaluation)435 will not simply accept at face value the
interpretations of test results presented in psychologists' reports.
Under cross-examination psychologists very likely will be asked for
the factual bases underlying their conclusions. For example, if a
psychologist testifies that part of the evidence substantiating a
diagnosis of mental retardation is a scale score of five on the
Information subtest of the WISC-R,436 a knowledgeable cross-
examiner will inquire as to the student's separate responses in an
attempt to cast doubt that those responses were the kind given by
genuinely retarded children, but were more like those of a culturally
different child with normal intelligence. In such an examination the
questions would have to be revealed. Psychologists refusing to
comply with the request could severely damage the position of the
party for whem they are testifying, since the hearing examiner
would be denied access to information useful in arriving at a
decision. Perhaps recognizing the potential harm to clients if
psychologists refuse to testify, the APA revised its Code of Ethics
and now simply cautions against "imparting unnecessary informa-
tion which would compromise test security" but permits psycholo-
gists to "provide requested information that explains the basis for
decisions that may adversely affect person[s examined]. ' 437
A case recently decided by the Supreme Court, Detroit Edison
Co. v. NLRB, 438 is relevant to the question whether examinees may
have access to test stimuli and their responses but does not offer any
clear-cut answer. In that case a union alleged that employees at
Detroit Edison were wrongfully denied promotion after taking
435. Under Public Law 94-142 parents have the right to obtain an independent
psychoeducational evaluation of their children and to present their results at
hearings. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(A) (1978); 45 C.F.R. § 121a.503 (1977).
436. The Information subtest asks several questions allegedly representing
common knowledge. On it, and on all subtests, the average scale score (derived from
raw scores) is 10. A scale score of five is significantly below average.
437. Am. Psychol. Ass'n, Revised Ethical Standards, 8 APA MONITOR 22 (March
1977). The Code of Ethics also mandates that "psychologists remain abreast of
relevant federal, state, local and agency regulations . .. concerning the conduct of
their practice." Id.
438. 440 U.S. 301 (1979), vacating and remanding 560 F.2d 722 (6th Cir. 1977).
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required aptitude tests. Citing a provision of the National Labor
Relations Act,439 the union requested copies of the examinations, as
well as the answers and scores of the applicants. The company
supplied only sample questions, descriptive literature, and validation
studies, arguing that any greater disclosure would render the test
unusable, would compromise the confidentiality of the employees,
and would be a breach of the psychologists' code of ethics.440 The
administrative law judge who first heard the case agreed that the
tests were relevant to the union's grievance but, concluding that the
union officials would be unable to evaluate them, permitted access
contingent on their being disclosed only through an industrial
psychologist selected by the union. He also forbade the copying of
the tests and their disclosure to third parties.441 However, he did
order that test scores be given directly to the union. On review, the
NLRB affirmed the decision in principle but amended it to allow the
tests and scores to be given directly to the union. The Sixth Circuit
affirmed the Board's decision and dismissed contentions by the APA
in an amicus brief supporting the company that disclosure of the
tests would ignore the interests of the present and future examinees
as well as psychologists:
[T]he principles which underlie the National Labor Relations
Act are paramount in this case. Detroit Edison cannot rely upon
an asserted privilege [confidentiality] which is personal to the
employees who took the examination, and we are not informed
as to any rule of law under which the professional code of the
American Psychological Association can stand as a barrier to
the right of a duly chosen and certified collective bargaining
representative to receive information of use to it in carrying out
its duties and responsibilities. The Board showed its considera-
tion for the expressed concerns of the company and the
Psychological Association by adopting the limitations on use of
the material recommended by the administrative law judge. 442
The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's decision, holding
that the lower court's approval of the NLRB's order requiring Detroit
439. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976). This section creates a duty of employers to
respond to requests by employees' bargaining agents for relevant and necessary
information.
440. 440 U.S. at 307-08, 317.
441. Id. at 309-10.
442. 500 F.2d 722, 726-27 (6th Cir. 1977). For a critique of the decision, see
Comment, Psychological Aptitude Tests and the Duty to Supply Information, 91
HARV. L. REV. 869 (1978).
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Edison "to turn over the test battery and answer sheets directly to
the Union" 443 and "unconditionally to disclose the employee
scores"444 was erroneous. The Court found that the NLRB's remedies
for handling employees' grievances did not adequately protect test
security:
The finding by the Board that this concern did not outweigh the
Union's interest in exploring the fairness of the Company's
criteria for promotion did not carry with it any suggestion that
the concern itself was not legitimate and substantial. Indeed, on
this record - which has established the Company's freedom
under the collective contract to use aptitude tests as a criterion
for promotion, the empirical validity of the tests, and the
relationship between secrecy and test validity - the strength of
the Company's concern has been abundantly demonstrated. 445
The Court's ruling that direct disclosure of test scores to the union
was inappropriate was based entirely on its desire to protect the
rights of individual employees. It noted the contention that breach of
the APA's code of professional ethics was an adequate ground for
refusing to disclose test scores and the Board position that "the
federal statutory duty to disclose relevant information cannot be
defeated by the ethical standards of a private group. ' 446 Given the
importance to the employees of the confidentiality of sensitive
information,447 and the minimal burden placed on the union by
having to obtain consent, the Court held that Detroit Edison's
resistance to disclosure of individual test results did not violate its
duty to bargain in good faith.448
The application of Detroit Edison to school systems is limited by
the fact that the decision was grounded in a specific statutory
provision in a field in which the government and the courts have
long been involved. Whether its rationale is applicable in the
educational setting is unclear. There seems to be no barrier to
parents' having access to their children's test scores under either the
Buckley Amendment or Public Law 94-142. The Supreme Court's
443. 440 U.S. at 317.
444. Id. at 320.
445. Id. at 315 (footnote omitted).
446. Id. at 317.
447. The Court cited a number of federal and state statutes, the Buckley
Amendment among them, recognizing the legislative concern for individual privacy.
Id. at 318 n.16.
448. Id. at 320.
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only concern in Detroit Edison in this regard was the lack of consent
on the part of employees to the union's receipt of their test scores.
Obviously, if parents request test results, there is no risk of an
invasion of privacy.
The question remains whether parents may obtain the
protocols. In Lora v. Board of Education,449 the court declared that
"failure to provide parents with clinical records upon which re-
commendations for special . . .placement are made"4  would be a
violation of due process because parents would be unable to prepare
for a hearing to contest placement without them. Unfortunately, the
court did not clarify what it meant by the term "clinical records." An
important development in New York may have some bearing on the
issue, however. Governor Carey recently signed a bill requiring
testing services to make standardized admissions tests for post-
secondary and professional schools available to examinees. The
statute permits students to see their graded tests and their correct
answers. 451 The law was passed despite protests from Educational
449. 456 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
450. Id. at 1278.
451. Amendment to art. 7-A of N.Y. EDUC. LAw (July 14, 1979). See N.Y. Times,
July 15, 1979, at 1, col. 1; Pecoraro, SAT's? They're an Open Book Now in New York
State, Baltimore Sun, July 29, 1979, § K, at 2, col. 1. The bill went into effect Jan. 1,
1980. In the same month a federal district court issued a preliminary injunction,
preventing the state from enforcing this law with regard to medical college entrance
examinations. Association of Am. Medical Colleges v. Carey, No. 79-CV-730
(N.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 1980). Cf. Lavash v. Kountze, 604 F.2d 103 (1st Cir. 1979) (denial of
access to multiple choice employment test does not deny applicant's equal protection
or due process rights).
Other so-called "Truth in Testing" legislation has been introduced in
Texas, Florida, Maryland, and California. Representative Harrington introduced a
bill in the 95th Congress that would have provided that any educational institution
receiving federal financial assistance must provide copies of standardized tests
administered to at least 10,000 individuals and the correct answers to any examinee
requesting them in writing. It would have also prevented release of test scores without
written permission of the examinee and required that release of test scores be
accompanied by a statement indicating that they were only approximations of the
true score. H.R. 6776, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). Because of problems in its language,
Rep. Harrington later withdrew the bill. Two new bills have been introduced in the
first session of the 96th Congress. H.R. 3564 would affect educational tests used for
admission to postsecondary institutions and for employment. Each testee would be
provided a written description of what the test was designed to measure, the
reliability (margin of error) of the test, and the manner in which test results would be
distributed. It does not explicitly provide for access to the test questions themselves.
H.R. 4949 is modeled on the New York legislation. It provides that upon request test
subjects may receive a copy of the test questions used in determining test scores, their
answers, and the correct answers. The bill would apply to all standardized tests used
for post-secondary school admissions administered to more than 5,000 test subjects
each year.
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Testing Service, the College Entrance Evaluation Board, and college
administrators that the statute would violate test security, increase
administrative costs, reduce services to handicapped persons, and
disadvantage minorities. Although the statute does not affect public
school tests used for special education placement, the passage of
such legislation may serve as a useful precedent for access to test
protocols by parents for such purposes.
CONCLUSION
Fifteen years ago two prescient scholars stated, "It requires no
Cassandra to predict lawsuits by parents, and a spate of restrictive
legislation, if those who administer. . . tests in schools - even for
the most legitimate of scientific purposes - do not show a sensitive
appreciation for both individual and group claims to a private
personality." 452 Their only error was in failing to divine all the
causes for the litigation and legislation that they so accurately
predicted. While concern for privacy did stimulate such suits as
Merriken and such statutes as the Buckley Amendment, it was the
perversion of psychological tests as instruments of segregation and
discrimination that led to the case and statutory law that this
Article has surveyed. The ineluctable conclusion is that psychologi-
cal testing - now banned, condemned, and regulated - would have
survived with its reputation relatively unscathed had it not been
used both intentionally and inadvertently to perpetuate racial
separation, stereotyping, and stigmatization.
An often repeated rejoinder to criticisms of psychological testing
has been that it is not the instruments but the users who have
brought about the current state of affairs. While such a defense
serves to deflect attention from genuine flaws in the tests them-
selves, there is truth in it. It is the use of tests that courts enjoin, but
it is the testers and their employers who are sued. It was the failure
of psychologists to question their role, to scrutinize the psychometric
soundness of their instruments, and to test the validity of their
interpretations that resulted in misclassification and miseducation
and the injuries that flowed therefrom to significant numbers of
children of all racial and cultural backgrounds. The consequence has
been the imposition of a number of well-meaning but unrealistic and
often impossible restrictions on the use of psychological tests.
There are at least three benefits, however, from the increased
involvement of courts and legislatures in psychologists' testing
452. Reubhausen & Brim, Privacy and Behavioral Research, 65 COLUM. L. REV.
1184, 1194 (1965).
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practices. First, it has made the profession, as well as society
generally, more sensitive to racial and cultural differences and to
how apparently innocent and benign practices may perpetuate
discrimination. Second, it has alerted psychologists and other
mental health professionals to the fact that they will be held
responsible for their conduct. Because of the accountability mech-
anisms now inherent in the procedural protections afforded handi-
capped children and their parents, psychologists who work in school
settings find that they cannot view themselves only as passive
recipients of orders from their supervisors. To protect the rights of
their clients, to safeguard their own integrity, and, in the long run, to
serve the asserted ends of their employers to educate students
effectively, they must examine their practices, their interpretations,
and their ultimate recommendations. Finally, the attack on
psychological testing has accelerated the search for alternative
means of assessment so that what is said about children is a more
valid, truer depiction of how they perceive themselves and how they
function in all spheres of life. In this light, the intense and searching
examination that psychological testing has received from the legal
system should be viewed as both salutary and welcome.
